

A N
E S S A Y

O N T H E

N A T U R E *and* C O N D U C T

O F T H E

Passions and Affections.

With ILLUSTRATIONS on the

M O R A L S E N S E.

B Y T H E

Author of the *Inquiry into the Original of
our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.*

Hoc opus, hoc studium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patriæ volumus, si nobis vivere chari. H O R.

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
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M.DCC.XXX.



THE
PREFACE.

ALTHO the main *practical Principles*, which are inculcated in this Treatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fear that renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well manag'd, may be look'd upon as *superfluous*; especially since little is offer'd upon them which has not often been well said before. But

beside that general Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such a Light by one, as will convince those who were not moved by them, even when better express'd by another; since, for every Class of *Writers*, there are Classes of *Readers* adapted, who cannot relish any thing higher: Besides this, I say, the very *Novelty* of a Book may procure a little Attention, from those who over-look the Writings which the World has long enjoy'd. And if by *Curiosity*, or any other means, some few can be engag'd to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects, about which a little *Reflection* will discover the Truth, and a thorow *Consideration* of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness; no Person need be asham'd of his Labours as useless, which do such Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.

The P R E F A C E.

V

I F any should look upon some Things in this *Inquiry into the Passions*, as too subtile for common Apprehension, and consequently not necessary for the Instruction of Men in *Morals*, which are the common business of Mankind : Let them consider, that the Difficulty on these Subjects arises chiefly from some *previous Notions*, equally difficult at least, which have been already receiv'd, to the great Detriment of many a *Natural Temper*; since many have been discourag'd from all Attempts of cultivating *kind generous Affections* in themselves, by a previous Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only *Disimulation, Affectation*, or at best some *unnatural Enthusiasm*. And farther, that to discover Truth on these Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little *Attention to what passes in our own Hearts*,

and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.

W H A T E V E R Confusion the *Schoolmen* introduced into Philosophy, some of their keenest *Adversaries* seem to threaten it with a worse kind of Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most *immediate simple Perceptions*, and to explain all *Approbation*, *Condemnation*, *Pleasure* and *Pain*, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the *External Senses*. In like manner they have treated our *Desires* or *Affections*, making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceed from *Self-Love*, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers.

LE T

LET this also still be remembered that the *natural Dispositions* of Mankind will operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them, nor form'd just Notions about them. Many are really *virtuous* who cannot explain what *Virtue* is. Some act a most generous disinterested Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by *Self-Love*, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in *Opticks*, contrary Accounts have been given of *Hearing*, *voluntary Motion*, *Digestion*, and other *natural Actions*. But the Powers themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the same manner our *moral Actions* and *Affections* may be in good order, when our Opini-

ons are quite wrong about them. *True Opinions* however, about both, may enable us to *improve* our natural Powers, and to *rectify* accidental Disorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must certainly be attended with as much *Pleasure* as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.

IT may perhaps seem strange, that when in this *Treatise* Virtue is suppos'd *disinterested*; yet so much Pains is taken, by a *Comparison* of our several *Pleasures*, to prove the *Pleasures* of *Virtue* to be the greatest we are capable of, and that consequently it is our truest *Interest* to be *virtuous*. But let it be remember'd here, that tho there can be no *Motives* or *Arguments* suggested which can directly raise any *ultimate Desire*, such as that of our *own Happiness*, or *publick Affections* (as we attempt to prove in *Treatise IV*;) yet

yet if both are *natural Dispositions* of our Minds, and nothing can stop the Operation of *publick Affections* but some *selfish Interest*, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them prevalent in our Lives, must be to remove these *Opinions of opposite Interests*, and to shew a superior Interest on their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, a *natural Disposition* can scarce fail to exert it self to the full.

IN this *Essay on the Passions*, the Proofs and Illustrations of a *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour* are not mention'd ; because they are so, in the *Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil*, in the first and fifth *Sections*. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all *Proofs* in such Matters would be needless.

SOME strange Love of *Simplicity* in the Structure of human Nature, or Attachment to some favourite *Hypothesis*, has engag'd many *Writers* to pass over a great many *simple Perceptions*, which we may find in our selves. We have got the Number *Five* fixed for our *external Senses*, tho *Seven* or *Ten* might as easily be defended. We have Multitudes of Perceptions which have no relation to any *external Sensation*; if by it we mean *Perceptions*, occasion'd by *Motions* or *Impressions* made on our *Bodies*; such as the Ideas of *Number*, *Duration*, *Proportion*, *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Pleasures of Honour*, of *Congratulation*; the *Pains of Remorse*, *Shame*, *Sympathy*, and many others. It were to be wish'd, that those who are at such Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that "all Ideas arise from Sensation and Reflection," had so explain'd

plain'd themselves, that none should take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either *external Sensations*, or *reflex Acts* upon *external Sensations*: Or if by *Reflection* they mean an *inward Power of Perception*, as I fancy they do, they had as carefully examin'd into the several kinds of *internal Perceptions*, as they have done into the *external Sensations*: that we might have seen whether the former be not as *natural* and *necessary* as the latter. Had they in like manner consider'd our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, tho perhaps not so strong as *Self-Love*.

THE Author hopes this imperfect *Essay* will be favourably receiv'd,

ceiv'd, till some Person of greater Abilities and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Dispositions* of Mankind; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be form'd, than any which has yet appear'd: and hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the human Temper, may be of some little use towards this great End.

THE principal Objections offer'd by Mr. *Clarke* of *Hull*, against the second Section of the second *Treatise*, occur'd to the Author in Conversation, and had appriz'd him of the necessity of a farther illustration of *disinterested Affections*, in answer to his Scheme of deducing them from *Self-Love*, which seem'd more ingenious than any which the Author of the *Inquiry* ever yet saw in print. He takes better from Mr. *Clarke*, all other

other Parts of his Treatment, than the raising such an Outcry against him as *injurious to Christianity*, for Principles which some of the most *zealous Christians* have publicly maintain'd: He hopes Mr. *Clarke* will be satisfy'd upon this Point, as well as about the Scheme of *disinterested Affections*, by what is offer'd in the Treatise on the *Passions*, Sect. I. and designedly placed here, rather than in any distinct *Reply*, both to avoid the disagreeable Work of *Answering* or *Remarking* upon Books, wherein it is hard to keep off too keen and offensive Expressions; and also, that those who have had any of the former Editions of the Inquiry, might not be at a loss about any *Illustrations* or additional *Proofs* necessary to complete the Scheme.

THE last Treatise had never seen the Light, had not some worthy
Gen-

Gentlemen mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledg'd to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several *Schemes* of accounting for our *moral Ideas*, which some apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that *Sense* which the Author attempts to establish. The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these *Schemes* must necessarily presuppose this *moral Sense*, and be resolv'd into it: Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon the Foundation of a moral Sense; tho what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the Terms much used on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great *variety of Terms*, and diversity of *Schemes* invented, that all Men *feel* something in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which
yet

yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of a small Number of *Senses*, so that we are unwilling to have recourse in our Theories to any more ; and rather strain out some Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to some other natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledg'd. The like difficulty attends several other *Perceptions*, to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned their *distinct Senses*; such as *natural Beauty, Harmony*, the Perfection of *Poetry, Architecture, Designing*, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, or Fancy: The Explications or Theories on these Subjects are in like manner full of Confusion and Metaphor.

To define *Virtue* by *agreeableness to this moral Sense*, or describing it to be *kind Affection*, may
appear

appear perhaps too uncertain ; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by *Custom, Habits*, false Opinions, Company : and that some *particular kind Passions* toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that “ every
“ one calls that Temper, or those
“ Actions *virtuous*, which are approved by his *own Sense* ;” and withal, that “ abstracting from particular Habits or Prejudices, every
“ one is so constituted as to approve
“ every *particular kind Affection*
“ toward any one, which argues no
“ want of *Affection* toward others.
“ And constantly to approve that
“ Temper which desires, and those
“ Actions which tend to procure
“ the greatest Moment of Good in
“ the Power of the Agent toward
“ the

The P R E F A C E. xvii

“ the most extensive System to
“ which it can reach ; ” and con-
sequently, that the Perfection of
Virtue consists in “ having the *uni-*
“ *versal calm Benevolence*, the pre-
“ valent Affection of the Mind, so
“ as to limit and counteract not on-
“ ly the *selfish Passions*, but even
“ the *particular kind Affections*. ”

OUR *moral Sense* shews this to
be the highest Perfection of our
Nature ; what we may see to be
the *End or Design* of such a Structure,
and consequently what is requir'd of
us by the Author of our Nature :
and therefore if any one like these
Descriptions better, he may call
Virtue, with many of the Antients,
“ *Vita secundum naturam* ; ” or
“ acting according to what we
“ may see from the Constitution
“ of our Nature, we were in-
“ tended for by our Creator. ”

I F this *Moral Sense* were once set in a convincing Light, those vain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish: alledging, that whatever we admire or honour in a *moral Species*, is the effect of *Art, Education, Custom, Policy*, or subtle Views of Interest; we should then acknowledge

*Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri
gignimur.* Perf.

'TIS true, a *Power of Reasoning* is natural to us; and we must own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our Actions, are, if not to be called *Natural*, an *Improvement upon our Nature*: yet if Virtue be look'd upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suspensions against it; as if indeed
it

it might tend to the greater Interest of *large Bodies* or *Societies* of Men, or to that of their *Governors*; whereas a private Person may better find his *Interest*, or enjoy greater Pleasures in the Practices counted *vicious*, especially if he has any Probability of *Secrecy* in them. These Suspicions must be entirely remov'd, if we have a *moral Sense* and *publick Affections*, whose Gratifications are constituted by Nature, our most intense and durable *Pleasures*.

I HOPE it is a good Omen of something still better on this Subject to be expected in the learned World, that Mr. *Butler*, in his Sermons at the *Rolls Chapel*, has done so much Justice to the wise and good Order of our Nature; that the Gentlemen, who have oppos'd some other Sentiments of the Author of the *Inquiry*, seem convinc'd of a *mo-*
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ral Sense. Some of them have by a Mistake made a Compliment to the Author, which does not belong to him ; as if the World were any way indebted to him for this Discovery. He has too often met with the *Sensus Decori & Honesti*, and with the *ἀναισθησία*, to assume any such thing to himself.

SOME Letters in the *London Journals*, subscribed *Philaretus*, gave the first Occasion to the *Fourth Treatise* ; the Answers given to them bore too visible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the *Author* declined to continue the Debate that way ; chusing to send a private Letter to *Philaretus*, to desire a more private Correspondence on the Subject of our Debate. I have been since informed, that his Death disappointed my great Expectations from
so

so ingenious a Correspondent. The *Objections* proposed in the first *Section* of *Treatise* IV, are not always those of *Philaretus*, tho I have endeavour'd to leave no *Objections* of his unanswer'd; but I also interspersed whatever *Objections* occur'd to me in *Conversation* on these *Subjects*. I hope I have not used any *Expressions* inconsistent with the high *Regard* I have for the *Memory* of so ingenious a *Gentleman*, and of such *Distinction* in the *World*.

THE last *Section* of the *Fourth Treatise*, was occasion'd by a private *Letter* from a *Person* of the most real *Merit*, in *Glasgow*; representing to me some *Sentiments* not uncommon among good *Men*, which might prejudice them against any *Scheme* of *Morals*, not wholly founded upon *Piety*. This *Point* is, I hope, so treated, as to remove the *Difficulty*.

THE

THE Deference due to a Person, who has appear'd so much in the learned World, as M. *Le Clerc*, would seem to require, that I should make some Defense against, or Submission to, the Remarks he makes in his *Bibliothèque Ancienne & Moderne*. But I cannot but conclude from his Abstract, especially from that of the *last Section* of the *Inquiry*, either that I don't understand his *French*, or he my *English*, or that he has never read more than the Titles of some of the *Sections*: and if any one of the three be the Case, we are not fit for a Controversy.

IN the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into *Beauty* is called *Treatise I*. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is *Treatise II*. The Essay on the Passions, *Treatise III*. And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, *Treatise IV*. THE

T H E
C O N T E N T S.

T R E A T I S E I.

*An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of
the Passions.*

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A N

A N

E S S A Y

O N T H E

N A T U R E *and* C O N D U C T

O F T H E

P A S S I O N S.

S E C T. I.

A general Account of our several
 S E N S E S *and* D E S I R E S, Selfish
 or Publick.

T H E Nature of human A C T I O N S
 cannot be sufficiently under-
 stood without considering the
Affections and Passions; or
 those *Modifications, or Actions of the*
Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of
certain Objects or Events, in which the
Mind generally conceives Good or Evil.

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Sect. 1. In this Inquiry we need little *Reasoning*, or *Argument*, since Certainty is only attainable by distinct *Attention* to what we are *conscious* happens in our Minds.

Art. I. "OBJECTS, Actions, or Events
 " obtain the Name of *Good*, or *Evil*, ac-
 " cording as they are the Causes, or Occa-
 " sions, mediately, or immediately, of
 " a grateful, or ungrateful *Perception*
 " to some sensitive Nature." To under-
 stand therefore the several Kinds of *Good*,
 or *Evil*, we must apprehend the several
Senses natural to us.

THERE seems to be some *Sense* or other
 suited to every sort of Objects which oc-
 curs to us, by which we receive either
Pleasure, or *Pain* from a great part of
 them, as well as some *Image*, or *Appre-
 hension* of them: Nay, sometimes our only
Idea is a *Perception* of *Pleasure*, or *Pain*.
 The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are some-
 times *simple*, without any other previous
Idea, or any *Image*, or other concomitant
Ideas, save those of *Extension*, or of *Du-
 ration*; one of which accompanies every
Perception, whether of *Sense*, or *inward
 Consciousness*. Other Pleasures arise only
 upon some *previous Idea*, or *Assemblage*,
 or *Comparison* of *Ideas*. These Pleasures,
 presupposing previous *Ideas*, were called
Perceptions of an *internal Sense*, in a for-


of the PASSIONS.

3

mer Treatise *. Thus *Regularity* and *Uniformity* in Figures, are no less grateful than *Tastes*, or *Smells*; the *Harmony* of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds †. In like

* INQUIRY into BEAUTY.

† It is not easy to divide distinctly our several *Sensations* into Classes. The Division of our *External Senses* into the five common Classes, is ridiculously imperfect. Some *Sensations*, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the *Sensations* of *Hunger*, *Thirst*, *Weariness*, *Sickness*; or if we reduce them to the Sense of *Feeling*, they are *Perceptions* as different from the other *Ideas* of *Touch*, such as *Cold*, *Heat*, *Hardness*, *Softness*, as the *Ideas* of *Taste* or *Smell*. Others have hinted at an *External Sense* different from all of these. The following general Account may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain *Motions* raised in our Bodies are by a *general Law* constituted the *Occasion* of *Perceptions* in the Mind. (2.) These *Perceptions* never come entirely alone, but have some other *Perception* joined with them. Thus every *Sensation* is accompanied with the *Idea* of *Duration*, and yet *Duration* is not a sensible *Idea*, since it also accompanies *Ideas* of *Internal Consciousness* or *Reflection*: So the *Idea* of *Number* may accompany any sensible *Ideas*, and yet may also accompany any other *Ideas*, as well as external *Sensations*. (3.) Some *Ideas* are found accompanying the most different *Sensations*, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible *Quality*; such are *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, and *Rest*, which accompany the *Ideas* of *Sight*, or *Colours*, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the *Ideas* of *Touch*, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, or *Rest* seem therefore to be more properly called *Ideas accompanying* the *Sensations* of *Sight* and *Touch*, than the *Sensations* of either of these Senses. The *Perceptions* which are purely sensible, received each by its proper Sense, are *Tastes*, *Smells*, *colours*, *Sound*, *Cold*, *Heat*, &c. The universal *Concomitant Ideas* which may attend any *Idea* whatsoever, are *Duration*, and *Number*. The *Ideas* which accompany the most different *Sensations*, are *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*. These all arise without any previous *Ideas* assembled, or compared:


 Sect. 1. like manner, *Affections, Tempers, Sentiments*, or *Actions*, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant *Occasions* of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call *Approbation*, or *Dislike*. These *Moral Perceptions* arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our *previous Opinion* or *Apprehension* of the *Affection, Temper, or Intention* of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

IF we may call every *Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain*, A SENSE, we shall find many other *Senses* beside those commonly explained. Tho it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will shew that there are such *Natural*

the Concomitant *Ideas* are reputed Images of something External.

From all these we may justly distinguish “ the Pleasures
 “ perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparison of
 “ various sensible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas,
 “ or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Re-
 “ semblance among them.” These are meant by *the Perceptions of the internal Sense*.

Powers

of the PASSIONS.

5

Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Sect. 1. Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the *External Senses*, universally known. In the 2d, the *Pleasant Perceptions* arising from *regular, harmonious, uniform* Objects; as also from *Grandeur* and *Novelty*. These we may call, after Mr. ADDISON, the Pleasures of the *Imagination*; or we may call the Power of receiving them, an *Internal Sense*. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a *Publick Sense*, viz. "our Determination " to be pleased with the *Happiness* of others, and to be uneasy at their *Misery*." This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called *Κοινωνικὴ αἴσθησις*, or *Sensus Communis* by some of the Antients. 4. The fourth Class we may call the *Moral Sense*, by which "we perceive *Virtue*, or *Vice* in our selves, or others." This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon *Virtue*, or *Vice* in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in *Natural Affection*, *Compassion*, *Friendship*, or even general *Benevolence* to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own *Virtue*." 5. The fifth

Sect. 1. Class is a *Sense of Honour*, “ which makes
 “ the *Approbation*, or *Gratitude* of others,
 “ for any good Actions we have done, the
 “ necessary occasion of Pleasure ; and their
 “ *Dislike*, *Condemnation*, or *Resentment*
 “ of Injuries done by us, the occasion of
 “ that uneasy Sensation called *Shame*, even
 “ when we fear no further evil from them.”

THERE are perhaps other *Perceptions* distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “ of *Decency*, *Dignity*, *Suitableness* to
 “ *human Nature* in certain Actions and Circumstances ; and of an *Indecency*, *Mean-ness*, and *Unworthiness*, in the contrary
 “ Actions or Circumstances, even without
 “ any conception of *Moral Good*, or *Evil*.” Thus the Pleasures of *Sight*, and *Hearing*, are more esteemed than those of *Taste* or *Touch* : The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. *Plato* * accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of *Innocence* in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their *Innocence*, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another *Class of Sensations*.

* *Hippias Major*. See also *Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

II. DESIRES arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our *selves* or *others* the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of *sensual Pleasure*, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the *Pleasures of Imagination* or Internal Sense*, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from *Publick Happiness*, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the *Misery of others*. 4. Desires of *Virtue*, and Aversion to *Vice*, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of *Honour*, and *Aversion* to Shame †.

THE third Class of *Publick Desires* contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the *Happiness of others*, or the removal of Misery; such as those of *Gratitude*, Com-

* See Treat. 1.

† See Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art 3—8.

Sect. I. *passion, Natural Affection, Friendship, or*
 ~~~~~ the more extensive calm *Desire of the uni-*  
*versal Good* of all sensitive Natures, which  
 our moral Sense approves as the Perfection  
 of Virtue, even when it limits, and coun-  
 teracts the narrower Attachments of Love.

*Secondary  
 Desires of  
 Wealth &  
 Power.*

Now since we are capable of *Reflection*,  
*Memory, Observation, and Reasoning* a-  
 bout the distant Tendencies of Objects and  
 Actions, and not confined to things pre-  
 sent, there must arise, in consequence of  
 our *original Desires*, "*secondary Desires*  
 " of every thing imagined useful to gratify  
 " any of the primary Desires, with strength  
 " proportioned to the several original De-  
 " sires, and the imagined Usefulness, or  
 " Necessity, of the advantageous Object."  
 Hence it is that as soon as we come to ap-  
 prehend the Use of *Wealth* or *Power* to  
 gratify any of our original Desires, we must  
 also desire them. Hence arises the *Univer-*  
*sality* of these Desires of Wealth and Power,  
 since they are the Means of gratifying all  
 other Desires. " How foolish then is the  
 " Inference, some would make, from the  
 " universal Prevalence of these Desires, that  
 " human Nature is wholly selfish, or that  
 " each one is only studious of his *own*  
 " *Advantage*; since Wealth or Power are  
 " as naturally fit to gratify our *Publick*  
 " *Desires*, or to serve *virtuous Purposes*,  
 " as the *selfish* ones?"

" How

“ How weak also are the Reasonings  
 “ of some recluse Moralists, who condemn  
 “ in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power,  
 “ as below a perfectly virtuous Character :  
 “ since Wealth and Power are the most ef-  
 “ fectual *Means*, and the most powerful  
 “ *Instruments*, even of the greatest Vir-  
 “ tues, and most generous Actions ? ”  
 The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the  
*Intention* is virtuous ; and the neglect of  
 them, when honourable Opportunities of-  
 fer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the  
 Poet's Sentiments :

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*Hic onus borret,  
 Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus :  
 Hic subit & perfert : aut virtus nomen inane est,  
 Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.*  
 HOR. Epist. 17.

“ FURTHER, the *Laws* or *Customs* of  
 “ a Country, the *Humour* of our Company  
 “ may have made strange *Associations* of  
 “ *Ideas*, so that some Objects, which of  
 “ themselves are indifferent to any Sense,  
 “ by reason of some *additional* grateful  
 “ *Idea*, may become very desirable ; or by  
 “ like *Addition* of an ungrateful *Idea* may  
 “ raise the strongest Aversion.” Thus  
 many a Trifle, when once it is made a  
*Badge of Honour*, an Evidence of some  
*generous Disposition*, a Monument of some  
*great Action*, may be impatiently pursued,  
 from



Sect. I. from our Desire of Honour. When any *Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture* is constituted as a Mark of *Infamy*, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, tho in it self most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of *Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy*, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus *Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions* are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional *Ideas* \*. Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the *publick Esteem*, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.

*The Uses of  
these Asso-  
ciations.*

SHOULD any one be surprized at this *Disposition* in our Nature to associate any *Ideas* together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what great *Evils*, and how much *Corrup-*

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\* See 1 Treat. Sect. 1. Art. 7. and 2 Treat. Sect. 6. Art. 2.

tion of Affections is owing to it, it may Sect. 1.  
help to account for this Part of our Con-  
stitution, to consider "that all our Lan-  
" guage and much of our *Memory* depends  
" upon it:" So that were there no such  
*Associations* made, we must lose the use of  
*Words*, and a great part of our Power of  
*recollecting past Events*; beside many o-  
ther valuable *Powers* and *Arts* which de-  
pend upon them. Let it also be considered  
that it is much in our power by a vigorous  
*Attention* either to prevent *these Associa-*  
*tions*, or by *Abstraction* to separate Ideas  
when it may be useful for us to do so.

CONCERNING our Pursuit of *Honour*,  
'tis to be observ'd, that "since our Minds  
" are incapable of retaining a great Diver-  
" sity of Objects, the *Novelty*, or *Singu-*  
" *larity* of any Object is enough to raise a  
" particular Attention to it among many  
" of equal Merit:" And therefore were  
Virtue *universal* among Men, yet, 'tis  
probable, the *Attention* of Observers would  
be turned chiefly toward those who distin-  
guished themselves by some *singular Ability*,  
or by some Circumstance, which, however  
trifling in its own Nature, yet had some  
honourable Ideas commonly joined to it,  
such as *Magnificence*, *Generosity*, or the  
like. We should perhaps, when we con-  
sidered sedately the common Virtues of o-  
thers,

Sect. 1. thers, equally love and esteem them\* :  
 ~~~~~ And yet probably our *Attention* would be generally fixed to those who thus were *distinguished* from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire of *Distinction*, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, thro' a *Confusion of Ideas*, is reputed honourable.

THIS Desire of *Distinction* has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very *Rarity*, *Difficulty*, or *Expence*; by a confused Imagination that they evidence *Generosity*, *Ability*, or a *finer Taste* than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A *Form of Dress*, a *foreign Dish*, a *Title*, a *Place*, a *Jewel*; an *useless Problem*, a *Criticism on an obsolete Word*, the *Origin of a Poetic Fable*, the *Situation of a razed Town*, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour :

*Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
 Subruit aut reficit.* ————— HOR.

* See 2 Treat. Sect. 3. last Parag.


Art. III. THERE is another Division of our Desires taken from the Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. ^{Desires, selfish and publick.}

“ The Desires in which one intends or
 “ pursues what he apprehends advantageous
 “ to himself, we may call SELFISH; and
 “ those in which we pursue what we apprehend
 “ advantageous to others, and do
 “ not apprehend advantageous to *our selves*,
 “ or do not pursue with this view, we
 “ may call *Publick* or BENEVOLENT
 “ Desires.” If there be a just Foundation
 for this Division, it is more extensive than
 the former Division, since each of the former
 Classes may come under either Member of
 this Division, according as we are desiring
 any of the five sorts of Pleasures *for our selves*,
 or desiring them *for others*. The former
 Division may therefore be conceived as a
 Subdivision of the latter.

THIS Division has been disputed since
Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and
 some of late, who detest other parts of his
 Scheme, maintain, “ that all our Desires
 “ are *selfish*: or, that what every
 “ one intends or designs ultimately, in
 “ each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure
 “ to *himself*, or the avoiding his own *private*
 “ Pain.” *

* See Cicero de finib. lib. I.

Sect. I.



IT requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to *Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community*, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and *Affectation*. But some do * acknowledge a *publick Sense* in many Instances; especially in *natural Affection, and Compassion*; by which “ the
 “ Observation of the Happiness of others
 “ is made the necessary Occasion of Plea-
 “ sure, and their Misery the Occasion of
 “ Pain to the Observer”. That this *Sympathy* with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon our selves by any Choice, with view to any *selfish Advantage*, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the *Fortunate*, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the *Distressed*: And every one feels that this *publick Sense* will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man’s *Choice*, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, “ That by means of it
 “ there is a *Conjunction of Interest*: the

* See Mr. Clark of Hull, his Remarks on Treat. 2.

“ Happiness of others becomes the Means Sect. 1.
 “ of private Pleasure to the Observer ;
 “ and for this Reason, or with a View to
 “ this private Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of another.” Others deduce our Desire of the Happiness of others from Self-love, in a less specious manner.

IF a *publick Sense* be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our *Love of others*, or for *generous Offices*, may be determined from the following Considerations ; which being matters of *internal Consciousness*, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

LET it be premised, that *Desire* is generally *uneasy*, or attended with an *uneasy Sensation*, which is something distinct from that uneasy Sensation arising from some *Event* or *Object*, the Prevention or Removal of which Sensation we are intending when the Object is apprehended as Evil ; as this *uneasy Sensation of Desire* is obviously different from the *pleasant Sensation*, expected from the Object or Event
 which


Sect. I. which we apprehend as Good. Then it is
 plain,

I. " THAT no Desire of any Event is
 " excited by any view of removing the
 " *uneasy Sensation attending this Desire*
 " *itself*". Sensations which are *previous*
 to a *Desire*, or not connected with it,
 may excite Desire of any Event, apprehended necessary to procure or continue the Sensation if it be pleasant, or to remove it if it be uneasy : But the *uneasy Sensation, accompanying and connected with the Desire itself*, cannot be a Motive to that *Desire* which it presupposes. The *Sensation* accompanying Desire is generally *uneasy*, and consequently our Desire is never raised with a view to obtain or continue it ; nor is the Desire raised with a view to *remove this uneasy Sensation*, for the *Desire* is raised previously to it. This holds concerning all *Desire* publick or private.

THERE is also a *pleasant Sensation of Joy*, attending the *Gratification* of any Desire, beside the *Sensation* received from the *Object itself*, which we directly intended.
 " But Desire does never arise from a View
 " of obtaining that *Sensation of Joy*, connected with the Success or Gratification of Desire ; otherwise the strongest
 " Desires might arise toward any Trifle,
 " or an Event in all respects indifferent :
 " Since,

“ Since, if Desire arose from *this View*, Sect 1.
 “ the stronger the Desire were, the higher
 “ would be the *Pleasure of Gratification*;
 “ and therefore we might desire the turn-
 “ ing of a Straw as violently as we do
 “ *Wealth* or *Power*.” This Expectation
 of the *Pleasure of gratified Desire*, would
 equally excite us to desire the *Misery* of
 others as their Happiness; since the *Plea-*
sure of Gratification might be obtained
 from both Events alike.

2. It is certain that, “ *that Desire of*
 “ the Happiness of others which we ac-
 “ count virtuous, is not *directly* excited
 “ by prospects of any *secular Advantage*,
 “ *Wealth, Power, Pleasure of the ex-*
 “ *ternal Senses, Reward from the Deity,*
 “ *or future Pleasures of Self-Approba-*
 “ *tion.*” To prove this let us consider;
 “ That no Desire of any Event can arise
 “ immediately or directly from an *Opinion*
 “ in the Agent, that his *having such a*
 “ *Desire* will be the Means of private
 “ *Good.*” This *Opinion* would make us
 wish or desire to have that *advantageous*
Desire or Affection; and would incline us
 to use any means in our power to raise that
 Affection: but no Affection or Desire is
 raised in us, directly by our *volition* or *de-*
siring it. That alone which raises in us
 from *Self-Love* the Desire of any Event,
 is an *Opinion* that *that Event* is the Means

Sect. I. of private Good. As soon as we form  this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises : But if *having the Desire or Affection* be imagined the *Means* of private Good, and not the *Existence of the Event desired*, then from *Self-Love* we should only desire or wish to have the *Desire* of that Event, and should not desire the *Event* itself, since the *Event* is not conceived as the *Means* of Good.

For instance, suppose GOD revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our *Country were happy* ; then from Self-Love we should have immediately *the subordinate Desire* of our Country's Happiness, as the *Means* of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness ; but that we should be rewarded, provided we *desired the Happiness of our Country* ; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the *Happiness of our Country*, since it is not now conceived as the *Means* of our Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The *Means* of our Happiness is *the having a Desire of our Country's Happiness* ; we should therefore from Self-Love only *wish* to have *this Desire*.

'TIS true indeed in fact, that, because *Benevolence* is natural to us, a little *Attention*

attention to other Natures will raise in us Sect. 1.
 good-will towards them, whenever by any
 Opinions we are persuaded that there is no
 real *Opposition of Interest*. But had we
 no Affection distinct from *Self-Love*, no-
 thing could raise our *Desire of the Happi-
 ness of others*, but conceiving their Hap-
 piness as the Means of ours. An Opinion
 that our having *kind Affections* would be
 the Means of our private Happiness, would
 only make us desire to have those Affec-
 tions. Now that Affections do not arise
 upon our *wishing* to have them, or our
 volition of raising them; as conceiving the
Affections themselves to be the *Means* of
 private Good; is plain from this, that if
 they did thus arise, then a *Bribe* might
 raise any Desire toward any Event, or any
Affection toward the most improper Ob-
 ject. We might be hired to *love* or *hate*
 any sort of Persons, to be *angry*, *jealous*,
 or *compassionate*, as we can be engaged into
 external Actions; which we all see to be
 absurd. Now those who alledg, that our
 Benevolence may arise from prospect of
secular Advantage, *Honour*, *Self-Appro-
 bation*, or *future Rewards*, must own,
 that these are either *Motives only to exter-
 nal Actions*, or *Considerations*, shewing,
 that *having the Desire* of the Happiness
 of others, would be the *Means* of private
 Good; while the *Event* supposed to be de-
 sired, *viz.* the Happiness of others, is not

Sect. 1 supposed the *Means* of any private Good.
 But the best Defenders of this part of the
 Scheme of *Epicurus*, acknowledge that
 “ Desires are not raised by *Volition*.”

This Dis-
 tinction
 defended.

3. “ THERE are in Men *Desires of the*
 “ *Happiness of others*, when they do not
 “ conceive this *Happiness* as the *Means*
 “ of obtaining any sort of Happiness to
 “ themselves.” *Self-Approbation*, or *Re-*
wards from the Deity, might be the *Ends*,
 for obtaining which we might possibly *de-*
sire or *will* from Self-Love, to raise in our
 selves *kind Affections*; but we could not
 from *Self-Love* desire the *Happiness of*
others, but as conceiving it the *Means* of
 our own. Now 'tis certain that sometimes
 we may have this *subordinate Desire* of the
 Happiness of others, conceived as the
Means of our own; as suppose one had
 laid a *Wager* upon the Happiness of
 a Person of such Veracity, that he
 would own sincerely whether he were
 happy or not; when Men are *Partners*
in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss;
 when one hopes to *succeed to*, or some
 way to *share in* the Prosperity of another;
 or if the DEITY had given such Threat-
 nings, as they tell us *Telamon* gave his
 Sons when they went to War, that he
 would reward or punish one according as
 others were happy or miserable: In such
 cases one might have this *subordinate De-*
sire

fire of another's Happiness from Self-Love. Sect. 1.
 But as we are sure the DEITY has not given
 such Comminations, so we often are con-
 scious of the *Desire of the Happiness of*
others, without any such Conception of
 it as the *Means* of our own; and are
 sensible that this *subordinate Desire* is not
 that virtuous Affection which we approve.
 The virtuous Benevolence must be an *ul-*
timate Desire, which would subsist without
 view to private Good. Such *ultimate pub-*
lick Desires we often feel, without any
subordinate Desire of the same Event, as
 the *Means* of private Good. The *subor-*
dinate may sometimes, nay often does con-
 cur with the *ultimate*; and then indeed
 the *whole Moment* of these conspiring De-
 sires may be greater than that of either
 alone: But the *subordinate alone* is not that
 Affection which we approve as virtuous.

Art. IV. THIS will clear our way to
 answer the chief Difficulty: "May not
 " our Benevolence be at least a *Desire of*
 " *the Happiness of others, as the Means*
 " *of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick*
 " *Sense, from the Contemplation of their*
 " *Happiness?*" If it were so, it is very
 unaccountable that we should approve this
subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet
 not approve the like Desire upon a *Wager*,
 or other Considerations of Interest. Both
 Desires proceed from *Self-Love* in the same

Sect. 1. manner : In the latter case the Desires might
 be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously ; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the *Motive of Interest* might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.

DON'T we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention ? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a *Publick Sense* ? Were it our only View, in *Compassion* to free our selves from the *Pain of the publick Sense* ; should the DEITY propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it ; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter ? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable ; should we not upon this Scheme be intirely indifferent ? Or, if we should even desire the *pleasant Thought* of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable ?

'TIS

'TIS true, our *Publick Sense* might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong *Desires* of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a View to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any *Desire* of the *Means of private Pleasure* can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, 'tis certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the *Happiness of others*, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the *Means of private Pleasure*.

SHOULD any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some *confused Association of Ideas*; as a Miser, who loves no body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this *Association* (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it.

Sect. I. How would any *Spectator* like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it *refined Wisdom*, or a *Perfection of Mind*, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? 'Tis plain then we feel this *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others to be a most *natural Instinct*, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.

THE Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving *disinterested Desires*, has probably been from the attempting to define this simple Idea, *Desire*. It is called *an uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good*. Whereas *Desire* is as distinct from any *Sensation*, as the *Will* is from the *Understanding* or *Senses*. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of *desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain*.

WE may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always toward *private Good*, that they are oftner employ'd about *the State of others*. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the *Means of private Good*, or *publick*. Thus an *Epicurean* who denies a future State; or, one to whom

whom God revealed that he should be an-
 nihilated, might at his very Exit desire a
future Fame, from which he expected no
 Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to o-
 thers. Such Desires indeed no *selfish Be-*
ing, who had the modelling of his own
 Nature, would chuse to implant in itself.
 But since we have not this power, we must
 be content to be thus “ befooled into a
 “ publick Interest against our Will;” as
 an ingenious Author expresses it.

THE Prospect of any *Interest* may be a
 Motive to us, to desire whatever we appre-
 hend as the *Means* of obtaining it. Parti-
 cularly, “ if *Rewards* of any kind are pro-
 “ posed to those who have virtuous Affec-
 “ tions, this would raise in us the Desire
 “ of having these *Affections*, and would
 “ incline us to use all means to raise them
 “ in our selves; particularly to *turn our*
 “ *Attention* to all those Qualities in the
 “ DEITY, or our Fellows, which are na-
 “ turally apt to raise the virtuous Affec-
 “ tions.” Thus it is, that Interest of any
 kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue,
 and Rewards particularly may over-ballance
 all Motives to Vice.

THIS may let us see, that “ the Sancti-
 “ ons of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, as
 “ proposed in the *Gospel*, are not rendered
 “ useless

Sect. I. “useless or unnecessary, by supposing the
virtuous Affection to be *disinterested* ;”
since such *Motives of Interest*, proposed
and attended to, must incline every Person
to *desire* to have virtuous Affections, and
to *turn his Attention* to every thing which
is naturally apt to raise them ; and must
overballance every other *Motive of Inte-*
rest, opposite to these Affections, which
could incline Men to suppress or counteract
them.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes.

I. **A**FTER the general account of *Sensations*, we may consider other *Modifications* of our Minds, consequent upon these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are *Desire* of the grateful Perceptions, and *Aversion* to the uneasy, either for our selves or others. If we would confine the word *Affection* to these two, which are entirely distinct from all *Sensation*, and directly incline the Mind to *Action* or *Volition of Motion*, we should have no Debate about the Number or Division of *Affections*. But since, by universal Custom, this Name is applied to other *Modifications* of the Mind, such as *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Despair*, we may consider what universal *Distinction* can be assigned between these *Modifications*, and the several *Sensations* above-mentioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call “the *direct immediate Perception* of Pleasure or Pain from the present
Proper Affections are Desire and Aversion.

Sect. 2. "sent Object or Event, the *Sensation*:"

But we denote by the *Affection* or *Passion* some other "Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our *Reflection* upon, or *Apprehension* of their present or certainly future Existence; so that we are sure that the Object or Event will raise the *direct Sensations* in us." In beholding a regular Building we have the *Sensation* of Beauty; but upon our *apprehending* our selves possessed of it, or that we can procure this pleasant *Sensation* when we please, we feel the *Affection* of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the *painful Sensation*; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the *Affection* of Sorrow, which might in some sense also be called a *Sensation*.

When the word *Passion* is imagined to denote any thing different from the *Affections*, it includes, beside the *Desire* or *Aversion*, beside the *calm Joy* upon apprehended Possession of Good, or *Sorrow* from the Loss of it, or from impending Evil, "a * *confused Sensation* either of Pleasure

Affection
distinct
from Pas-
sion.

* Whoever would see subtile Divisions of those Sensations, let him read *Malebranche's Recherche de la Verite*, B. v. c. 3. Together with these Sensations there are also some strong *Propensities* distinct from any rational Desire: About which see Sect. 3. Art. 2. of this Treatise.

“ or Pain, occasioned or attended by some Sect. 2.
 “ violent bodily Motions, which keeps
 “ the Mind much employed upon the
 “ present Affair, to the exclusion of every
 “ thing else, and prolongs or strengthens
 “ the Affection sometimes to such a de-
 “ gree, as to prevent all *deliberate Reaso-*
 “ *ning* about our Conduct. ”

II. WE have little reason to imagine, ^{General} that all other Agents have such *confused* ^{Desires,} *Sensations* accompanying their Desires as ^{and parti-} we often have. Let us abstract from them, ^{cular Af-} and consider in what manner we should ^{fections or} act upon the several Occasions which now ^{Passions.} excite our Passions, if we had none of these *Sensations* whence our Desires become *passionate*.

THERE is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between “ the *calm Desire* “ of Good, and Aversion to Evil, either “ selfish or publick, as it appears to our “ *Reason* or *Reflection*; and the *particu-* “ *lar Passions* towards Objects immedi- “ ately presented to some Sense. ” Thus nothing can be more distinct than the *gene-* *ral calm Desire* of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the *particular selfish Passions*, such as *Ambition*, *Covetousness*, *Hunger*, *Lust*, *Revenge*, *Anger*,
as

Sect. 2. as they arise upon particular Occasions.
 In like manner, our publick Desires may be distinguished into the *general calm Desire of the Happiness of others*, or *Aversion to their Misery* upon Reflection; and the *particular Affections or Passions of Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection*. These *particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, thro' want of Reflection, the *general calm Desires* are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. We obtain *Command* over the *particular Passions*, principally by strengthening the *general Desires* thro' frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so as to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*.

AGAIN, the *calm public Desires* may be considered as “ they either regard the
 “ Good of *particular Persons or Societies*
 “ presented to our Senses; or that of some
 “ more abstracted or general Community,
 “ such as a *Species or System*.” This latter sort we may call *universal calm Benevolence*. Now 'tis plain, that not only *particular kind Passions*, but even *calm particular Benevolence* do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the *universal Benevolence*; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former two may be

be opposite to the other, where they meet Sect. 2.
together in one Temper. So the *universal Benevolence* might be where there was
neither of the former; as in any superior
Nature or Angel, who had no particular
Intercourse with any part of Mankind.

OUR *moral Sense*, tho it approves all particular *kind Affection* or *Passion*, as well as *calm particular Benevolence* abstractly considered; yet it also approves the *Restraint* or *Limitation* of all particular Affections or Passions, by the *calm universal Benevolence*. To make this Desire prevalent above all *particular Affections*, is the only sure way to obtain constant *Self-Approbation*.

THE *calm selfish Desires* would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of *Good in general*, of *infinite Good*, or of the *greatest Aggregate*: Much less need we suppose any *actual Inclination* toward any of these, as the *Cause* or *Spring* of all particular Desires. 'Tis enough to allow, " that we
" are capable by *enlarging*, or by *Abstraction*, of coming to these Ideas: That
" we must, by the Constitution of our
" Nature, desire any apprehended Good
" which occurs a-part from any Evil:
" That

Sect. 2. “ That of two Objects inconsistent with
 “ each other, we shall desire that which
 “ seems to contain the greatest *Moment of*
 “ *Good.*” So that it cannot be pronounced
 concerning any *finite Good*, that it shall
 necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the
 Agent may possibly have the Idea of a
Greater, or see this to be inconsistent with
 some *more valuable Object*, or that it may
 bring upon him some *prepollent Evil*. The
 certain Knowledge of any of these Things,
 or probable *Presumption* of them, may
 stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If
 this be any sort of *Liberty*, it must be al-
 lowed to be in Men, even by those who
 maintain “ the *Desire* or *Will* to be ne-
 “ cessarily determined by the *prepollent*
 “ *Motive* ;” since this very *Presumption*
 may be a *prepollent Motive*, especially
 to those, who by frequent *Attention* make
 the Idea of the *greatest Good* always pre-
 sent to themselves on all important Occa-
 sions.

THE same may easily be applied to our
 Aversion to finite Evils.

THERE seems to be this Degree of
 Liberty about the Understanding, that tho
 the *highest Certainty* or *Demonstration* does
 necessarily engage our Assent, yet we can
 suspend any *absolute Conclusion* from *pro-*
bable Arguments, until we examine whe-
 ther

ther this apparent *Probability* be not opposite to *Demonstration*, or *superior Probability* on the other side. Sect. 2.

THIS may let us see, that tho it were acknowledged that " Men are *necessarily* determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive appears to be *prepollent*;" yet they might be proper *Subjects of a Law*; since the very *Sanctions* of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive *prepollent* to all others. In like manner, " Errors may be criminal, * where there are sufficient *Data or Objective Evidence* for the Truth;" since no *Demonstration* can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet *human Penalties* concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of *Argument*, or *Probability* to engage our Assent, however they may as *Motives* determine our *Election*.

IN the *calm publick Desires*, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm

* See Treat. 4. Sect. 6. Art. 6. last Paragraph.

Sect. 2. universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the *Moment* of the Good, and the *Number* of those who shall enjoy it.

WHEN the *publick Desires* are opposite to the *private*, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is *stronger* or more intense.

Definitions. III. THE following *Definitions* of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions ; and the *Axioms* subjoined may shew the manner of acting from *calm Desire*, with Analogy to the *Laws of Motion*.

*Natural
Good and
Evil.*

1. NATURAL *Good* is Pleasure : *Natural Evil* is Pain.

2. NATURAL *good Objects* are those which are apt, either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure ; the former are called *Advantageous*. *Natural Evil Objects* are such as, in like manner, give Pain.

Absolute.

3. ABSOLUTE *Good* is that which, considered with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.

4. ABSOLUTE *Evil*, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

5. RE-

5. **RELATIVE** *Good or Evil*, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the *Bonum simpliciter*, and *secundum quid* of the Schoolmen. Relative.

Cor. **RELATIVE** *Good* may be *Absolute Evil*; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And *Absolute Good* may be *Relative Evil*; thus an *unpleasant Potion* may recover Health.

GOOD and *Evil*, according to the *Persons* whom they affect, may be divided into *Universal*, *Particular* and *Private*.

6. **UNIVERSAL** *Good*, is what tends to *Universal* the Happiness of the whole *System of sensitive Beings*; and *Universal Evil* is the contrary.

7. **PARTICULAR** *Good* is what tends *Particular* to the Happiness of a Part of this System: *Particular Evil* is the contrary.

8. **PRIVATE** *Good or Evil* is that of *Private* the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either *Absolute* or *Relative*.

Sect. 2.



Cor. 1. PARTICULAR or private Good may possibly be *universal Evil*: And *universal Good* may be *particular or private Evil*. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there are some apparent Instances; such as the *Success of an unjust War*; or the *Escape of an unrelenting Criminal*.

Cor. 2. WHEN particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are *universal Good*.

Compound. 9. COMPOUND good Objects or Events, are such as contain the Powers of several Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the *Moral Sense* and of *Honour*. The same is easily applicable to *compound Evil*.

Mixed.

10. A MIXED Object is what contains at once the Powers of Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the *Pleasures of the Moral Sense*, and *Pains of the external Senses*. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the *publick Sense*, and the Pains of *Compassion* toward the Sufferer.

11. THE

11. THE *greatest* or *most perfect Good* is that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them. *Greatest Good.*

12. AN Action is *good, in a moral Sense*, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend *universal absolute Good*; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing *particular absolute Good*, not inconsistent with universal Good. *Moral Good.*

13. AN Action is *morally evil*, either from Intention of *absolute Evil*, universal, or particular, (* which is seldom the case with Men, except in sudden Passions;) or from pursuit of *private* or *particular relative Good*, which they might have known did tend to *universal absolute Evil*. For even the *want* of a † just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil. *Moral Evil.*

* See 2 Treatise, Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 143.

† Treatise 4. Sect. 6. Art. 4.

Sect. 2.

Compound.

14. COMPOUND *moral Goodness* is that to which different *moral Species* concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand *compound moral Evil*. We cannot suppose *mixed moral Actions* ‡.

15. AGENTS are denominated *morally good or evil*, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.

Axioms, or
general
Laws.

IV. AXIOMS, or natural Laws of *calm Desire*.

1. SELFISH *Desires* pursue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.

2. BENEVOLENT or *publick Desires* pursue the Good of others, according to the several *Systems* to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.

3. THE *Strength* either of the *private* or *publick Desire* of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined *Quantity of Good*, which will arise from it to the Agent, or the Person beloved.

‡ See 2 Treatise, Sect. 7. Art. 9. last Parag.

4. MIXED *Objects* are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended *Excess* of Good or Evil.

5. EQUAL *Mixtures* of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.

6. A COMPOUND *good or evil Object*, is prosecuted or shunned with a *Degree* of Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the *Sum* of Good, or of Evil.

7. IN computing the *Quantities* of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for our selves or others, when the *Durations* are equal, the Moment is as the *Intenseness*: and when the *Intenseness* of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the *Duration*.


8. HENCE the *Moment* of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the *Duration* and *Intenseness*.

9. THE *Trouble, Pain, or Danger*, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the *Sum* of the Good. So the *Pleasures* which attend or flow from the means of *prepotent Evil*, are to be subtracted, to find the *absolute Quantity*.

D 4

10. THE

Sect. 2.



10. THE Ratio of the *Hazard* of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the *Hazard* of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.

Cor. HENCE it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the greatest Good, if the *Uncertainty* of the latter surpasses *that* of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with *smaller*, but more *probably successful* Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but *less Probability*.

11. TO an *immortal* Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally *acute* in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.

12. BUT if the Duration of the Good be *infinite*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as *finite* added to *infinite*, surpasses *infinite* alone.

13. TO

13. To Beings of *limited certain Duration*, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the *Duration* of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.

14. To Beings of *limited uncertain Duration*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according to the Hazard of the *Possessor's Duration*. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledg to be a *natural Disposition* of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, *viz.* that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the *nearer* Enjoyments than the more distant, tho of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.

15. THE *Removal of Pain* has always the Notion of Good, and sollicitus us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by *Intenseness* and *Duration*, and affected by the *Hazard* and by the *Uncertainty* of our Existence.

THESE are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or the

Sect. 2. the Good of others from publick Affections.
 ~~~~~ Concerning these latter we may observe,

16. THAT our Desires toward *publick Good* are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.

17. OUR publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when the *Moments* and other Circumstances are equal.

18. WHEN the *Moments* themselves, and *Numbers* of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the *Strength* or *Nearness* of the *Ties* or *Attachments* to the Persons.

19. WHEN all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended *Moral Excellence* of the Persons.

20. IN general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the *Quantity of the Good itself*, and the *Number, Attachment, and Dignity* of the Persons.

THESE seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our  
*Senses*



*Senses* constitute Objects, Events or Sect. 2.  
*Actions good*; and “ we have Power to  
 “ *reason*, reflect and compare the several  
 “ Goods, and to find out the proper and  
 “ effectual Means of obtaining the greatest  
 “ for our selves or others, so as not to be  
 “ led aside by every Appearance of *rela-*  
 “ *tive or particular Good.*”

V. IF it be granted, that we have im-<sup>Action</sup>  
 planted in our Nature the several *Desires*<sup>from pure</sup>  
 above-mentioned, let us next inquire “ in-<sup>Desire or</sup>  
 “ to what *State* we would incline to bring  
 “ our selves, upon the several Accidents  
 “ which now raise our *Passions*; supposing  
 “ that we had the Choice of our own State  
 “ entirely, and were not, by the Frame of  
 “ our Nature, subjected to certain *Sensa-*  
 “ *tions*, independently of our Volition.”

IF it seems too rash to assert a Distin-  
 ction between *Affections* and *Passions*, or  
 that *Desire* may subsist without any *uneasi-*  
*ness*, since perhaps we are never conscious  
 of any Desire absolutely free from all un-  
 easiness; “ let it be considered, that the  
 “ simple Idea of *Desire* is different from  
 “ that of Pain of any kind, or from any  
 “ *Sensation* whatsoever: Nor is there any  
 “ other Argument for their Identity than  
 “ this, that they occur to us at once:  
 “ But this Argument is inconclusive, other-  
 “ wise

Sect. 2. "wise it would prove *Colour* and *Figure*  
 ~~~~~ "to be the same, or *Incision* and *Pain*."

THERE is a *middle State* of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any *important Good*, nor know of any great *Indigence* of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to our selves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely *desire* and *pursue* it, without any considerable *Sensation of Pain* or Uneasiness. Some Tempers seem to have as strong *Desires* as any, by the Constancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give small Evidence of any *uneasy Sensation*. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others: Nay, if we consult our selves, and not the common Systems, we shall perhaps find, that "the
 " noblest Desire in our Nature, that of
 " *universal Happiness*, is generally calm,
 " and wholly free from any confused unea-
 " sy Sensation:" except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively *Imagination*, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward *universal Nature* *. Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly fu-

* See *Marcus Aurelius*, in many places.

ture Event, the fixed Time of its Existence Sect. 2. being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any *Pain* attending such Desires. But tho this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.

UPON this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it *difficult* or *uncertain* to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost; we would set about it with Diligence, but would never chuse to bring upon our selves any *painful Sensation* accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by *Anxiety*. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional Good, we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense; and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before: And we should never chuse to bring upon our selves those *Frettings* which now commonly arise from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we should *desire* and *use all means* to prevent it, but should never voluntarily bring upon our selves the uneasy Sensation of *Fear*, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If the Evil did befall us, we should never chuse

Sect. 2. chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of *Sorrow* or *Despair*; we should consider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil; and should enjoy our selves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the *absolute Good* yet remaining with us; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our *State* and the *Modifications* of our Mind depend upon our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehended Approach of Good or Evil, to those whom we love; we should have *desires* of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no *uneasy Sensations*. We do indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneasy Sensations*; but these Sensations do not seem the necessary *Result* of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present *Constitution of our Nature*, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some *sedate Tempers* equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of *Ferment, Confusion, and Pain*, which attend the same Desires in the *Passionate*.

ACCORDING to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the *Modifications* or *Passions* of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon our selves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for our selves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with *uneasy confused Sensations*, which often occasion *Fretfulness*, *Anxiety*, and *Impatience*. We find violent *Motions* in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the Good desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused *Sensations of Joy*, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of *Sorrow* and *Dejection*, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of *Fear*; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of *Sorrow*, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our *publick Desires* are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very *Frame*
of

Sect. 2. of our Nature, however we may regulate
 ~~~~~ or moderate them.

*The Necessity for these Sensations.*

VI. LET us then examine “ for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us.” Would not those *first sorts of Sensations*, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our *Reason* and *pure Desires*, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called *Passions*, or those *Sensations* which attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil ?

THE common Answer, that “ they are given to us as useful *Incitements* or *Spurs* to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote our private Good, or that of the Publick,” is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a *calm pure Desire* of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, “ we are averse to *Labour*; we are apt to be hurried away by Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*; we are often so *indolent* and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these solliciting  
 “ Sen-



“ Sensations.” But may it not be answer- Sect. 2.  
ed, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers be attended with *Uneasiness* or *Pain*, why should not this be brought into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is really foolish; violent *Labour* may be as pernicious as any thing else: Why should we be excited to any *uneasy Labour*, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is *prepollent*, what need of any further *Incitement* than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*; if their *absolute Pleasures* be greater than that of the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted from it? If not, then the *real Moment* of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.

IF indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other *Desires* should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthening and fixing our *private Desires*, the like Sensation joined to *publick Affections* is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to pre-  
E serve

Sect. 2. serve an *Equilibrium*. But the first Question is, “ whence arose the Necessity of  
 “ such additional Incitements on either  
 “ side?”

It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of *Nature*, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the *whole*. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There is probably an infinite *Variety* of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is *absolutely Good*, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the *inferior Natures*, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude\*, that there are in the Universe as many Species of *superior Natures*, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted upon by *Simplicius*, that the uni-

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\* See *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, Cap. 34. And the Archbishop of *Dublin*, *de Origine Mali*, above all others on this Subject.

versal Cause must produce τα μέσα, as well as Sect. 2.  
 τα πρῶτα, καὶ τα ἔξωτα. We know not if this  
 Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of  
 Natures superior to ours: If not, it must  
 certainly be in the *whole* better that it should  
 have its *imperfect Inhabitants*, whose State  
 is absolutely Good, than that it should be  
 desolate.

ALL then which we can expect to do  
 in this Matter, is only to shew, that “ these  
 “ confused Sensations are necessary to such  
 “ Natures as we are in other *respects*: Par-  
 “ ticularly that Beings of such Degrees of  
 “ *Understanding*, and such *Avenues* to  
 “ Knowledge as we have, must need these  
 “ *additional Forces*, which we call Pas-  
 “ sions, beside the first *Sensations* by which  
 “ Objects are constituted Good or Evil,  
 “ and the *pure Desire* or *Aversion* arising  
 “ from Opinion or Apprehension of Good  
 “ or Evil.”

Now our *Reason*, or *Knowledge of the* From the  
*Relations* of external Things to our Bodies, Imperfec-  
 is so inconsiderable, that it is generally tion of our  
 some *pleasant Sensation* which teaches us Under-  
 what tends to their Preservation; and some standing,  
*painful Sensation* which shews what is per- which re-  
 nicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; quired Sen-  
 we need also to be directed *when* our Bo- sations of  
 dies want supplies of Nourishment; to this Appetite.  
 our Reason could not extend: Here then




Sect. 2. appears the first Necessity of *uneasy Sensation*, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.

AGAIN, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense of Pain, connected with *Incisions*, *Bruises*, or violent *Labour*, or whatever else tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Sensation, accompanying its Desires of the *Means of Preservation*, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of *Labour*: this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of Food.

IN like manner, the *Propagation of Animals* is a Mystery to their *Reason*, but easy to their *Instinct*. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of *Benevolence*. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthening the *Στοργή*, or *natural Affection*, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter-balance the Pains of *Labour*, and the Sensations of the *selfish*

*selfish Appetites*; since Parents must often Sect. 2.  
check and disappoint their own Appetites, ~~~~~  
to gratify those of their Children.

“ WHEN a Necessity of joining strong  
“ Sensations to one Class of Desires ap-  
“ pears, there must appear a like Necessity  
“ of strengthening the rest by like Sen-  
“ sations, to keep a just Ballance.” We know,  
for instance, that the Pleasures of the *Ima-  
gination* tend much to the Happiness of  
Mankind: the Desires of them therefore  
must have the like *Sensations* assisting them,  
to prevent our indulging a nasty solitary  
Luxury. The Happiness of human Life  
cannot be promoted without *Society* and  
*mutual Aid*, even beyond a Family; our  
*publick Affections* must therefore be strength-  
ned as well as the private, to keep a Bal-  
lance; so must also our Desires of *Virtue*  
and *Honour*. *Anger*, which some have  
thought an useless Passion, is really as ne-  
cessary as the rest; since Mens Interests  
often seem to interfere with each other;  
and they are thereby led from Self-Love to  
do the worst *Injuries* to their Fellows.  
There could not therefore be a wiser Con-  
trivance to restrain *Injuries*, than to make  
every mortal some way *formidable* to an  
unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion.  
We need not have recourse to a *Prome-  
theus* in this matter, with the old Poets:

Sect 2. they might have ascribed it to their Op-  
 *timus Maximus.*

— *Infani Leonis,*  
*Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.*

*A Ballance  
 may be still  
 preserved.*

VII. WITH this *Ballance* of publick *Passions* against the private, with our *Passions* toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by *pure Desires*; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also *publick Passions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to *Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries.* *Compassion* will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue, and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.


THE Sensations of Joy or Sorrow, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments,*



ments, to excite us to act with the utmost Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of others, for the future, and to punish past Negligence. The Moment of every Event is thereby increased: as much as the Sensations of *Sorrow* add to our *Misery*, so much those of *Joy* add to our *Happiness*. Nay, since we have some considerable *Power* over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleasures of Joy* upon our Success, than *Pains of Sorrow* upon Disappointment.

'TIS true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein these Sensations of the several Passions are in such a *Ballance*, as in all cases to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Sensations of *Anger* in some Tempers are violent above their proportion; those of *Ambition*, *Avarice*, *desire of sensual Pleasure*, and even of *natural Affection*, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its Passions. The best State of human Nature possible might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is

A just Balance very rare.


Sect. 2. requisite for this End. *Custom, Education,*  
 *Habits, and Company,* may often contribute much to this Disorder, however its Original may be ascribed to some more universal Cause. But it is not so great, but that human Life is still a desirable State, having a superiority of Goodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply our selves to it, does it hinder us from discerning that just *Ballance* and *Oeconomy*, which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the greatest Good in the whole.

*Disposi-  
 ons to some  
 particular  
 Passions.*

LET Physicians or Anatomists explain the several Motions in the *Fluids* or *Solids* of the Body, which accompany any Passion; or the *Temperaments* of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. 'Tis only to our Purpose in general to observe, " that  
 " probably certain *Motions* in the Body  
 " do accompany every Passion by a fixed  
 " Law of Nature; and alternately, *that*  
 " *Temperament* which is apt to receive or  
 " prolong these Motions in the Body, does  
 " influence our *Passions* to heighten or  
 " prolong them." Thus a certain *Tempe-  
 rament* may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions of *Anger, Joy, Love, or Sorrow*; and the Continuance of this *Temperament* shall make Men prone to the several

veral Passions for the future. We find our Sect. 2.  
selves after a long Fit of *Anger* or *Sorrow*,  
in an uneasy State, even when we are not  
reflecting on the particular *Occasion* of our  
Passion. During this State, every trifle  
shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On  
the contrary, after *good Success*, after strong  
*friendly Passions*, or a State of *Mirth*, some  
considerable *Injuries* or *Losses*, which at  
other times would have affected us very  
much, shall be overlooked, or meekly re-  
ceived, or at most but slightly resented; per-  
haps because our Bodies are not fit easily  
to receive these *Motions* which are consti-  
tuted the Occasion of the uneasy Sen-  
sations of Anger. This *Diversity* of Tem-  
per every one has felt, who reflects on him-  
self at different Times. In some Tempers  
it will appear like *Madness*. Whether the  
only *Seat* of these Habits, or the Occasion  
rather of these *Dispositions*, be in the Body;  
or whether the *Soul* itself does not, by fre-  
quent Returns of any Passion, acquire some  
greater Disposition to receive and retain it  
again, let those determine, who sufficiently  
understand the Nature of either the one or  
the other.





## S E C T. III.

*Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.*

I. **T**HE Nature of any *Language* has considerable Influence upon Mens Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.

*The Division of the Stoicks.*

CICERO, in the Fourth Book of *Tusculan Questions*, gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the *Passions*: First, into *Love* and *Hatred*, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is *present* or *expected*. About Good we have these two, *Libido* & *Latitia*, *Desire* and *Joy*: About Evil we have likewise two, *Metus* & *Ægritudo*, *Fear* and *Sorrow*. To this general Division he subjoins many  
Sub-

*Subdivisions* of each of these four Passions ; Sect. 3. according as in the *Latin* Tongue they had different Names for the several *Degrees* of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of *Lexicons* would probably get the most precise Meanings of the *Latin* Names in that Book ; nor would it be useless in considering the Nature of them.

THE *Schoolmen*, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, have not so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired *Aristotle*.

II. 'TIS strange that the thoughtful M<sup>A</sup>LEBRANCHE did not consider, that " *Desire* and *Aversion* are obviously different from the other Modifications called *Passions* ; that these two directly lead to Action, or the Volition of Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation." Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations ; and other Affections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion, or their correspondent Propensities : So that *Desire* and *Aversion* are the only pure Affections in the strictest Sense.

IF, indeed, we confine the Word *Sensa-*<sup>Sensation</sup>  
*tion* to the " immediate Perceptions of <sup>and Affec-</sup>  
" Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Pre-<sup>tion dis-</sup>  
" <sup>inct.</sup> sence

Sect. 3. “ fence or Operation of any Object or Event, which are occasioned by some Impression on our Bodies;” then we may denote by the Word *Affection*, those *Pleasures* or *Pains* not thus excited, but resulting from some *Reflection* upon, or *Opinion* of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one hand, or from a like *Reflection* or *Prospect* of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either to our selves or others.”

*Passion.* WHEN more violent *confused Sensations* arise with the *Affection*, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, especially when accompanied with some *natural Propensities*, to be hereafter explained.

*Division by Malebranche.* IF this use of these Words be allowed, the Division of MALEBRANCHE is very natural. Good Objects excite *Love*; evil Objects *Hatred*: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is *present* and *certain*, or *doubtfully expected*, or *certainly removed*. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. *Joy*, *Desire* and *Sorrow*. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense, the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil present,




present, raises *Aversion of Sorrow*; Evil Sect. 3. expected, *Aversion or Hatred of Desire*; and Evil removed, *Aversion of Joy*. The *Joy of Love*, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the *Sorrow of Love*, and the *Sorrow of Aversion*: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.

PERHAPS it may be more easy to conceive our *Affections* and Passions in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper *Affections*, distinct from all *Sensation*: We may call both *Desires* if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself. A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The *Reflection* upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*, distinct from those

*Desire and Aversion.*

*Joy and Sorrow.*

SECT. 3. those *immediate Sensations* arising from the  
 Objects or Events themselves.

*Affections  
 may be di-  
 stinguished  
 from Pas-  
 sions.*

THESE Affections, *viz.* *Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow*, we may, after MALEBRANCHE, call *spiritual or pure Affections*; because the purest Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beside these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent *confused Sensations*, connected with *bodily Motions*, from which our *Affections* are denominated *Passions*.

*Affections  
 attended  
 with unde-  
 signing  
 Propensi-  
 ties.*

WE may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, distinct both from *Sensation* and *Desire*; if by *Desire* we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: *viz.* a certain *Propensity of Instinct* to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the *Means* of some Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we observed above \*, the *Propensity to Fame*

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\* Sect. 1. near the End.

may continue after one has lost all notion Sect. 3.  
of *Good*, either publick or private, which  
could be the Object of a distinct Desire.  
Our *particular Affections* have generally  
some of these *Propensities* accompanying  
them; but these *Propensities* are sometimes  
without the *Affections* or distinct Desires,  
and have a stronger Influence upon the Ge-  
nerality of Men, than the *Affections* could  
have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the  
Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation  
from the Injury received; beside the De-  
sire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and  
Security for the future, which are some  
sort of *Goods* intended by Men when they  
are calm, as well as during the Passion,  
there is in the passionate Person a Propensi-  
ty to occasion *Misery* to the Offender, a  
Determination to *Violence*, even where  
there is no *Intention* of any Good to be  
obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence.  
And 'tis principally this Propensity which  
we denote by the Name *Anger*, tho other *Anger*.  
Desires often accompany it.

So also our *Presence* with the distressed  
is generally necessary to their relief; and  
yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention  
of relieving them, we shall find a *Propen-*  
*sity* to run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus  
also, beside the calm *Desire* of the Happi-  
ness of a Person beloved, we have a strong  
Propensity to their *Company*, to the very



*Sect. 3.* *Sight* of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to our selves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. These *Propensities*, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call *Passions*, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them *passionate*. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.


*Love and  
Hatred.*

It may perhaps be convenient to confine *Love* and *Hatred* to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; *Love* denoting  
 “ *Desire* of the Happiness of another,  
 “ generally attended with some *Appro-*  
 “ *bation* of him as innocent at least, or  
 “ being of a mixed Character, where Good  
 “ is generally prevalent:” And *Hatred*  
 “ denoting Disapprobation by our *Sense*,  
 “ with the Absence of Desire of their  
 “ Hap-

“Happiness.” *Benevolence* may denote Sect. 3.  
only “the Desire of another’s Happiness;”  
and *Malice*, “the Desire of their Misery,”  
abstractly from any Approbation or Con-  
demnation by our *Moral Sense*. This sort  
of Malice is never found in our Nature,  
when we are not transported with Passion.  
The Propensities of Anger and Envy have *Envy*.  
some Resemblance of it; yet Envy is not  
an ultimate Desire of another’s Misery, but  
only a subordinate Desire of it, as the  
Means of advancing our selves, or some  
Person more beloved than the Person en-  
vied.

FEAR, as far as it is an *Affection*, and *Fear*.  
not an undesigning Propensity, is “a Mix-  
“ture of *Sorrow* and *Aversion*, when we  
“apprehend the Probability of Evil, or  
“the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or  
“those we love:” There is more or less  
of Sorrow, according to the apprehended  
Degrees of Probability. Hope, if it be *Hope*.  
any way an Affection, and not an Opinion,  
is “a Mixture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon  
“the probability of obtaining Good, and  
“avoiding Evil.” Both these Passions may  
have some *Propensities* and *Sensations* at-  
tending them, distinct from those of the  
other Affections.

THE confused Use of the Names, *Love*, *Confused*  
*Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Delight*, has made *Use of*  
F some *Names*.

Sect. 3.  some of the most important Distinctions of our Affections and Passions. to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a *private Desire*, and a *publick*; yet both are called *Love*. The *Love of Money*, for Instance, and the *Love of a generous Character*, or a *Friend*: The *Love of a fine Seat*, and the *Love of a Child*. In like manner, what can be more different than the *Sorrow for a Loss befallen our selves*, and *Sorrow for the Death of a Friend*? Of this Men must convince themselves by Reflection.

THERE is also a considerable Difference even among the *selfish Passions*, which bear the same general Name, according to the different *Senses* which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of *Honour*, and the Desire of *Wealth*, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The *Sorrow* in like manner for our Loss by a *Shipwreck*, and our *Sorrow* for having done a *base Action*, or *Remorse*: *Sorrow* for our being subject to the *Gout* or *Stone*, and *Sorrow* for our being *despised* and *condemned*, or *Shame*: *Sorrow* for the Damage done by a *Fire*, and that *Sorrow* which arises upon an apprehended *Injury* from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call *Anger*. Where we  
get



get some special distinct *Names*, we more Sect. 3.  
easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may  
appear in *Shame* and *Anger*; but had we  
other *Names*, appropriated in the same  
manner, we should imagine, with good  
ground, as many distinct *Passions*. The  
like Confusion is observable about our Sen-  
ses\*.

To say that the *Sensation* accompanying <sup>False Re-</sup>  
all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and *that* accom- <sup>presenta-</sup>  
panying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue <sup>tions of our</sup>  
that there is no farther Diversity. Pains <sup>Nature</sup>  
have many differences among themselves, <sup>rectified.</sup>  
and so have Pleasures, according to the dif-  
ferent *Senses* by which they are perceived.  
To enumerate all these *Diversities*, would  
be difficult and tedious. But some Men have  
piqued themselves so much upon represen-  
ting "all our Affections as *selfish*; as if  
"each Person were in his whole Frame  
"only a *separate System* from his Fellows,  
"so that there was nothing in his Consti-  
"tution leading him to a *publick Interest*,  
"further than he apprehended it subservi-  
"ent to his own private Interest; and this  
"Interest made nothing else, than the gra-  
"tifying our *external Senses* and *Imagi-*  
"nation, or obtaining the Means of it:"  
that thereby the Wisdom and Goodness of

\* Treat. I. Sect. I. Art. 10.


Sect. 3. the AUTHOR of our Nature is traduced, as if he had given us the strongest *Dispositions* toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if *what* all good Men have represented as the *Excellence* of our Nature, were a *Force* or *Constraint* put upon it by *Art* or *Authority*. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, as “ they are excited by something in our Frame different from *Self-Love*, and tend to something else than the private Pleasures of the *external Senses* or *Imagination*.” This we may do under the following Heads, by shewing

1. How our Passions arise from the *Moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*.

2. How our Passions tend toward the *State of others*, abstractly from any Consideration of their *Moral Qualities*.

3. How the *publick Passions* are diversified by the *Moral Qualities* of the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Sense as virtuous or vicious.

4. How the publick Passions are diversified by the *Relations* of several Agents to each other, when we consider at once their *State*, as to Happiness or Misery, and their

their past as well as present *Actions* towards Sect. 3.  
each other. 

5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the *selfish*. Under each of these Heads we may find the six Passions of *Malebranche*, or the four of *Zeno*; with many other Combinations of them.

III. I. THE Passions about our own <sup>1. Passions</sup> Actions occasioned by the *Moral Sense*. <sup>about our own Ac-</sup>  
When we form the Idea of a *morally good* <sup>tions.</sup> *Action*, or see it represented in the *Drama*, or read it in *Epicks* or *Romance*, we feel a *Desire* arising of doing the like. This <sup>The Passion of Heroism in Castle-</sup> leads most Tempers into an imagined Series <sup>building.</sup> of *Adventures*, in which they are still acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we <sup>Moral Joy or Self-</sup> have executed any good Design, we feel <sup>Approba-</sup> inward *Triumph* of *Joy*: If we are disap- <sup>tion.</sup> pointed thro' our own *Negligence*, or have been diverted from it by some *selfish View*, we shall feel a Sorrow called *Remorse*. <sup>Remorse.</sup>

WHEN the Idea is in like manner formed of any *morally evil Action*, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises *Reluctance*, or Aversion: <sup>Reluctance.</sup> If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called *Remorse*: If we have resisted the Temptation,



Sect. 3. tion, we feel a secret *Joy* and *Self-Appro-*  
 ~~~~~ bation, for which there is no special Name.

WE might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of *Honour*, according as we apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances, shall affect the *Opinions* which others form concerning us. When any Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would arise, we feel *Desire*; when we attain it, *Joy*; when we are disappointed, *Sorrow*. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as *dishonourable*, we feel *Aversion* arising; if we apprehend our selves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may call *Modesty* or *Shame*; when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a *Joy*, for which there is no special Name.

Modesty.
Shame.

Ambition. WE give the Name *Ambition* to a violent Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into *immoral Means* to gratify it. The same Word often denotes the *Desire of Power*.
Pride. *Pride* denotes sometimes the same Desires of Honour and Power, with *Aversion* to their contraries; sometimes *Pride* denotes Joy upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim* to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right.

M E N

MEN may feel the Passion of *Shame* for the dishonourable Actions of others, when any part of the Dishonour falls upon *themselves*; as when the Person dishonoured is one of their *Club*, or *Party*, or *Family*. The general Relation of *human Nature* may produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour of another, tho this is more owing to our *publick Sense*.

IV. 2. THE second Class are the *publick Passions* about the *State of others*, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their *Moral Qualities*. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally *desire* the absent Happiness of others; *rejoice* in it when obtained, and *sorrow* for it when lost. We have *Aversion* to any impending Misery; we are *sorrowful* when it befalls any Person, and *rejoice* when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compassion; the Joy we may call *Congratulation*.

Good-will.

Compassion.

Pity.

Congratulation.

SINCE our Moral Sense represents *Virtue* as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the *Virtue of others*. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are

Sect. 3. no way prejudiced, we *wish* he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel *Joy*; if he is disappointed, or quits the Attempt, we feel *Sorrow*. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a base Action, we have *Aversion* to the Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel *Joy*; if he yields to it, *Sorrow*. Our Affections toward the *Person* arise jointly with our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.

3. Publick
Passions
with moral
Perceptions.

Regret.

V. 3. THE Passions of the third Class are our *publick Affections*, jointly with *moral Perceptions* of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good appears attainable by a Person of *Moral Dignity*, our Desire of his Happiness, founded upon *Esteem* or *Approbation*, is much stronger than *that* supposed in the former Class. The Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger *Sorrow*, *Pity*, or *Regret*, and *Dissatisfaction* with the Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the *real Advantage* of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of *Joy* and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong *Aversion* to it, with *Love* toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises *Joy*, *Confidence* in Pro-

Providence, with *Security* in Virtue. If Sect. 3.
the Evil befalls him, we feel the contrary
Passions, *Sorrow*, *Dissatisfaction* with
Providence, and *Suspicion* of the Reality
of Virtue.

HENCE we see how unfit such Repre-^{Which of}
sentations are in *Tragedy*, as make the per-^{them fit for}
fectly Virtuous miserable in the highest de-^{the Dra-}
gree. They can only lead the Spectators
into *Distrust* of Providence, *Diffidence* of
Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some
Authors, who probably mistake his meaning,
tell us *Brutus* express'd at his Death, "That
" the Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good,
" proved but an empty Name." But we
must here remember, that, notwithstanding
all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated
upon us of the *King of Terrors*, yet an
honourable Death is far from appearing to
a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils.
The *Ruin of a Free State*, the *Slavery of*
a generous Spirit, a *Life upon shameful*
Terms, still appear vastly greater Evils;
beside many other exquisite *Distresses* of a
more private nature, in comparison of which,
an honourable Death befalling a favourite
Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

UNDER this Class are also included the ^{Passions to-}
Passions employed about the Fortunes of ^{ward mo-}
Characters, apprehended as *morally Evil*. ^{ral evil}
Such Characters do raise *Dislike* in any ^{Agents.}
Obser-

Sect. 3. Observer, who has a moral Sense: But
 ~~~~~  
 No disinte-  
 rested or ul-  
 timate Ma-  
 lice in  
 Men.

Anger.

*Malice*, or the *ultimate Desire* of their Misery, does not necessarily arise toward them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of desiring the Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us *pure disinterested Malice*, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake\*. When we apprehend any Person as *injurious* to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of *Anger* arises toward the Agent. By *Anger* is generally meant “ a Propensity to occasion Evil to “ another, arising upon apprehension of “ an Injury done by him:” This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with *Sorrow* for the Injury sustained, or threatned, and *Desire* of repelling it, and making the Author of it *repent* of his Attempt, or *repair* the Damage.

Its Effects.

THIS Passion is attended with the most violent *uneasy Sensations*, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by this Passion, to apprehend the *injurious* as

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\* See Sect. .5 Art. 5. of this Treatise.

*directly malicious*, and designing the Misery Sect. 3.  
of others without farther Intention. While  
the Heat of this Passion continues, we seem  
naturally to pursue the Misery of the inju-  
rious, until they relent, and convince us of  
their better Intentions, by expressing their  
Sense of the Injury, and offering Repara-  
tion of Damage, with Security against fu-  
ture Offences.

Now as it is plainly necessary, in a  
System of Agents *capable of injuring* each  
other, that every one should be made *for-  
midable* to an Invader, by such a violent  
Passion, till the Invader shews his Refor-  
mation of Temper, as above, and no longer;  
so we find it is thus ordered in our Consti-  
tution. Upon these Evidences of Refor-  
mation in the Invader, our Passion natu-  
rally abates; or if in any perverse Temper  
it does not, the *Sense of Mankind* turns  
against him, and he is looked upon as cruel  
and inhumane.

IN considering more fully the Passions  
about the Fortunes of evil Characters, di-  
stinct from *Anger*, which arises upon a  
fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil  
Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes  
represents them, *directly evil* and *malici-  
ous*; and then make proper Abatements,  
for *what* the worst of Men come short of  
this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathe-  
maticians



Sect. 3. Mathematicians suppose perfect *Hardness* in some Bodies, and *Elasticity* in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

Joy of Hatred.

Sorrow of Hatred.

THE Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as *entirely malicious*, raises *Aversion* in the Observer, or *Desire* of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises *Joy* in the Event, with *Trust* in Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of *Sorrow*, *Distrust*, and *Suspicion*. The *Prospect of Evil*, befalling an evil Character, at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived the Passion of *Anger*; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of *Joy*, than as it is necessary to some prepollent Happiness in the whole. The *escaping* of Evil impending over such a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of *Sorrow*, and *Distrust* of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises *Joy*, and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. We see therefore, that the *Success of evil Characters*, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in *Tragedy*.

LET

LET any one reflect on this Class of Passions, especially as they arise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see how little of *Self-Love* there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent as any Passions whatsoever. We seem conscious of some *Dignity* in these Passions above the selfish ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor are we ashamed of them. These *complicated Passions* the Philosophers have confusedly mentioned, under some general Names, along with the simple selfish Passions. The *Poets* and *Criticks* have sufficiently shown, that they felt these Differences, however it did not concern them to explain them. We may find Instances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.

THE *Abatements* to be made for what human Nature comes short of the highest Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When the Good in any *mixed Character* surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise as toward the *Good*; where the Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions arise as toward the *Evil*, only in both Cases with less Violence. And further, the Passions in both Cases are either *stopped*, or turned the contrary way, by want of due *Proportion* between the *State* and *Character*. Thus an imperfect good Character,

in

Sect. 3. in pursuit of a Good too great for his Virtue, or to the exclusion of more worthy Characters, instead of raising *Desire* of his Success, raises *Aversion*; his Success raises *Envy*, or a Species of *Sorrow*, and his Disappointment *Joy*. An imperfectly evil Character, threatened by an Evil greater than is necessary to make him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising *Desire* toward the Event, raises *Aversion*; his escaping it raises *Joy*, and his falling under it raises *Pity*, a Species of *Sorrow*.

*The best  
Plots in  
Tragedy.*

THERE is another Circumstance which exceedingly varies our Passions of this Class, when the Agents themselves, by their *own Conduct*, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the State, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of Providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in reading the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, when we see the Distress of that Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown.

We



We feel the like Passions from the Fortunes Sect. 3. of *Creon* in the *Antigone*; or from the Fates of *Pyrrhus* and *Orestes*, in the *Andromache* of *Racine*; or our *Distressed Mother*. We heartily pity these Characters, but without repining at Providence; their Misery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the justest Reason, that *Aristotle* \* prefers such Plots to all others for *Tragedy*, since these Characters come nearest to those of the Spectators, and consequently will have the strongest Influence on them. We are generally conscious of some good Dispositions, mixed with many Weaknesses: few imagine themselves capable of attaining the height of perfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer imagine themselves capable of sinking into the Baseness of perfectly evil Tempers, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befall them.

THERE is one farther Circumstance How these Passions are raised high and complicated. which strengthens this Class of Passions exceedingly, that is, the greatness of the Change of Fortune in the Person, or the Surprise with which it comes. As this gives the Person a more acute Perception either of Happiness or Misery, so it

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\* *Aristotle Poetic*. Chap. 13.

strengthens

Sect. 3. strengthens our *Passions*, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of the Person, for whom they would move our pity; his *Projects*, his *Hopes*, his *half-executed Designs*. One left his *Palace unfinished*, another his *betrothed Mistress*, or young *Wife*; one promised himself *Glory*, and a fortunate *old Age*; another was heaping up *Wealth*, boasted of his *Knowledge*, was honoured for his *fine Armour*, his *Activity*, his *Augury*.

Αλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρύσσατα κῆρα μέλαιναν.

— οὐδὲ τί οἱ τόγ' ἐπὶ κέσσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. Homer.

*Sed non Augurio potuit depellere pestem;  
Sed non Dardania medicaricuspidis ictum  
Invaluit. ———* Virg.

THE Joy is in like manner increased upon the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by representing their former *Prosperity*, *Pride* and *Insolence*.

THIS Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversified or complicated, when the Sufferers are *multiplied*, by representing the Persons attached to the principal Sufferer, and setting before us their *Affections*, *Friendships*, *tender Solitudes*, *care in Education*, *succour in former Distresses*; this every  
one

one will find in reading the Stories of *Pal-Sect. 3.*  
*las, Camilla, Nisus, and Euryalus*; or in  
 general, any Battle of *Homer* or *Virgil*.  
 What there is in Self-Love to account for  
 these Effects, let all Mankind judge.

VI. THE Passions of the fourth Class arise <sup>4. Publick</sup>  
 from the same *moral Sense* and *publick Affec-* <sup>Passions</sup>  
*ctions*, upon observing the Actions of Agents <sup>and Rela-</sup>  
 some way *attached* to each other, by prior <sup>tions of A-</sup>  
 Ties of Nature or good Offices, or disen- <sup>gents.</sup>  
 gaged by *prior Injuries*; when these *Re-*  
*lations* are known, the moral Qualities of  
 the Actions appear considerably different,  
 and our Passions are much diversified by  
 them: there is also a great *Complication* of  
 different Passions, and a sort of *Contraste*, <sup>Contrastes</sup>  
 or assemblage of opposite Passions toward <sup>and Com-</sup>  
 the several Persons concerned. The most <sup>plications</sup>  
 moving *Peripeties*, and *Remembrances*, <sup>of Passions.</sup>  
 in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry, are  
 calculated to raise these complicated Pas-  
 sions; and in *Oratory* we study to do the  
 same.

THUS strong Sentiments of *Grati-*  
*tude*, and vigorous Returns of good Offi-  
 ces observed, raise in the Spectator the  
 highest *Love* and *Esteem* toward both the  
*Benefactor*, and even the *Person obliged*,  
 with *Security* and *Delight* in Virtue. —  
*Ingratitude*, or returning bad Offices de-  
 signedly, raises the greatest *Detestation* a-  
 G gainst



Sect. 3. gainst the Ungrateful; and *Love* with *Compassion* toward the Benefactor, with *Dejection* and *Diffidence* in a virtuous Courle of Life. — *Forgiving of Injuries*, and much more *returning Good for Evil*, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest *Love* toward the Forgiver, *Compassion* for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if *relenting*, some degree of *Good-will*, with *Compassion*; if not relenting, the most violent *Abhorrence* and *Hatred*. — Mutual *good Offices* done designedly between morally good *Agents*, raise *Joy* and *Love* in the Observer toward both, with *delight* in *Virtue*. — *Mutual Injuries* done by evil *Agents* designedly, raise *Joy* in the Events, along with *Hatred* to the *Agents*, with *Detestation* of *Vice*. — *Good Offices* done designedly by good *Agents* toward *Evil*, but not so as to encourage, or enable them to further *Mischief*, raise *Love* toward the good *Agent*; *Displience*, with some *Good-will* toward the evil *Agent*. — *Good Offices* designedly done mutually among evil *Agents*, if these *Offices* do not promote their evil *Intentions*, diminish our *Dislike* and *Hatred*, and introduce some *Compassion* and *Benevolence*. — *Good Offices* from good *Agents*, to *Benefactors unknown* to the *Agent*, or to their unknown *Friends* or *Posterity*, increase *Love* toward both; and raise great *Satisfaction* and *Trust* in  
Pro-

*Providence, with Security in Virtue, and Sect. 3.*  
*Joy in the Event. — Undesigned evil Re-*  
*turns in like Case with the former, raise Sor-*  
*row in the Observer upon account of the E-*  
*vent, Pity toward both, with Suspicion of*  
*Providence and Virtue. — An undesigned Re-*  
*turn of Evil to an evil Agent from a good*  
*one, whom he had injured, raises Joy up-*  
*on account of the Event, and Trust in Pro-*  
*vidence. — Undesigned evil Offices mu-*  
*tually done to each other by evil Agents,*  
*raise Joy in the Event, Abhorrence of*  
*Vice, and Satisfaction with Providence. —*  
*Undesigned good Offices done by good A-*  
*gents toward the evil, by which they are*  
*further excited or impowered to do evil,*  
*raise Pity toward the good Agent, Indig-*  
*nation and Envy toward the Evil, with*  
*Distrust in Providence. — Undesigned*  
*good Offices done by good to evil Agents,*  
*by which they are not excited or enabled*  
*to do further mischief, raise Envy or In-*  
*dignation toward the evil Agent, if the Be-*  
*nefit be great ; if not, they scarce raise any*  
*new Passion distinct from that we had be-*  
*fore, of Love toward the one, and Ha-*  
*tred or Dislike toward the other.*

THESE Passions might have been di-  
 versified, according to *Malebranche's* Di-  
 vision, as the Object or Event was *present*,  
 or in *suspense*, or *certainly removed* : And  
 would appear in different Degrees of  
 G 2 Strength,

Sect. 3. Strength, according as the Persons concerned were more nearly attach'd to the Observer, by *Nature*, *Friendship*, or *Acquaintance*.

5. *Publick  
Passions  
join'd with  
the selfish.*

VII. THE Passions of the last Class, are those in which any of the former Kinds are complicated with *selfish Passions*, when our own Interest is concerned. It is needless here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of selfish Passions will very much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any *selfish Interests*, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the *publick Desires* or Aversions, or those founded upon the Sense of *Virtue* or *Honour*; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against *Conscience*.

THESE Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation of others; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in the most lively manner.

— *Æstuat ingens*

*Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Insania Luctu,*

*Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia Virtus. Virg.*



IN all this tedious Enumeration, let any one consider, “ How few of our Passions  
“ can be any way deduced from *Self-Love*, or desire of private Advantage :  
“ And how improbable it is, that Persons  
“ in the Heat of Action, have any of  
“ those *subtle Reflections*, and *selfish Intentions*, which some Philosophers invent for them : How great a part of  
“ the Commotions of our Minds arise upon the *moral Sense*, and from *publick Affections* toward the good of others.  
“ We should find, that without these Principles in our Nature, we should not feel  
“ the one half at least of our present *Pleasures* or *Pains* ; and that our Nature would be almost reduced to *Indolence*.”


AN accurate Observation of the several *distinct Characters and Tempers* of Men, which are constituted by the various Degrees of their *natural Sagacity*, their *Knowledge*, their *Interests*, their *Opinions*, or *Associations* of Ideas, with the *Passions* which are prevalent in them, is a most useful and pleasant Entertainment for those, who have Opportunities of large Acquaintance and Observation. But our present Purpose leads only to consider the first general *Elements*, from the various Combinations

Sect. 3. nations of which, the several *Temper*s and  
 ~~~~~ *Characters* are formed.

*The Order
 of Nature
 partly vin-
 dicated.*

THIS account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for the *Goodness of the Deity*, from the Constitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of *Pleasure* or *Advantage* are given us, than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other *Affections* represented as natural, save those toward private Good: it may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue from *Inclination*, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the *Biafs* of our Nature opposite to the Laws he would give us; and making all *Pleasure*, the most natural Character of Good, attend the *prohibited Actions*, or the *indifferent* ones; while *Obedience* to the Law must be a *constrained* Course of Action, intorced only by *Penalties* contrary to our *natural Affections* and *Senses*. *Nature* and *Grace* are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no such Inconsistency: “ Every Passion
 “ of

“ or Affection in its *moderate Degree* Sect. 3.
“ is innocent, many are directly *amiable*,
“ and *morally good*: we have *Senses* and
“ *Affections* leading us to *publick Good*,
“ as well as to *private*; to *Virtue*, as well
“ as to external Pleasure.”



S E C T. IV.

How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects.

Affections and Passions depend much upon Opinions.

I. **F**ROM what was said above it appears, that our Passions are not so much in our *Power*, as some seem to imagine, from the *Topicks* used either to raise or allay them. We are so constituted by Nature, that, as soon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our *Desire* or *Aversion* will arise toward them; and consequently our Affections must very much depend upon the *Opinions* we form, concerning any thing which occurs to our Mind, its *Qualities*, *Tendencies*, or *Effects*. Thus the Happiness of every sensitive Nature is desired, as soon as we remove all *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of *Opposition of Interest* between this Being and others. The *Apprehension* of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of *Approbation*, by our moral Sense, and of stronger Love. The Cause of *Hatred*, is the *Apprehension*

prebension of the opposite Qualities. *Fear*, Sect. 4. in like manner, must arise from *Opinion of Power*, and *Inclination* to hurt us: *Pity* from the *Opinion* of another's *undeserved Misery*: *Shame* only arises from *Apprehension* of *Contempt* from others: *Joy*, in any Event, must arise from an *Opinion* of its Goodness. Our *selfish Passions* in this, do not differ from our *publick ones*.

THIS may shew us some Inconsistency in Topicks of Argument, often used to inculcate *Piety* and *Virtue*. Whatever Motives of Interest we suggest, either from a present or future *Reward*, must be ineffectual, until we have first laboured to form *amiable Conceptions* of the *Deity*, and of our *Fellow Creatures*. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cause, “ Mankind
“ are represented as *absolutely evil*, or
“ at best as *entirely selfish*; nor are there
“ any nobler Ideas of the DEITY suggested.
“ It is grown a *fashionable Topick*, to put
“ some *sly selfish Construction* upon the
“ most generous human Actions; and he
“ passes for the *shreudest Writer*, or *Ora-*
“ *tor*, who is most artful in these *Insinua-*
“ *tions*.”

II. THE Government of our Passions *Appetites*
must then depend much upon our *Opinions*: *and Affec-*
But we must here observe an obvious *tions dis-* *tinguished.*
Difference among our Desires, viz. that
“ some

Sect 4. “ some of them have a *previous*, painful,
 “ or uneasy Sensation, antecedently to
 “ any *Opinion* of Good in the Object;
 “ nay, the Object is often chiefly esteem-
 “ ed good, only for its *allaying this Pain*
 “ or Uneasiness; or if the Object gives
 “ also positive Pleasure, yet the *uneasy*
 “ *Sensation* is previous to, and indepen-
 “ dent of this *Opinion* of Good in the
 “ Object.” These Desires we may call
Appetites. “ Other Desires and Aversions
 “ necessarily presuppose an *Opinion* of Good
 “ and Evil in their Objects; and the De-
 “ sires or Aversions, with their concomi-
 “ tant uneasy Sensations, are produced or
 “ occasioned by this *Opinion* or *Appre-*
 “ *hension*.” Of the former kind are
Hunger and *Thirst*, and the Desires be-
 tween the *Sexes*; to which Desires there
 is an uneasy Sensation *previous*, even in
 those who have little other Notion of Good
 in the Objects, than allaying this *Pain*
 or *Uneasiness*. There is something like to
 this in the Desire of *Society*, or the Com-
 pany of our fellow Creatures. Our Nature
 is so much formed for this, that altho the
Absence of Company is not immediately
 painful, yet if it be long, and the Person
 be not employed in something which tends
 to *Society* at last, or which is designed to
 fit him for *Society*, an uneasy *Fretfulness*,
Sullenness, and *Discontent*, will grow up-
 on him by degrees, which Company a-
 lone

lone can remove. He shall not perhaps be Sect 4.
sensible always, that it is the Absence of ~~~~~
Company which occasions his Uneasiness:
A painful Sensation dictates nothing of it
self; it must be therefore some *Reflection*
or *Instinct*, distinct from the Pain, which
suggests the Remedy. Our Benevolence
and Compassion presuppose indeed some
Knowledge of other sensitive Beings, and
of what is good or evil to them: But
they do not arise from any previous *Opinion*,
that "the Good of others tends to
"the Good of the Agent." They are
Determinations of our Nature, previous
to our Choice from Interest, which excite
us to Action, as soon as we know other
sensitive or rational Beings, and have any
Apprehension of their Happiness or Misery.

IN other Desires the Case is different.
No Man is distressed for want of *fine Smells*,
harmonious Sounds, *beautiful Objects*,
Wealth, *Power*, or *Grandeur*, previously
to some Opinion formed of these things as
good, or some *prior Sensation* of their
Pleasures. In like manner, *Virtue* and
Honour as necessarily give us Pleasure,
when they occur to us, as Vice and Con-
tempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to
some *Experience* or *Opinion* of this Plea-
sure, there is no previous uneasy Sensation
in their Absence, as there is in the Absence
of the Objects of *Appetite*. The Necessity
of

Sect. 4. of these Sensations previous to our Appetites, has been considered already*. The Sensations accompanying or subsequent to our other Desires, by which they are denominated *Passions*, keep them in a just Balance with our *Appetites*, as was before observed.

BUT this holds in general, concerning all our Desires or Aversions, that according to the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil, the Desire or Aversion is increased or diminished: Every *Gratification* of any Desire gives at first Pleasure; and Disappointment Pain, proportioned to the Violence of the Desire. In like manner, the *escaping* any Object of Aversion, tho it makes no permanent Addition to our Happiness, gives at first a pleasant *Sensation*, and relieves us from Misery, proportioned to the Degree of *Aversion* or *Fear*. So when any Event, to which we had an Aversion, befalls us, we have at first Misery proportioned to the Degree of Aversion. So that some Pain is subsequent upon all *Frustration* of Desire or Aversion, but it is previous to those Desires only, which are called *Appetites*.

* Sect. 2. Art. 6.

III. HENCE we see how impossible it is for one to judge of the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery in others, unless he knows their *Opinions*, their *Associations* of Ideas, and the *Degrees* of their Desires and Aversions. We see also of how much Consequence our *Associations* of Ideas and *Opinions* are to our Happiness or Misery, and to the Command of our Passions.

FOR tho in our *Appetites* there are uneasy Sensations, previous to any Opinion, yet our very Appetites may be strengthened or weakned, and variously alter'd by *Opinion*, or *Associations* of Ideas. Before their Intervention, the bodily Appetites are easily satisfied: Nature has put it in almost every one's power, so far to gratify them, as to support the Body, and remove Pain. But when *Opinion*, and *confused Ideas*, or *Fancy* comes in, and represents some particular kinds of Gratifications, or great Variety of them, as of great Importance; when Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandure*, *Magnificence*, *Generosity*, or any other *moral Species*, are joined to the Objects of Appetites, they may furnish us with endless Labour, Vexation, and Misery of every kind.

As to the other Desires which presuppose some *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good,

Sect. 4. Good, previous to any Sensation of uneasiness; they must still be more directly influenced by *Opinion*, and *Associations* of Ideas. The higher the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil is, the stronger must the *Desire* or *Aversion* be; the greater is the Pleasure of *Success* at first, and the greater the Pain of *Disappointment*. Our publick Desires are influenced in the same manner with the private: what we conceive as Good, we shall desire for those we love, as well as for our selves; and that in proportion to the *Degree* of *Good* apprehended in it: whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to those we love, to that we shall have proportionable *Aversion*.

THE common Effect of these *Associations* of Ideas is this, “ that they raise the
 “ Passions into an extravagant Degree, beyond the proportion of real Good in
 “ the Object: And commonly beget some
 “ secret Opinions to justify the Passions.
 “ But then the *Confutation* of these false
 “ Opinions is not sufficient to break the
 “ *Association*, so that the *Desire* or *Passion* shall continue, even when our Understanding has suggested to us, that the
 “ Object is not good, or not proportioned
 “ to the Strength of the Desire.” Thus we often may observe, that Persons, who by reasoning have laid aside all Opinion of
Spirits

Spirits being in the dark more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in the dark*. *Sect. 4.*

Thus the *luxurious*, the *extravagant Lover*, the *Miser*, can scarce be supposed to have *Opinions* of the several Objects of their Pursuit, proportioned to the Vehemence of their Desires; but the constant *Indulgence* of any Desire, the frequent *Repetition* of it, the *diverting* our Minds from all other Pursuits, the Strain of *Conversation* among Men of the same Temper, who often haunt together, the *Contagion* in the very Air and Countenance of the passionate, beget such wild *Associations* of Ideas, that a sudden *Conviction of Reason* will not stop the Desire or Aversion, any more than an Argument will surmount the *Loathings* or *Aversions*, acquired against certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or emetick Preparations.

THE *Luxurious* are often convinced, when any Accident has revived a *natural Appetite*, of the superior Pleasures in a plain Dinner, with a sharp Stomach †: but

* Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
Interdum nihilo quæ sunt metuenda magis. L U C.

† ——— Leporem sectatus, equove
Lassus ab in domito, vel si Romana fatigat
Militia assuetum Græcari ———
Cum labor extuderit fastidia
————— Cum sale panis
Latrantem stomachum bene leniet ——— H O R.
this

Sect. 4. this does not reform them; they have got
 ~~~~~ all the Ideas of *Dignity, Grandure, Excellence,* and *Enjoyment of Life* joined to their Table. Explain to a Miser the Folly of his *Conduct*, so that he can alledg nothing in his Defence; yet he will go on,

*Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere futo.* Juv.

He has likewise all Ideas of *Good*, of *Worth*, and *Importance* in Life confounded with his Coffers.

A ROMANTICK Lover has in like manner no Notion of Life without his *Mistress*, all *Virtue* and *Merit* are summed up in his *inviolable Fidelity*. The *Connoisseur* has all Ideas of valuable *Knowledge*, *Gentlemanlike Worth* and *Ability* associated with his beloved Arts. The Idea of *Property* comes along with the Taste, and makes his Happiness impossible, without *Possession* of what he admires. A plain Question might confute the *Opinion*, but will not break the *Association*: “What  
 “ Pleasure has the Possessor more than  
 “ others, to whose Eyes they are exposed  
 “ as well as his?”

OUR *publick Desires* are affected by confused Ideas, in the same manner with our private Desires. What is apprehended



as Good, thro' an Association of foreign Sect. 4.  
 Ideas, shall be pursued for *those we love*, as well as what is really good for them. Our *benevolent Passions* in the nearer Ties, are as apt to be too violent as any whatsoever: this we may often experience in the *Love of Offspring, Relations, Parties, Cabals*. The Violence of our Passion makes us sometimes incapable of pursuing effectually their Good, and sinks us into an useless State of Sorrow upon their Misfortunes. *Compassion* often makes the Evil greater to the Spectator than to the Sufferer; and sometimes subjects the Happiness of a Person of great Worth, to every Accident befalling one entirely void of it.

THE Desire of Virtue, upon extensive impartial Schemes of publick Happiness, can scarce be too strong; but, upon *mistaken or partial Views* of publick Good, this Desire of Virtue may often lead Men into very pernicious Actions. One may conceive a sort of *Extravagancy*, and *effeminate Weakness* even of this Desire; as when Men are dissatisfied with themselves for *Disappointments* in good Attempts, which it was not in their Power to accomplish; when some *heroick Tempers* shew no Regard to private Good; when the Pursuit of the lovely Form is so passionate, that the Agent does not relish his *past Conduct*

H by

Sect. 4. by agreeable Reflection, but like the Ambitious,

*Nil actum reputat si quid superesset agendum.* Lucan.

BUT the most pernicious *Perversions* of this Desire are “ some *partial Admiration*s of certain moral Species, such as “ *Fortitude, Propagation of true Religion, Zeal for a Party*; while other “ *Virtues* are overlooked, and the very “ *End* to which the admired Qualities are “ *subservient* is forgotten. Thus some “ *Phantoms* of Virtue are raised, wholly “ *opposite* to its true Nature, and to the “ *sole End* of it, *the publick Good.*”

HONOUR, in like manner, has had its foolish Associations, and the true Nature of it has been overlooked, so that the Desire of it has run into *Enthusiasm*, and pernicious *Madness*. Thus, “ however our “ *Desires*, when our *Opinions* are true, “ and the Desire is proportioned to the “ *true Opinion*, are all calculated for good, “ either publick or private; yet *false* “ *Opinions*, and *confused Ideas*, or too “ great a *Violence* in any of them, above “ a due Proportion to the rest, may “ turn the best of them into destructive “ *Follies.*”

THIS

THIS is probably the Case in those Affections which some suppose *natural*, or at least incident to our Natures, and yet *absolutely evil*: Such as *Rancour*, or *disinterested Malice*, *Revenge*, *Misanthropy*. We indeed find our Nature determined to disapprove an *Agent* apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Intention*; we must desire the Destruction of such a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others. Now when we rashly form Opinions of *Seets*, or *Nations*, as absolutely evil; or get associated Ideas of *Impiety*, *Cruelty*, *Profaneness*, recurring upon every mention of them: when, by repeated Reflection upon Injuries received, we strengthen our Dislike into an *obdurate Aversion*, and conceive that the Injurious are *directly malicious*; we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spectators, who are unacquainted with our *secret Opinions*, or *confused Apprehensions* of others, may think we have *pure disinterested Malice* in our Nature; a very *Instinct* toward the Misery of others, when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a just natural Affection, upon false Opinions, or confused Ideas; even as our *Appetites*, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental *Loathings* at the most wholesom Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very rashly formed, but our Affec-

Malicious  
or cruel  
Temper,  
how they  
arise.



**Sect. 4.** *tions* are generally suited to our *Opinions*.  
 When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are just, our Affections are generally regular and good: But when we give loose Reins to our *Imagination* and *Opinion*, our Affections must follow them into all Extravagance and Folly; and inadvertent Spectators will imagine some *Dispositions* in us wholly useless, and absolutely and directly *evil*.

Now the *Gratification* of these destructive Desires, like those of all the rest, gives at first some *Pleasure*, proportioned to their Violence; and the *Disappointment* gives proportioned *Pain*. But as to the *Continuance* of these Pleasures or Pains, we shall find hereafter great Diversity.

FROM this view of our Desires, we may see “ the great Variety of *Objects, Circumstances, Events*, which must be of Importance to the Happiness of a Creature, furnished with such a *Variety of Senses* of Good and Evil, with equally various *Desires* corresponding to them: especially considering the strange *Combinations of Ideas*, giving Importance to many Objects, in their own Nature indifferent.”

*How far  
the several  
Desires  
must neces-  
sarily arise  
in us.*

IV. WE must in the next Place enquire “ how far these several *Desires* must  
 “ neces-

“ necessarily arise, or may be prevented by Sect. 4.  
“ our Conduct.”

THE Pleasures and Pains of the *external Senses* must certainly be perceived by every one who comes into the World; the one raising some Degree of Desire, and the other Aversion: the *Pains of Appetites* arise yet more certainly than others, and are previous to any *Opinion*. But then it is very much in our power to keep these Sensations *pure* and *unmixed* with any foreign Ideas: so that the plainest Food and Raiment, if sufficiently nourishing and healthful, may keep us easy, as well as the *rarest* or most *expensive*. Nay the Body, when accustomed to the simpler Sorts, is easiest in the Use of them: And we are raised to an higher Degree of *Cheerfulness*, by a small Improvement in our Table, than it is possible to bring a *pampered Body* into, by any of the Productions of Nature. Whatever the Body is once accustomed to, produces no considerable Change in it.

THE Pleasures of the *Imagination*, or of the *internal Sense of Beauty*, and *Decency*, and *Harmony*, must also be perceived by us. The *Regularity*, *Proportion* and *Order* in external Forms, will as necessarily strike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the external Senses. But then, as we have no uneasiness of *Appetite*, previous to the

Sect. 4. Reception of those grateful Ideas, we are not *necessarily* made miserable in their Absence; unless by some fantastick *Habit* we have raised very violent Desires, or by a long Pursuit of them, have made our selves incapable of other Enjoyments.

AGAIN, the Sense and Desire of *Beauty* of several kinds is entirely abstracted from *Possession* or *Property*; so that the finest *Relish* of this kind, and the strongest subsequent *Desires*, if we admit no foolish Conjunctions of Ideas, may almost every where be gratified with the Prospects of *Nature*, and with the Contemplation of the more curious *Works of Art*, which the Proprietors generally allow to others without Restraint. But if this Sense or Desire of Beauty itself be accompanied with the Desire of *Possession* or *Property*; if we let it be guided by *Custom*, and receive *Associations* of foreign Ideas in our Fancy of *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*, *Retinue*; if we relish only the Modes of the *Great*, or the Marks of *Distinction* as beautiful; if we let such Desires grow strong, we must be very *great* indeed, before we can have any Pleasure by this Sense: and every Disappointment or Change of Fortune must make us miserable. The like Fate may attend the Pursuit of *speculative Sciences*, *Poetry*, *Musick*, or *Painting*; to excel in these things is granted but to few.



A violent Desire of *Distinction* and *Emi-* Sect. 4.  
*nence* may bring on Vexation and Sorrow ~~~~~  
for the longest Life.

THE Pleasures and Pains of the *publick* <sup>3. The pub-  
lick Desires.</sup> *Sense* will also necessarily arise in us. Men  
cannot live without the *Society* of others,  
and their *good Offices*; they must observe  
both the *Happiness* and *Misery*, the *Plea-*  
*sures* and *Pains* of their Fellows: *Desire*  
and *Aversion* must arise in the Observer.  
Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more  
near Attachments of Love, either from  
the Instinct between the *Sexes*, or that  
toward *Offspring*, or from Observation of  
the *benevolent Tempers* of others, or their  
particular *Virtues* and *good Offices*, we must  
feel the Sensations of *Joy* and *Sorrow*, from  
the State of others even in the stronger De-  
grees, and have the publick Desires in a  
greater Height. All we can do to prevent  
the *Pains* of general Benevolence, will  
equally lessen the *Pleasures* of it. If we  
restrain our *publick Affection* from grow-  
ing strong, we abate our Pleasures from the  
good Success of others, as much as we  
lessen our Compassion for their Misfor-  
tunes: If we confine our Desires to a small  
*Circle* of Acquaintance, or to a *Cabal* or  
*Faction*, we contract our Pleasures as much  
as we do our Pains. The Distinction of  
Pleasures and Pains into *real* and *imagina-*  
*ry*, or rather into *necessary* and *voluntary*,

Sect. 4. would be of some use, if we could correct the *Imaginations* of others, as well as our own; but if we cannot, we are sure, whoever thinks himself miserable, is really so; however he might possibly, by a better Conduct of his Imagination, have prevented this Misery. All we can do in this affair, is to enjoy a great Share of the Pleasures of the *stronger Ties*, with fewer *Pains* of them, by confining the stronger Degrees of Love, or our Friendships, to Persons of *corrected Imaginations*, to whom as few of the uncertain Objects of Desire are necessary to Happiness as is possible. Our Friendship with such Persons may probably be to us a much greater Source of Happiness than of Misery, since the Happiness of such Persons is more probable than the contrary.

SINCE there is nothing in our Nature determining us to *disinterested Hatred* toward any Person; we may be secure against all the Pains of *Malice*, by preventing false *Opinions* of our Fellows as absolutely evil, or by guarding against *habitual Anger*, and rash *Aversions*.

THE *moral Ideas* do arise also necessarily in our Minds. We cannot avoid observing the *Affections* of those we converse with; their *Actions*, their *Words*, their *Looks* betray them. We are conscious of  
our

our own Affections, and cannot avoid Sect. 4.  
Reflection upon them sometimes: the kind  
and generous Affections will appear amia-  
ble, and all Appearance of Cruelty, Malice,  
or even very selfish Affections, will be dis-  
approved, and appear odious. Our *own*  
*Temper*, as well as that of others, will ap-  
pear to our moral Sense either lovely or  
deformed, and will be the Occasion either  
of Pleasure or Uneasiness. We have not  
any proper *Appetite* toward Virtue, so as  
to be uneasy, even antecedently to the Ap-  
pearance of the lovely Form; but as soon  
as it appears to any Person, as it certainly  
must very early in Life, it never fails to  
raise *Desire*, as Vice does raise *Aversion*.  
This is so rooted in our Nature, that no  
*Education, false Principles, depraved Ha-*  
*bits*, or even *Affectation* itself can entirely  
root it out. LUCRETIVS and HOBBS  
shew themselves in innumerable Instances  
struck with some *moral Species*; they are  
full of Expressions of *Admiration, Gra-*  
*titude, Praise, Desire of doing Good*; and  
of *Censure, Disapprobation, Aversion to*  
*some Forms of Vice*.

SINCE then there is no avoiding these  
Desires and Perceptions of *Morality*, all  
we can do to secure our selves in the pos-  
session of Pleasures of this kind, without  
Pain, consists in “ a vigorous Use of our  
“ Reason, to discern what Actions really  
“ tend



Sect. 4. “ tend to the publick Good in the *whole*,  
 “ that we may not do *that* upon a partial  
 “ View of Good, which afterwards, upon  
 “ a fuller Examination, we shall condemn  
 “ and abhor our selves for ; and withal, to  
 “ fix our *Friendships* with Persons of like  
 “ Dispositions, and just Discernment.” Men  
 of partial Views of publick Good, if they  
 never obtain any better, may be easy in a  
 very pernicious Conduct, since the *moral*  
*Evil* or *Deformity* does not appear to them.  
 But this is seldom to be hop’d for in any  
 partial Conduct. Those who are injured by  
 us fail not to complain ; the Spectators,  
 who are disengaged from our partial Attach-  
 ments, will often take the Freedom to ex-  
 press their Sentiments, and set our Conduct  
 in a full Light : This must very probably  
 occasion to us *Shame* and *Remorse*. “ It  
 “ cannot therefore be an indifferent Mat-  
 “ ter, to an Agent with a moral Sense,  
 “ what *Opinions* he forms of the Tenden-  
 “ cy of Actions ; what partial *Attach-*  
 “ *ments* of Love he has toward *Parties*  
 “ or *Factions*. If he has true Opinions  
 “ of the Tendencies of *Actions* ; if he  
 “ carefully examines the real Dignity of  
 “ *Persons* and *Causes*, he may be sure  
 “ that the Conduct which he now ap-  
 “ proves he shall always approve, and have  
 “ delight in Reflection upon it, however  
 “ it be censured by others. But if he takes  
 “ up at hazard *Opinions* of Actions ; if  
 “ he

“ he has a foolish *Admiration* of particular Sect. 4.  
 “ Sects, and as foolish *Aversions* and Dis-  
 “ like to others, not according to any real  
 “ Importance or Dignity, he shall often  
 “ find occasion for *Inconstancy* and *Change*  
 “ of his Affections, with *Shame* and *Re-*  
 “ *morse* for his past Conduct, and an in-  
 “ ward *Dislike* and *Self-Condernnation*.”

WHAT most deeply affects our Happi-  
 ness or Misery, are the Dispositions of  
 those Persons with whom we voluntarily  
 contract some *nearer Intimacies* of Friend-  
 ship: If we act wisely in this Point, we  
 may secure to our selves the greatest Plea-  
 sures with the fewest Pains, by attaching  
 our selves to Persons of real Goodness, good  
 Offices toward whom are useful to the  
 World. The Ties of *Blood* are generally  
 very strong, especially toward *Offspring*;  
 they need rather the Bridle than the Spur,  
 in all Cases wherein the Object is not re-  
 commended to a singular Love by his good  
 Qualities. We may, in a considerable mea-  
 sure, restrain our *natural Affection* toward  
 a worthless Offspring, by setting our *pub-*  
*lick Affections* and our *moral Sense* against  
 it, in frequent Contemplation of their Vices,  
 and of the Mischief which may arise to  
 Persons of more worth from them, if we  
 give them any Countenance in their Vices.

THE

## Sect. 4.

THE regulating our Apprehensions of the *Actions of others*, is of very great Importance, that we may not imagine Mankind worse than they really are, and thereby bring upon our selves a Temper full of *Suspicion, Hatred, Anger* and *Contempt* toward others; which is a constant State of Misery, much worse than all the Evils to be feared from *Credulity*. If we examine the true *Springs* of human Action, we shall seldom find their Motives worse than *Self-Love*. Men are often subject to *Anger*, and upon sudden *Provocations* do Injuries to each other, and that only from *Self-Love*, without Malice; but the greatest part of their Lives is employed in Offices of *natural Affection, Friendship, innocent Self-Love, or Love of a Country*. The little *Party-Prejudices* are generally founded upon Ignorance, or false Opinions, rather apt to move *Pity* than *Hatred*. Such Considerations are the best Preservative against *Anger, Malice, and Discontent* of Mind with the Order of Nature. “ When  
 “ you would make your self chearful and  
 “ easy ( says the Emperor \* ) consider the  
 “ *Virtues* of your several Acquaintances,  
 “ the *Industry* and *Diligence* of one, the  
 “ *Modesty* of another, the *Generosity* or

---

\* Marcus Antoninus, *Lib. vi. C. 48.*



“ *Liberality* of a third; and in other Per- Sect. 4.  
 “ sons some other Virtue. There is no-  
 “ thing so delightful, as the Resemblances  
 “ of the *Virtues* appearing in the Conduct  
 “ of your Contemporaries as frequently as  
 “ possible. Such Thoughts we should still  
 “ retain with us.”

WHEN the *moral Sense* is thus assisted by a sound Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a constant Source of solid Pleasure, along with the Pleasures of *Benevolence*, in the highest Degree which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as possible.

As to the Desires of *Honour*, since we cannot avoid observing or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we must feel the Desire of the *good* How far  
our Sense  
of Honour  
is in our  
power.  
*Opinions* of others, and Aversion to their *Censures* or *Condemnation*: since the one necessarily gives us Pleasure, and the other Pain. Now it is impossible to bring all Men into the same *Opinions* of particular Actions, because of their different *Opinions* of *publick Good*, and of the *Means* of promoting it; and because of *opposite Interests*; so that it is often impossible to be secure against all Censure or Dishonour from some of our Fellows. No one is so much Master of *external Things*, as to make his honourable Intentions successful; and yet  
Suc-

**Sect. 4.** *Success* is a Mark by which many judge of the Goodness of Attempts. Whoever therefore suffers his Desire of *Honour* or *Applause* to grow violent, without Distinction of the *Persons* to whose Judgment he submits, runs a great hazard of Misery. But our natural Desire of Praise, to speak in the Mathematical Style, is in a compounded Proportion of the *Numbers* of Applauders, and their *Dignity*. “ He  
 “ therefore who makes *Distinction* of Per-  
 “ sons justly, and acts wisely for the pub-  
 “ lick Good, may secure himself from much  
 “ uneasiness upon injudicious Censure, and  
 “ may obtain the Approbation of those  
 “ whose Esteem alone is valuable, or at  
 “ least far over-ballances the Censure of  
 “ others.”

*The Desire  
 of Wealth  
 and Power.*

THE *Desire of Wealth* must be as necessary as any other Desires of our Nature, as soon as we apprehend the usefulness of Wealth to gratify all other Desires. While it is desired as the *Means* of something farther, the Desire tends to our Happiness, proportionably to the good Oeconomy of the *principal Desires* to which it is made subservient. It is in every man's power, by a little Reflection, to prevent the Madness and Enthusiasm with which Wealth is insatiably pursued, even for itself, without any direct Intention of using it. The Consideration of the small Addition often made


made by Wealth to the Happiness of the Sect. 4. Possessor, may check this Desire, and prevent that *Insatiability* which sometimes attends it.

POWER in like manner is desired as the Means of gratifying other *original Desires*; nor can the Desire be avoided by those who apprehend its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the *Extravagance* of this Desire, and many of its consequent Pains, by considering “ the *Danger* of affecting it by “ injurious Means, supporting it by *Force*, “ without consent of the Subject, and “ employing it to *private Interest*, in opposition to publick Good.” No Mortal is easy under such Subjection; every Slave to such a Power is an *Enemy*: The Possessor must be in a continual State of *Fear*, *Suspicion* and *Hatred*.



THERE is nothing in our Nature leading us necessarily into the *fantastick Desires*; they wholly arise thro' our *Ignorance* and *Negligence*; when, thro' want of Thought, we suffer foolish *Associations* of Ideas to be made, and imagine certain trifling Circumstances to contain something *honourable and excellent* in them, from their being used by Persons of *Distinction*. We know how the *Inadvertences*, *Negligences*, *Infirmities*, and even *Vices*, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected,



Sect. 4.  fected, and imitated by those who were incapable of imitating their Excellencies. This happens often to young Gentlemen of plentiful Fortunes, which set them above the Employments necessary to others, when they have not cultivated any relish for the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, such as *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Painting*, *Poetry*, *Natural Philosophy*, *History*: When they have no farther Knowledge of these things, than stupidly to praise what they hear others praise: When they have neglected to cultivate their *publick Affections*, are bantered a long time from *Marriage* and *Offspring*; and have neither themselves Minds fit for *Friendships*, nor any intimate Acquaintance with such as are fit to make Friends of: When their *moral Sense* is weakned, or, if it be strong in any points, these are fixed at random, without any *regular Scheme*: When thro' Ignorance of *publick Affairs*, or want of *Eloquence* to speak what they know, they despair of the *Esteem* or *Honour* of the *Wise*: When their Hearts are too gay to be entertained with the dull Thoughts of increasing their *Wealth*, and they have not Ability enough to hope for *Power*; such poor empty Minds have nothing but Trifles to pursue; any thing becomes agreeable, which can supply the Void of Thought, or prevent the fullen Discontent which must grow upon a Mind conscious of no *Merit*, and expecting

the *Contempt* of its Fellows; as a *Pack* of *Sect. 4.*  
*Dogs*, an *Horse*, a *Jewel*, an *Equipage*,  
 a *Pack* of *Cards*, a *Tavern*; any thing  
 which has got any confused Ideas of *Ho-*  
*nour*, *Dignity*, *Liberality*, or *genteel En-*  
*joyment of Life* joined to it. These fan-  
 tastick Desires any Man might have banish-  
 ed at first, or entirely prevented. But if  
 we have lost the *Time* of substituting bet-  
 ter in their stead, we shall only change from  
 one sort to another, with a perpetual Suc-  
 cession of *Inconstancy* and *Dissatisfaction*.

—— Cui si vitiosa Libido

Fecerit Auspicium ——

*Idem eadem possunt horam durare probantes.*

Hor. Ep. I.

V. THE End of all these Considerations,  
 is to find out the most effectual way of ad-  
 vancing the Happiness of Mankind; in or-  
 der to which, they may perhaps appear of  
 considerable Consequence, since Happiness  
 consists in “ the highest and most durable  
 “ Gratifications of, either all our *Desires*,  
 “ or, if all cannot be gratify’d at once, of  
 “ those which tend to the greatest and  
 “ most durable *Pleasures*, with exemption  
 “ either from all *Pains* and Objects of *A-*  
 “ *version*, or at least from those which  
 “ are the most grievous.” The following  
 general Observations may be premised con-  
 cerning their Objects.

I

I. “ It

## Sect. 4.

The full  
Pursuit of  
all kinds of  
Pleasure is  
impossible.

1. "IT is plainly impossible that any Man should pursue the Gratifications of all these *Desires* at once, with Prudence, Diligence, and Vigor, sufficient to obtain the highest Pleasures of each kind, and to avoid their opposite Pains." For, not to mention the *Narrowness* of the Powers of our Minds, which makes them incapable of a Multiplicity of Pursuits at once; the very *Methods* of obtaining the highest Gratification of the several Senses and Desires, are directly inconsistent with each other. For example, the violent Pursuit of the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, or *Sensuality*, is opposite to the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, and to the Study of the ingenious *Arts*, which tend to the Ornament of Life: These require Labour and Application, inconsistent with the *Voluptuousness* of the external Senses, which by itself would engross the whole Application of our Minds, thro' vain Associations of Ideas.

AGAIN: The violent Pursuits of either of the former kinds of Pleasures, is often directly inconsistent with *publick Affections*, and with our *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*. These Pleasures require a quite different Temper, a Mind little set upon selfish Pleasures, strongly possessed with Love for others, and Concern for their  
Inte-



Interests capable of Labour and Pain. How-  
 ever our desire of Honour be really *selfish*,  
 yet we know it is never acquired by Actions  
 appearing selfish; but by such as appear  
 publick-spirited, with neglect of the Plea-  
 sures of the external Senses and Wealth.  
*Selfishness* is generally attended with  
*Shame*;\* and hence we conceal even our  
*Desire of Honour* itself, and are ashamed  
 of *Praise* in our own Presence, even when  
 we are doing beneficent Actions, with de-  
 sign to obtain it. The Pursuits of *Wealth*  
 and *Power* are often directly opposite to  
 the Pleasures of all the other kinds, at least  
 for the present, however they may be in-  
 tended for the future Enjoyment of them.

2. " THERE is no such *Certainty* in  
 " human Affairs, that a Man can assure  
 " himself of the perpetual Possession of  
 " these Objects which gratify any one  
 " Desire," except that of *Virtue* itself:  
 which, since it does not depend upon ex-  
 ternal Objects and Events †, but upon our  
 own *Affections* and *Conduct*, we may pro-  
 mise to our selves that we shall always en-  
 joy. But then Virtue consists in Benevo-  
 lence, or Desire of the publick Good: *The*  
*Happiness of others* is very uncertain, so

\* Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 7.

† Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.

Sect. 4. that our publick Desires may often be disappointed; and every Disappointment is uneasy, in proportion to the Degree of Desire. And therefore, however the *Admiration* and fixed *Pursuit of Virtue* may always secure one stable and constant Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, yet this Enjoyment presupposes a *Desire of publick Good*, subject to frequent Disappointments, which will be attended with Uneasiness proportioned to the Degree of publick Desire, or the *Virtue* upon which we reflect. There seems therefore no possibility of securing to our selves, in our present State, an *unmixed Happiness* independently of all other Beings. Every Apprehension of Good raises desire, every Disappointment of Desire is uneasy; every Object of Desire is uncertain except Virtue, but the *Enjoyment of Virtue* supposes the Desire of an uncertain Object, viz. the *publick Happiness*. To secure therefore independently of all other Beings invariable and pure Happiness, it would be necessary either to have the *Power* of directing all Events in the Universe, or to root out all *Sense of Evil*, or Aversion to it, while we retained our *Sense of Good*, but without previous Desire, the Disappointment of which could give Pain. The *rooting* out of all Senses and Desires, were it practicable, would cut off all Happiness as well as Misery: The removing or stopping a part of them, might indeed be

of consequence to the Happiness of the *Individual* on some occasions, however pernicious it might be to the *Whole*. But 'tis plain, we have not in our power the modelling of our *Senses or Desires*, to form them for a private Interest: They are fixed for us by the AUTHOR of our Nature, subservient to the Interest of the *System*; so that each Individual is made, previously to his own Choice, a Member of a *great Body*, and affected with the Fortunes of the *Whole*, or at least of many Parts of it; nor can he break himself off at pleasure.


THIS may shew the Vanity of some of the lower rate of Philosophers of the *Stoick Sect*, in boasting of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity, independently even of the DEITY, as well as of their Fellow-Creatures, wholly inconsistent with the Order of Nature, as well as with the Principles of some of their great Leaders: for which, Men of Wit in their own Age did not fail to ridicule them.

THAT must be a very fantastick Scheme of Virtue, which represents it as a *private sublimely selfish Discipline*, to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the Changes of Fortune as to our *Wealth or Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain*, but even in all *external Events*



Sect. 4. whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our dearest *Friends or Country*, solacing our selves that we are easy and undisturbed. If there be any thing amiable in human Nature, the Reflection upon which can give us pleasure, it must be kind *disinterested Affections* towards our Fellows, or towards the *whole*, and its *AUTHOR* and Cause. These Affections, when reflected upon, must be one constant Source of Pleasure in *Self-Approbation*. But some of these very Affections, being toward an uncertain Object, must occasion Pain, and directly produce one sort of Misery to the virtuous in this Life. 'Tis true indeed, it would be a much greater Misery to want such an amiable Temper, which alone secures us from the basest and most detestable State of *Self-Condemnation* and *Abhorrence*. But, allowing such a Temper to be the necessary Occasion of one sort of Happiness, even the greatest we are capable of, yet it may also be the Occasion of no inconsiderable Pains in this Life.

THAT this *affectionate Temper* is true Virtue, and not that *undisturbed Selfishness*, were it attainable, every one would readily own who saw them both in Practice. Would any honest Heart relish such a Speech as this from a *Cato* or an *Æmilius Paulus*?  
 “ I foresee the Effects of this Defeat, my  
 “ *Fellow-Creatures*, my *Countrymen*, my  
 “ honours-

“ honourable *Acquaintances*; many a ge-Sect. 4.  
 “ nerous gallant *Patriot* and *Friend*, *Fa-*  
 “ *thers*, *Sons*, and *Brothers*, *Husbands*  
 “ and *Wives*, shall be inflaved, tortured,  
 “ torn from each other, or in each others  
 “ fight made subject to the *Pride*, *Ava-*  
 “ *rice*, *Petulancy*, or *Lust* of the Conque-  
 “ ror. I have, for my own *Pleasure*, to  
 “ secure agreeable *Reflections*, laboured in  
 “ their Defence. I am unconcerned in  
 “ their Misfortunes; their *bodily Tortures*,  
 “ or more exquisite *Distresses of Mind*  
 “ for each other, are to me indifferent. I  
 “ am entirely absolute, compleat in my self;  
 “ and can behold their Agonies with as  
 “ much Ease or Pleasure, as I did their  
 “ Prosperity.” This is the plain Language  
 of some boasting *Refiners* upon Virtue;  
 Sentiments as disagreeable as those of *Ca-*  
*tiline*.

THE Desire of Virtue is toward an Ob-  
 ject *ἐν τῷ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, or in our power, since all  
 Men have naturally *kind Affections*, which  
 they may increase and strengthen; but these  
 kind Affections tend toward an *uncertain*  
*Object*, which is not in our power. Suppose  
 the *Stoick* should alledg, “ Vice is the only  
 “ Evil, and Virtue the only Good.” If  
 we have *Benevolence* to others, we must  
 wish them to be virtuous, and must have  
 compassion toward the vicious: thus still  
 we may be subjected to Pain or Uneasiness,

Sect. 4. by our *very Virtue* ; unless we suppose, *what* no Experience can confirm, that Men may have strong Desires, the Disappointment of which will give no *Uneasiness*, or that *Uneasiness* is no Evil. Let the *Philosopher* regulate his own Notions as he pleases about Happiness or Misery ; whoever imagines himself unhappy, is so in reality ; and whoever has *kind Affections* or *Virtue*, must be uneasy to see others really unhappy.

BUT tho a pure unmixed Happiness is not attainable in this Life, yet all their Precepts are not rendered useless.

*Est quoddam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.*

3. The full Sense of Good may be preferred, without the greater Pains of Desire, in many Cases.

3. FOR we may observe, thirdly, that “ the *Sense of Good* can continue in its full Strength, when yet we shall have but “ *weak Desires*.” In this case we are capable of enjoying all the Good in any Object, when we obtain it, and yet exposed to no great Pain upon *Disappointment*. This may be generally observed, that “ the *Violence of Desire* does not proportionably “ enliven the Sensation of Good, when it “ is obtained ; nor does *diminishing the Desire* weaken the Sensation, tho it will “ diminish the *Uneasiness of Disappointment*, or the *Misery of contrary Evils*.” Our high Expectations of Happiness from any



any Object, either thro' the *Acuteness* of Sect. 4. our *Senses*, or from our *Opinions* or *Associations* of Ideas, never fail to increase Desire: But then the *Violence* of *Desire* does not proportionably enliven our *Sensation* in the Enjoyment. During the first confused Hurry of our Success, our *Joy* may perhaps be increased by the Violence of our *previous Desire*, were it only by allaying the great Uneasiness accompanying the Desire itself. But this Joy soon vanishes, and is often succeeded by *Disgust* and *Uneasiness*, when our *Sense* of the Good, which is more fixed in Nature than our *Fancy* or *Opinions*, represents the Object far below our Expectation. Now he who examines all *Opinions* of Good in Objects, who prevents or corrects *vain Associations* of Ideas, and thereby prevents *extravagant Admirations*, or *enthusiastick Desires*, above the real Moment of Good in the Object, if he loses the *transient Raptures* of the first Success, yet he enjoys all the *permanent Good* or Happiness which any Object can afford; and escapes, in a great measure, both the uneasy Sensations of the more violent *Desires*, and the *Torments* of *Disappointment*, to which Persons of irregular Imaginations are exposed.

THIS is the Case of the *Temperate* and the *Chaste*, with relation to the Appetites; of the Men of *Moderation* and *Frugality*,  
and

Sect. 4. and *corrected Fancy*, with regard to the Pleasures of *Imagination*; of the *Humble* and the *Content*, as to *Honour*, *Wealth* or *Power*. Such Persons upon good Success, want only the first *transitory Ecstasies*; but have a full and lively *Sense* of all the lasting Good in the Objects of their Pursuit; and yet are in a great measure secure against both the Uneasiness of *violent Desire*, and the *Dejection* of Mind, and *abject Sorrow* upon Disappointment, or upon their being exposed to the contrary Evils.

FURTHER, Persons of *irregular Imaginations* are not soon reformed, nor their Associations of Ideas broke by every *Experience* of the Smallness of the Good in the admired Object. They are often rather set upon *new Pursuits* of the same kind, or of greater *Variety* of like Objects. So their experience of *Disappointment*, or of contrary Evils, does not soon correct their Imaginations about the Degrees of Good or Evil. The Loss of Good, or the Pressure of any Calamity, will continue to torment them, thro' their *vain Notions* of these Events, and make them insensible of the real Good which they might still enjoy in their present State. Thus the *Covetous* have smaller Pleasure in any given *Degree of Wealth*; the *Luxurious* from a *splendid Table*; the *Ambitious* from any given *Degree*

Degree of Honour or Power, than Men Sect. 4.  
of more moderate Desires: And on the  
other hand, the Miseries of Poverty, mean  
Fare, Subjection, or Contempt, appear  
much greater to them, than to the mode-  
rate. Experience, while these confused  
Ideas remain, rather increases the Disorder:  
But if just *Reflection* comes in, and tho  
late, applies the proper Cure, by correct-  
ing the *Opinions* and the *Imagination*,  
every Experience will tend to our Ad-  
vantage.

THE same way may our *publick Desires*  
be regulated. If we prevent confused No-  
tions of Good, we diminish or remove  
many Anxieties for our *Friends* as well as  
our selves. Only this must be remembred,  
that weakning our *publick Affections*, ne-  
cessarily weakens our *Sense* of publick Good  
founded upon them, and will deprive us of  
the Pleasures of the *moral Sense*, in reflect-  
ing on our Virtue.


4. WE may lastly remark, " That the  
" *Expectation* of any Pain, or the fre-  
" *quent Consideration* of the Evils which  
" may befall us, or the Loss of Good we  
" now enjoy, before these Events actually  
" threaten us, or raise any *Consternation*  
" in our Minds by their Approach, does  
" not diminish our *Joy* upon escaping Evil,  
" or our *Pleasure* upon the arrival of any  
" Good

4. Laying  
our ac-  
count to  
meet with  
Evil, often  
lessens our  
Misery.



Sect. 4. “ Good beyond Expectation: But this  
 “ previous Expectation generally diminishes  
 “ our *Fear*, while the Event is in sus-  
 “ pence, and our *Sorrow* upon its arrival;”  
 Since thereby the Mind examines the *Nature* of the Event, sees how far it is necessarily Evil, and what Supports under it are in its power: This *Consideration* may break vain Conjunctions of foreign Ideas, which occasion our greatest Fears in Life, and even in Death itself. If, indeed, a *weak Mind* does not study to correct the *Imagination*, but still dwells upon its possible Calamities, under all their *borrowed Forms* of Terror; or if it industriously aggravates them to itself, this previous Consideration may embitter its whole Life, without arming it against the smallest Evil.


THIS Folly is often occasioned by that Delight which most Men find in the *Pity of others* under Misfortunes; those especially, who are continually indulged as the *Favorites of Families or Company*, being long enured to the Pleasure arising from the perpetual *Marks of Love* toward them from all their Company, and from their tender *Sympathy* in Distress: this often leads them even to *feign Misery* to obtain Pity, and to raise in themselves the most dejected Thoughts, either to procure *Consolation*, or the Pleasure of observing the *Sympathy* of others. This *peevish* or *pettish*

*tish Temper*, tho it arises from something Sect. 4.  
 sociable in our Frame, yet is often the   
 Fore-runner of the greatest Corruption of  
 Mind. It disarms the Heart of its natural  
*Integrity*; it induces us to throw away our  
 true *Armour*, our *natural Courage*, and  
 cowardly to commit our selves to the vain  
 Protection of others, while we neglect our  
 own Defence.

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SECT.



## S E C T. V.

*A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intensity and Duration.*

I. **H**AVING considered how far these Desires must necessarily affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain; since by the first general *Observation*, the Pursuits of their several Pleasures, and the avoiding their several Pains, may often be inconsistent with each other; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are *the most valuable*, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others; and which of these Pains are *most grievous*, so as to be shunned even by the enduring of other Pains if necessary.

“ THE *Value* of any Pleasure, and the  
 “ *Quantity* or *Moment* of any Pain, is in  
 “ a compounded Proportion of the *Intensity*  
 “ *ness* and *Duration*.” In examining the  
 Duration of Pleasure, we must include not  
 only the Constancy of the *Object*, but  
 even of our *Fancy*; for a Change in either  
 of these will put an end to it.




To compare these several Pleasures and Pains as to their *Intenseness*, seems difficult, <sup>The difficulty in comparing the several Pleasures, as to Intenseness.</sup> because of the Diversity of *Tastes*, or *Turns of Temper* given by *Custom* and *Education*, which make strange *Associations of Ideas*, and form *Habits*; from whence it happens, that, tho' all the several kinds of original Senses and Desires seem equally natural, yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind, as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some pursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, and all other Pursuits are made subservient to them: Others are chiefly set upon the Pleasures of *Imagination* or *internal Senses*; *social* and *kind Affections* employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high *moral Sense*, and *Love of Honour*. We may sometimes find an high *Sense of Honour*, and desire of *Applause*, where there is indeed a *moral Sense*, but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made subservient to it: In this *Character* the Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the Imagination, have little room, except so far as they may procure *Distinction*. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the *Luxurious* would be quite opposite

**Sect. 5.** to that of the *Virtuous*. The *Ambitious* would differ from both. Those who are devoted to the *internal Senses* or *Imagination*, would differ from all the three. The *Miser* would applaud himself in his Wealth above them all. Is there therefore no disputing about Tastes? Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain the several Enjoyments for which they have a Relish? If they are, the Dispute is at an end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts, is as happy as a Hero, or Patriot, or Friend, who has newly delivered his Country or Friend, and is surrounded with their grateful Praises. The Fly or Maggot may think so of itself; but who will stand to its Judgment, when we are sure that it has experienced only one sort of Pleasure, and is a stranger to the others? May we not in like manner find some Reasons of appealing from the Judgment of certain Men? Or may not some Characters be found among Men, who alone are capable of judging in this matter?

The Pleasures of a moral Kind proved superior, by the Testimony of the *Virtuous*.

II. IT is obvious that “ those alone are capable of judging, who have experienced all the several kinds of Pleasure, and have their Senses acute and fully exercised in them all.” Now a high Relish for *Virtue*, or a strong moral Sense, with its concomitant publick Sense and Affections, and a Sense of Honour, was never alledged to impair our external Senses, or to


to make us incapable of any pleasure of the *Sect. 5.*  
*Imagination* ; *Temperance* never spoiled a   
*good Palate*, whatever *Luxury* may have  
done ; a generous affectionate publick Spi-  
rit, reflecting on itself with delight, never  
vitiated any Organ of *external Pleasure*,  
nor weakned their Perceptions. Now all  
virtuous Men have given *Virtue* this Testi-  
mony, that its Pleasures are superior to any  
other, nay to all others jointly ; that a  
friendly generous *Action* gives a *Delight*  
superior to any other ; that other Enjoy-  
ments, when compared with the Delights  
of *Integrity, Faith, Kindness, Genero-*  
*sity, and publick Spirit*, are but trifles  
scarce worth any regard \*.

NAY, we need not confine our Evidence *By the Tes-*  
to the Testimony of the *perfectly Virtu-* *timony of*  
*ous.* The *vicious Man*, tho no fit judge, *the Vicious*  
were he entirely abandoned, since he loses  
his *Sense* of the Pleasures of the *moral*  
*Kind*, or at least has not experienced them  
fully, yet he generally retains so much of  
human Nature, and of the *Senses* and *Af-*  
*fections* of our Kind, as sometimes to ex-  
perience even *moral Pleasures*. There is  
scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible  
to all *Species of Morality*.

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\* See this Argument in *Plato de Repub. Lib. 9.* And  
*Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.*





A LUXURIOUS *Debauchee* has never perhaps felt the *Pleasures* of a wise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social, and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own *moral Worth*, and merited *Esteem* and *Love*; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he may despise in comparison of his *Pleasures*. But if in any particular Affair, a *moral Species*, or *Point of Honour* has affected him, he will soon despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his *Friend*, whom he loves upon whatever fantastick Reasons, he can quit his *Debauch* to serve him, nay can run the Hazard of *Wounds* and *Death* to rescue him from Danger? If his *Honour* be concerned to resent an *Affront*, will he not quit his Pleasures, and run the hazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of *Cowardice* or *Falshood*? He will scorn one who tells him, that “ a  
 “ *Liar*, or a *Coward*, may be happy e-  
 “ nough, while he has all things necessary  
 “ to *Luxury*.” ’Tis in vain to alledge, “ that  
 “ there is no disputing about *Tastes* :” To every Nature there are certain *Tastes* assigned by the great AUTHOR of all. To the *human Race* there are assigned a *publick Taste*, a *moral one*, and a *Taste for Honour*. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more than their *external Senses* :  
 They

They may pervert them, and weaken them Sect 5.  
by false *Opinions*, and foolish *Associations*  
of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but  
by keeping them in their natural State, and  
gratifying them. The Happiness of an *In-*  
*sect* or *Brute*, will only make an *Insect* or  
*Brute* happy. But a Nature with further  
*Powers*, must have further *Enjoyments*.

NAY, let us consider the different *Ages*  
in our own Species. We once knew the  
time when an *Hobby-Horse*, a *Top*, a *Rat-*  
*tle*, was sufficient Pleasure to us. We grow  
up, we now relish *Friendships*, *Honour*,  
*good Offices*, *Marriage*, *Offspring*, *serving*  
*a Community or Country*. Is there no dif-  
ference in these Tastes? We were happy  
before, are we no happier now? If not,  
we have made a foolish Change of Fancy.  
An *Hobby-Horse* is more easily procured  
than an *Employment*; a Rattle kept in order  
with less trouble than a *Friend*; a *Top* than  
a *Son*. But this Change of Fancy does not  
depend upon our *Will*. “ Our Nature de-  
“ termines us to certain Pursuits in our se-  
“ veral Stages; and following her Dictates,  
“ is the only way to our Happiness. Two  
“ States may both be happy, and yet the  
“ one infinitely preferable to the other:  
“ Two Species may both be *content*, and  
“ yet the Pleasures of the one, greater be-  
“ yond all comparison, than those of the  
“ other.” The *virtuous Man*, who has

Sect. 5. as true a Sense of all external Pleasure as any, gives the preference to *moral Pleasures*. The Judgment of the *Vicious* is either not to be regarded, because of his Ignorance on one side; or, if he has experience of *moral Sentiments* in any particular Cases, he agrees with the *Virtuous*.

Experience  
proves the  
same.

III. AGAIN, we see in fact, that in the virtuous Man, *publick Affections*, a *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*, actually overcome all other Desires or Senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest Combate, and the Success is on the side of Virtue.

THERE is indeed an obvious Exception against this Argument. "Do not we see, " in many Instances, the *external Senses* " overcome the *moral*?" But the Reply is easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external Senses can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of *Innocence*, or the *Absence* of moral Evil; so that here the moral Sense is not engaged in the Combat. Do not our \* luxurious Debauchees, among their Intimates, continually defend their Practices as *innocent*? Transient Acts of Injustice may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the

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\* Treat. 2. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.



Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Sect. 2.  
 Evil, or upon some violent Motion of *Ap-*  
*petite*: and yet even in these cases, Men  
 often argue themselves into some *moral*  
*Notions* of their *Innocence*. But for a con-  
 tinued Course of Life disapproved by the  
 Agent, how few are the Instances? How  
 avowedly miserable is that State, wherein  
 all *Self-Approbation*, all *consciousness* of  
*Merit or Goodness* is gone? We might here  
 also alledge, what universal Experience con-  
 firms, “ that not only an Opinion of *In-*  
 “ *nocence* is a necessary Ingredient in a  
 “ Course of *selfish Pleasures*, so that  
 “ there should be no Opposition from the  
 “ moral Sense of the Agent; but that  
 “ some *publick Affections*, some *Species*  
 “ of *moral Good*, is the most powerful  
 “ *Charm* in all sensual Enjoyments.” And  
 yet, on the other hand, “ *Publick Affec-*  
 “ *tions, Virtue, Honour*, need no *Species*  
 “ of sensual Pleasure to recommend them;  
 “ nor even an Opinion or Hope of Ex-  
 “ emption from external Pain. These  
 “ powerful Forms can appear amiable, and  
 “ engage our Pursuit thro’ the rugged Paths  
 “ of *Hunger, Thirst, Cold, Labour, Ex-*  
 “ *pences, Wounds and Death.*”

THUS, when a Prospect of external  
 Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, en-  
 gages Men into Actions really evil, the  
*moral Sense* of the Agent is not really over-

Sect. 5. come by the *external Senses*. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The *Temptation* seems to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a *Point of Honour*, or a *moral Species*, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Pains of the *external Senses*, there can be no question made of a real Victory. The external Senses represent these Objects in the same manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the Virtuous their *Sense of Pain, Toil or Wounds*. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all *external Pleasure* of every kind. The Expences of *Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion* are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be known to the full. But the moral Sense, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known *external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage*: but, where there is a depraved *Taste*, and a weak *Understanding*, private Advantage, or the avoiding of some external Evil, may make Actions appear *innocent*, which are not; and then the moral Sense gives no Opposition. All the Conquest on such Occasions is only this, that private external *Advantage* surmounts our Aversion to *Dishonour*, by making us do Actions which *others* will censure, but we esteem *innocent*. In these Cases we generally fear only the Reproach of a *Party*,  
of


of whom we have conceived an unfavourable Opinion \*. Sect. 5.

NAY farther: It was before observed, that “ *fantastick Associations* of Ideas do “ not really increase the Pleasure of *Enjoyment*, however they increase the previous *Desire*. The want of such Associations does not abate the external *Pain*, tho it diminishes the previous *Fear*, or takes away some farther *Fears* “ which may attend the Pain.” So that a Man of the most correct Imagination does feel and know all the *Good* in external Pleasure, and all the *Evil* in Pain. “ When “ therefore the *moral Sense*, and *publick Affections*, overcome all *sensual Pleasure*, or *bodily Pain*, they do it by their “ own Strength, without *foreign Aids*. “ *Virtue* is never blended with *bodily Pleasure*, nor *Vice* with *bodily Pain* in “ our Imaginations. But when the external Senses seem to prevail against the “ moral Sense, or publick Affections, it “ is continually by *Aid* borrowed from the “ *moral Sense*, and *publick Affections* “ themselves, or from our Sense of Honour.” The Conquest is over a weakened moral Sense, upon partial views of Good, not by external Pleasure alone, but

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\* Sect. 4. Art. 3.



Sect. 5. by some *moral Species*, raised by a false  
 Imagination.

SET before Men in the clearest Light all external Pleasures, but strip them of their borrowed Notions of *Dignity, Hospitality, Friendship, Generosity, Liberality, Communication of Pleasure*; let no regard be had to the *Opinions* of others, to *Credit*, to avoiding *Reproach*, to *Company*: Separate from the Pursuit of Wealth all Thoughts of a *Family, Friends, Relations, Acquaintance*; let Wealth be only regarded as the Means of private Pleasure of the *external Senses*, or of the *Imagination*, to the Possessor alone; let us divide our confused Ideas, and consider things barely and apart from each other: and in opposition to these Desires, set but the weakest *moral Species*, and see if they can prevail over it. On the other hand, let us examine as much as we please, a *friendly, generous, grateful, or publick-spirited Action*; divest it of all external Pleasure, still it will appear the more lovely; the longer we fix our Attention to it, the more we admire it. What is it which we feel in our own Hearts, determining as it were our Fate as to Happiness or Misery? What sort of Sensations are the most lively and delightful? In what sort of Possessions does the highest Joy and Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has ever felt the Pleasure of a generous  
 .friendly

friendly *Temper*, of *mutual Love*, of com-  
*passionate Relief and Succour* to the dis-  
 tressed; of having *served a Community*, and  
 render'd Multitudes happy; of a strict *In-*  
*tegrity*, and *thorow Honesty*, even under ex-  
 ternal Disadvantages, and amidst Dangers; of  
 Congratulation and publick Rejoycing, in the  
 Wisdom and Prosperity of Persons beloved,  
 such as Friends, Children, or intimate  
 Neighbours? Who would not, upon Re-  
 flection, prefer that *State of Mind*, these  
*Sensations of Pleasure*, to all the Enjoy-  
 ments of the *external Senses*, and of the  
*Imagination* without them? \*

IV. THE truth, in a Question of this na-  
 ture, one might expect would be best  
 known by the Judgment of *Speçtators*,  
 concerning the Pursuits of others. Let  
 them see one entirely employed in Solitude,  
 with the most exquisite Tastes, Odors,  
 Prospects, Painting, Musick; but without  
 any *Society*, *Love* or *Friendship*, or any  
 Opportunity of doing a kind or generous  
*Action*; and see also a † Man employed in  
 protecting the Poor and Fatherless, receiving  
 the Blessings of those who were ready to  
 perish, and making the Widow to sing for

Sect. 5.

Our Judg-  
 ments in  
 the Case of  
 others  
 proves the  
 same.

\* See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of  
 Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*.

† See the Character of *Job*, Ch. 31. See also *Treat. 2.*  
 Sect. 6.

Joy;

*W* Sect. 5. Joy ; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger of Oppression ; who never despised the Cause of his very Slave, but considered him as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same Hand ; who never eat his Morsel alone, without the Orphan at his Table, nor caused the Eyes of the Poor to fail ; who never suffered the Naked to perish, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep ; who never took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own Power or Interest : Let this Character be compared with the former ; nay, add to this latter some considerable *Pains* of the *external Senses*, with *Labour* and kind *Anxiety* : which of the two would a Spectator chuse ? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and most suitable to human Nature ? Were he given to *Castle-building*, or were he advising a *Son*, or a *Friend*, which of these States would he chuse or recommend ? Such a Trial would soon discover the Prevalence of the *moral Species* above all Enjoyments of Life.

*Little Happiness in malicious Pleasures.*

V. THERE are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, arising from the Gratification of *Anger* or *Hatred*. To compare these Pleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds universally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion,



nion, either favourable or unfavourable, Sect. 5.  
 nor obtained any other Ideas than merely  
 that it is *sensitive*, fills us with Joy and  
 Delight: The apprehending the Torments  
 of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain.  
 The Poets know how to raise delight in us  
 by such *pastoral Scenes*, they feel the Power  
 of such *pleasing Images*: they know that  
 the human Heart can dwell upon such Con-  
 templations with *delight*; that we can con-  
 tinue long with Pleasure, in the View of  
*Happiness* of any Nature whatsoever. When  
 we have received unfavourable Apprehen-  
 sions of any Nature, as *cruel* and *savage*,  
 we begin indeed from our very publick Af-  
 fections, to desire their Misery as far as it  
 may be necessary to the Protection of  
 others.

BUT that the Misery of another, for its  
*own sake*, is never grateful, we may all  
 find by making this Supposition: " That  
 " had we the most savage Tyger, or Cro-  
 " codile, or some greater Monster of our  
 " own Kind, a *Nero*, or *Domitian*, chained  
 " in some Dungeon; that we were perfectly  
 " assured they should never have power of  
 " doing farther *Injuries*; that no Mortal  
 " should ever know their Fate or Fortunes,  
 " nor be influenced by them; that the  
 " *Punishments* inflicted on them would  
 " never restrain others by way of example,  
 " nor any *Indulgence* shown be discovered;  
 " that

Sect. 5. “ that the first Heat of our *Resentment*  
 “ were allayed by Time ” — No Mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of *Good* arising from their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischief, began himself to feel *Remorse* and *Anguish* for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray *Remorse* nor *Approbation*, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who would delight to load him with *useless Misery*?

IF the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises the Pleasure of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*? The Reason is plainly this: Upon apprehending *Injury* to our selves or others, NATURE wisely determines us to study *Defense*, not only for the present, but for the future. *Anger* arises with its most *uneasy Sensations*, as every one acknowledges. The *Misery* of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature scarce leads to any farther *Resentment*, when once the Injurious seems to us fully seized with *Remorse*, so that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their *Revenge* further, are prepossessed with  
 some

some *false Opinion* of Mankind, as worse Sect. 5.  
 than they really are ; and are not easily in-  
 clined to believe their hearty Remorse for  
 Injuries, or to think themselves secure.  
 Some *Point of Honour*, or *Fear* of Re-  
 proach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Re-  
 venge : But this farther confirms, that the  
*Misery of another* is only grateful as it al-  
 lays, or secures us against a furious Pain ;  
 and cannot be the Occasion, by itself, of  
 any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer  
*Absence of Injury* to *Injury revenged* ? Who  
 would not chuse an untainted *Reputation*, for  
*Courage* gained in a just War, in which,  
 without *Hatred* or *Anger*, we acted from  
 Love of our Country, rather than the Fame  
 acquired by asserting our questioned Courage  
 with furious *Anger* in a *Duel*, and with conti-  
 nued *Hatred* toward the Person conquered ?  
 Who can dwell upon a *Scene of Tortures*,  
 tho practis'd upon the vilest Wretch ; or can  
 delight either in the Sight or Description of  
*Vengeance*, prolonged beyond all necessity  
 of *Self-Defense*, or *publick Interest* ? “ The  
 “ Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Plea-  
 “ sures of Humanity and Virtue, as the fla-  
 “ king the burning, and constantly recur-  
 “ ring Thirst of a Fever, to the natural En-  
 “ joyments of grateful Food in Health.”

VI. WERE we to compare, in like man-  
 ner, the *Pains* of the publick and moral  
 Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with  
 other

*Moral*  
*Evil com-*  
*pared with*  
*other Evils,*  
*appears*  
*greater.*



Sect. 5. *other Pains of the external Senses*, or with  
 the greatest external Losses, we should find  
 the former by far superior. And yet no-  
 thing is more ordinary, than to find Men,  
 who will allow “ the *Pleasures* of the  
 “ former Classes superior to any other, and  
 “ yet look upon *external Pain* as more  
 “ intollerable than any.” There are two  
 Causes of Mistake. Reasons for this Mistake. 1. “ They  
 “ compare the most *acute Pains* of the ex-  
 “ ternal Senses with some *smaller Pains* of  
 “ the other Senses.” Whereas, would  
 they compare the strongest of both Kinds,  
 they would find the Ballance on the other  
 side. How often have Parents, Husbands,  
 Friends, Patriots, endured the greatest *bo-  
 dily Pains*, to avoid the Pains of their  
*publick and moral Sense*, and *Sense of Ho-  
 nour*? How do they every day suffer  
 Hunger, Thirst, and Toil, to prevent like  
 Evils to those they love? How often do  
 Men endure, for their *Party or Faction*,  
 the greatest external Evils, not only when  
 they are unavoidable, but, when by coun-  
 ter-acting their *publick or moral Sense*, or  
*Sense of Honour*, they could extricate  
 themselves? Some Crimes appear so horrid,  
 some Actions so cruel and detestable, that  
 there is hardly any Man but would rather  
 suffer *Death*, than be conscious of having  
 done them.

THE second Cause of Mistake in this Matter, is this, “ The avoiding moral Evil by the Sufferance of *external Pain*, “ does not diminish the *Sense* of the Pain; “ but on the other hand, the *Motive* of “ avoiding grievous Pain, really diminishes “ the *moral Evil* in the Action done with “ that design.” So that in such Instances we compare *external Pain* in its full strength, with a *moral Pain* of the lighter sort, thus alleviated by the Greatness of the *Temptation*\*. To make a just Comparison, it should be thus: “ Whether would a “ Man chuse to be tortured to Death, “ or to have, without any *Temptation* or “ *Necessity*, tortured another, or a dear “ Friend, or Child to Death?” Not whether a Man will betray his Friend or Country, for fear of Tortures, but “ whether “ it be better voluntarily, and under no “ fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, “ than to suffer Tortures, or the Pain of “ the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures?” Upon such Comparisons as these, we should find some other Pains and Misery superior to any *external Pain*. When we judge of the *State of others*, we would not be long in suspense which of these Evils to

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\* Treat. 2. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.

Sect. 5. chuse as the lightest for those whom we  
 ~~~~~ † most regarded.

*Publick
 Affections
 compared
 with our
 Desire of
 Virtue.*

VII. WE have hitherto only compared on the one side the *publick and moral Sense*, and the *Sense of Honour* jointly, with the *external Senses*, the *Pleasures of Imagination*, and *external Advantage or Disadvantage* jointly. The reason of joining them thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind not prepossessed with any *false Apprehensions* of things, the former three Senses and Desires really concur, in exciting to the same Course of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be opposite to *private Virtue*; nor can the *Desire of Virtue* ever lead to any thing pernicious to the Publick: Had Men also true Opinions, *Honour* could only be obtained by *Virtue*, or serving the Publick.

BUT since there may be some *corrupt partial Notions of Virtue*, as when Men have inadvertently engaged themselves into some Party or Faction pernicious to the Publick, or when we mistake the *Tendencies* of Actions, or have some Notions of the DEITY, ‡ as requiring some Actions
 appre-

† Treat. 2. Sect. 6. Art. 1.

‡ Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some particular moral Species, have produced these monstrous Decisions

apprehended pernicious to the publick, as Sect. 5. *Duties* to himself; in such cases there is room to compare our *publick Sense* or *Desires* with our *moral*, to see which is prevalent. The Pleasures of these Senses, in such cases, need not be compared; the following either the one or the other will give little Pleasure: The Pain of the counteracted *Sense* will prevent all *Satisfaction*. This State is truly deplorable, when a Person is thus distracted between two noble Principles, his *publick Affections*, and *Sense of Virtue*. But it may be inquired, which of these Senses, when counteracted, would occasion the *greater Pain*? Perhaps nothing can be answered *universally* on either side. With Men of *recluse contemplative Lives*, who have dwelt much upon some *moral Ideas*, but without large *extensive View* of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the *pub-*

sions or Apothegms; viz. "Some Actions are not lawful, tho they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happiness, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World, or to avoid universal eternal Misery."

"Fiat Justitia & ruat Cælum."

Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked upon as universally and necessarily Evil, is only this, "that in our present Constitution of Nature, they cannot possibly produce any good, prepollent to their evil Consequences." Whatever Action would do so, in the whole of its Effects must necessarily be good. This Proposition is Identick.

Sect. 5. lick Affections, and common Affairs of Life: The Sense of Virtue, in some partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; especially since these partial Species of Virtue have always some sort of kind Affection to assist them. With active Men, who have fully exercised their publick Affections, and have acquired as it were an Habit this way, 'tis probable the publick Affections would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any publick Necessity, do always break thro' the limited narrow Rules of Virtue or Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any Scheme of Principles to justify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in such cases, their moral Sense is brought over to the Side of their Affections, tho' their speculative Opinions are opposite to both.

The Moral Sense compared with the Sense of Honour.


VIII. IT is of more consequence to compare the *publick and moral Senses*, in opposition to the *Sense of Honour*. Here there may be direct Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the *Agent*, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.

To allow the Prevalence of *Honour*, cannot with any Person of just Reflection,
weaken

weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour Sect. 5.
presupposes * a *moral Sense*, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it. But it is enough for some *Writers*, who affect to be wondrous shrewd in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making all the World, as well as themselves, a *selfish Generation*, incapable of any real Excellence or Virtue, without any *natural Disposition* toward a *publick Interest*, or toward any *moral Species*; to get but a “ Set of different *Words* from those commonly used, yet including the same *natural Dispositions*,† or presupposing them,” however an inadvertent Reader may not observe it; and they are sufficiently furnished to shew, that there is no real *Virtue*, that all is but *Hypocrisy*, *Disguise*, *Art*, or *Interest*. “ To be honoured, highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proud or ashamed, are Words without any meaning, if we take away a *moral Sense*.” Let this Sense be as *capricious*, *inconstant*, different in different Persons as they please to alledge, “ a *Sense of Morality* there must be, and *natural* it must be, if the *Desire of Esteem*, *Pride* or *Shame* be natural.”

* See *Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 4.* † *Ibid.*

Sect. 5.




To make this comparison between the *publick* and *moral Senses* on the one hand, and that of *Honour* on the other, 'tis to be observed, that all *Aversion to Evil* is stronger than *Desire of positive Good*. There are many sorts of positive Good, without which any one may be easy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any *kind*, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The *avoiding of Evil* is always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a *Crime*, than the *Prospect of positive Good*: to make therefore just Comparisons of the Prevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several *Goods* should be opposed to each other, and their *Evils* to each other, and not the *Pleasures* of one compared with the *Pains* of another.

PUBLICK *Affections*, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleasures of *Honour*, but even the *Pains of Shame*. This is the most common Event in Life, that for some apprehended Interest of *Offspring, Families, Friends*, Men should neglect Opportunities of gaining *Honour*, and even incur *Shame* and *Contempt*. In Actions done for the Service of a *Party*, there can be no comparison, for *Honour* is often a Motive on both sides.

'TIS

'TIS also certain, that the *Fear of Shame*, in some Instances, will overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even *natural Affection*, Love of *Pleasure*, *Virtue*, *Wealth*, and even of *Life* itself. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their Offspring; has persuaded Men to the most dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their *Fortunes*, to counteract their *Duty*, and even to throw away their *Lives*. The Distraction and Convulsion of Mind observable in these *Conflicts* of Honour, with Virtue and publick Affection, shews how *unnatural* that State is, wherein the strongest *Principles of Action*, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.

'TIS perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of *Honour* on the one hand, or that of the Desire of *Virtue* and *publick Good* on the other. *Habits* or *Custom* may perhaps determine the Victory on either side. Men in high Stations, who have long indulged the Desire of *Honour*, and have formed the most frightful Apprehensions of *Contempt* as the worst of Evils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value *Reputation* in any particular, and dread *Dishonour* in that point, may have *Fear of Shame* supe-


Sect. 5. rior to all Aversions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged *good Nature*, or reflected much upon the Excellency of *Virtue* itself, abstracted from *Honour*, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

*Duels no
proper In-
stances.*

To compare the *moral Sense* with the Sense of *Honour*, we must find cases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears *Infamy* by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain *Praise* by an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself as considerable a Virtue, as the *Praise* to be expected from the Action would represent the Action to be. The common Instances, in which some, who pretend deep Knowledge of *human Nature*, triumph much, have not these necessary Circumstances. When a Man condemns *Duelling* in his private Sentiments, and yet practises it, we have indeed a considerable Evidence of the Strength of this *Desire of Honour*, or *Aversion to Shame*, since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But here on one hand, besides the *Fear of Shame*, there is the *Fear of constant Insults*, of losing all the *Advantages* depending upon the Character of Courage, and sometimes even some *Species of Virtue* and *publick Good*, in restraining an intolent Villain:

Villain : On the other hand is the *Fear of Sect. 5. Death*. The *moral Sense* is seldom much concerned : for however Men may condemn *voluntary Duelling* ; however they may blame the *Age* for the Custom, or censure the *Laws* as defective, yet generally, in their present Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of *Self-Defence* against opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of *Self-Defence* and *Prosecution of Injuries*. The Case seems to them the same with that of *Thieves* and *Night-Robbers*, who may be put to Death by private Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn *Duelling*, and yet practise it.

It is foreign to our present Purpose, to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of *Duels*, as they are commonly practised among us; when Men from a sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary *Affronts* the despising of which would appear honourable in every wise Mans Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adversary ; tho the *Success* in such Attempts can have no tendency to justify them

Sect. 5. against the dishonourable *Charge*, or to
 procure any Honour from Men of worth.

Nor the
 Case of
 Lucretia.

THE magnified Instance of *Lucretia* * is yet less to our purpose. Some talk, as if
 “ she indeed would rather have died than
 “ consented to the Crime ; but the *Crime*
 “ did not appear so great an Evil as the
 “ *Dishonour* ; to the Guilt she submitted to
 “ avoid the Shame.” Let us consider this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but *Fear of Shame*, and a *Sense of Duty* ? If we look into the Story, we shall find, that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the *Fear of Shame*, and of *Death*, which she little regarded, the Hope of *noble Revenge*, or rather of *Justice* on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant’s Family ; nay, the Hopes of a *nobler Fame* by her future Conduct ; the *Fear* of suffering that contumely by *force*, which she was tempted to consent to, and that in such a manner as she could have had no Redress. All these Considerations concurred to make her consent. On the other side, there was only the *moral Sense* of a Crime thus extenuated by the most grievous *Necessity*, and by hopes of *doing Justice* to her Husband’s Honour, and *rescuing her Country* : Nay,

* Livy, Lib. i. c. 57.

could she not have at once saved her *Character* and her *Life* by consenting; when in that virtuous Age she might have expected *Secrecy* in the Prince, since boasting of such Attempts would have been dangerous to the greatest Man in *Rome*?

It is not easy to find just Room for a Comparison even in fictitious Cases, between these two *Principles*. Were there a Person who had no Belief of any *DEITY*, or of any reality in *Religion*, in a Country where his *secular Interest* would not suffer by a Character of *Atheism*; and yet he knew that the Profession of zealous Devotion would tend to his *Honour*: If such a Person could have any Sense of *Morality*, particularly an Aversion to *Disimulation*, then his *Profession of Religion* would evidence the Superiority of the *Sense of Honour*; and his *Discovery* of his Sentiments, or *Neglect* of Religion, would evidence the Ballance to be on the other side. I presume in *England* and *Holland*, we have more Instances of the latter than the former. 'Tis true, our Gentlemen who affect the Name of *Freedom*, may have now their Hopes of *Honour* from their own *Party*, as well as others.

THE Adherence to any particular *Religion* by one in a strange Country, where it was dishonourable, would not be allowed a
good

Sect. 5. good Instance of the Prevalence of a *moral Species*; it is a very common thing indeed, but here are *Interests* of another Life, and Regard to a *future Return* to a Country where this Religion is in repute.

The Pleasures of Imagination greater than those of external Senses.

IX. THE Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the *external Senses*, tho they were enjoyed to the full.

OTHER Comparisons might be made but with less use, or certainty in any general Conclusions, which might be drawn from them.

THE Pleasures of *Wealth* or *Power*, are proportioned to the Gratifications of the *Desires* or *Senses*, which the Agent intends to gratify by them: So that, for the Reasons above offered, Wealth and Power give greater Happiness to the *Virtuous*, than to those who consult only *Luxury* or *external Splendor*. If these Desires are grown *enthusiastick* and *habitual*, without regard to any other end than *Possession*, they are an endless Source of Vexation, without any real *Enjoyment*; a perpetual *Craving*, without *Nourishment* or *Digestion*; and they may surmount all other Affections,
by

by Aids borrowed from other Affections Sect. 5.
themselves.

THE *fantastick Desires* are violent, in proportion to the Senses from which the *associated Ideas* are borrowed. Only it is to be observed, that however the Desires may be violent, yet the obtaining the *Object desired* gives little Satisfaction; the *Possession* discovers the Vanity and Deceit, and the *Fancy* is turned toward different Objects, in a perpetual Succession of inconstant Pursuits.

X. THESE several kinds of Pleasure or Pain are next to be compared as to their *Duration*. Here we are not only to consider the *Certainty* of the Objects occasioning these Sensations, but the *Constancy* of our Relish or Fancy.

I. THE Objects necessary to remove the Pains of *Appetite*, and to give as grateful *external Sensations* as any others, to a Person of a *correct Imagination*, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry. But then the *Sensations* themselves are short and transitory; the *Pleasure* continues no longer than the *Appetite*, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the *Intervals* of Enjoyment. When the Sensation is past, we are no happier for it, there is no pleasure in
Re-

Sect. 5. Reflection; nor are past Sensations any security against, or support under either *external Pain*, or any other sort of evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses pure, and unmixed with *foreign Ideas*, they cannot furnish Employment for Life: If *foreign Ideas* come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our *Relish* or *Fancy* full of Inconstancy and Caprice.

2. IN like manner, the Pleasures of the *Imagination* may be enjoyed by all, and be a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from *Property*, and keep our *Imagination* pure. Such are the Pleasures in the Observation of *Nature*, and even the Works of *Art*; which are ordinarily exposed to view. But as these give less Pleasure the more *familiar* they grow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much less can they secure us against, or support us under the *Calamities of Life*, such as *Anger*, *Sorrow*, *Dis honour*, *Remorse*, or *external Pain*. If the *monstrous* or *trifling Taste* take place, or the Ideas of *Property*, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleasure, frequent *Disgusts*, *Anxieties*, and *Disappointments*, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.

3. THE *publick Happiness* is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Course of *Events*. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our *publick Desires* must therefore frequently subject us to *Sorrow*; and the Pleasures of the *publick Sense* must be very inconstant. 'Tis true indeed, that a general *Good-will* to our kind, is the most constant Inclination of the Mind, which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we ever dissatisfied with the *Fancy*: the *Incertainty* therefore is wholly owing to the *Objects*. If there can be any Considerations found out to make it probable, that in the Whole all Events tend to Happiness, this implicit Hope indeed may make our *publick Affections* the greatest and most constant Source of Pleasure. Frequent *Reflection* on this, is the best Support under the Sorrow arising from particular evils, befalling our Fellow-Creatures. In our *nearer Attachments* brought upon our selves, we may procure to our selves the greatest Enjoyments of this kind, with considerable *Security* and *Constancy*, by chusing for our *Friends*, or *dearest Favourites*, Persons of just Apprehensions of Things, who are subjected only to the *necessary Evils* of Life, and can enjoy all
the

Sect. 5. the certain and constant Good. And in like manner, our Attachment to a *Country* may be fixed by something else than the *Chance of our Nativity*. The Enjoyments of the publick Sense cannot indeed secure us against bodily *Pains* or *Loss*; but they are often a considerable Support under them. Nothing can more allay *Sorrow* and *Dejection* of Mind for private Misfortunes, than good Nature, and Reflection upon the *Happiness* of those we love.

4. THE *moral Sense*, if we form true *Opinions* of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the *Affections* whence they spring, as it is the Fountain of the most *intense Pleasure*, so “ it is in itself *constant*, not “ subject to Caprice or Change. If we re- “ solutely encourage this Sense, it grows “ more acute by frequent *Gratification*, “ never cloy, nor ever is surfeited. We “ not only are sure never to want *Oppor-* “ *tunities* of doing good, which are in “ every one’s power in the highest De- “ gree; * but each good Action is Matter “ of pleasant *Reflection* as long as we live. “ These Pleasures cannot indeed wholly “ secure us against all kinds of *Uneasiness*, “ yet they never tend naturally to increase “ them. On the contrary, their general

* *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

“ Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent Sect. 5.
 “ into all Pleasures, in the highest Degree ~~~~~
 “ in which they are consistent with each
 “ other. Our *external Senses* are not
 “ weakned by Virtue, our *Imaginations*
 “ are not impaired; the *temperate Enjoy-*
 “ *ment* of all external Pleasures is the
 “ highest. A virtuous Conduct is generally
 “ the most prudent, even as to outward
 “ *Prosperity*. Where Virtue costs us
 “ much, its own *Pleasures* are the more
 “ sublime. It directly advances the Plea-
 “ sures of the *publick Sense*, by leading us
 “ to promote the publick Happiness as far
 “ as we can; and *Honour* is its natural
 “ and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot
 “ remove the *necessary Pains* of Life, yet
 “ it is the best Support under them. These
 “ moral Pleasures do some way more nearly
 “ affect us than any other: They make
 “ us delight in our *selves*, and relish our
 “ very *Nature*. By these we perceive an
 “ *internal Dignity and Worth*; and seem
 “ to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed
 “ often to the DEITY, by which we en-
 “ joy our own *Perfection*, and that of e-
 “ very other Being.”

It may perhaps seem too *metaphysical*
 to alledge on this Subject, that other *Sen-*
sations are all dependent upon, or related
 by the Constitution of our Nature, to
 something different from our *selves*; to a
 Body

Sect. 5. *Body* which we do not call *Self*, but something belonging to this *Self*. That other *Perceptions* of *Joy* or *Pleasure* carry with them *Relations* to *Objects*, and *Spaces* distinct from this *Self*; whereas “ the
 “ *Pleasures* of *Virtue* are the very *Perfection* of this *SELF*, and are immediately
 “ perceived as such, independent of external *Objects*.”

OUR Sense of *Honour* may afford very constant *Pleasures* by good *Oeconomy*: If our *moral Sense* be not perverted; if we form just *Apprehensions* of the *Worth* of others, *Honour* shall be pleasant to us in a compound *Proportion* of the *Numbers* and *Worth* of those who confer it. If therefore we cannot approve our selves to all, so as to obtain *universal Honour* among all to whom we are known, yet there are still *Men* of just *Thought* and *Reflection*, whose *Esteem* a virtuous *Man* may procure. Their *Dignity* will compensate the *Want* of *Numbers*, and support us against the *Pains* of *Censure* from the *Injudicious*.


THE *Inconstancy* of the *Pleasures* of *Wealth* and *Power* is well known, and is occasioned, not perhaps by *Change* of *Fancy*, for these *Desires* are found to continue long enough, since they tend toward the *universal Means* of gratifying all other *Desires*; but by the *Uncertainty* of *Objects*

or *Events* necessary to gratify such conti- Sect. 5.
nually increasing Desires as these are, where
there is not some fixed View different from
the *Wealth* or *Power* itself. When indeed
they are desired only as the Means of gra-
tifying some other well-regulated *Desires*,
we may soon obtain such a Portion as will
satisfy us. But if once the *End* be forgot-
ten, and *Wealth* or *Power* become grateful
for themselves, no farther Limits are to be
expected: the Desires are insatiable, nor
is there any considerable *Happiness* in any
given *Degree* of either.

XI. WERE we to consider the *Dura-* The Dura-
tion of the several Pains, we may find it tions of the
generally as the Duration of their Plea- several
sures. As to the external Senses, the old Pains con-
sidered.
Epicurean Consolation is generally just:
“ Where the Pain is violent it shortens our
“ *Duration*; when it does not shorten
“ our *Duration*, it is generally either *tole-*
“ *erable*, or admits of frequent *Intermis-*
“ *sions*;” and then, when the external
Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse
for having endured it. There is nothing
uneasy in the *Reflection*, when we have
no present *Pain*, or fear no *Return* of it.

THE *internal Senses* are not properly
Avenues of Pain. No *Form* is necessarily
the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.

Sect. 5.




THE Pains of the *moral Sense* and Sense of *Honour*, are almost perpetual. *Time*, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us no *Relief* from these. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself an uneasy Burden. Our very *Self*, our Nature is disagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The *Deformity* of *Vice* often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of it. Their Actions are under some Disguise of *Innocence*, or even of *Virtue* itself. When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a *Fury*, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one *Vice*, which perhaps has had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any, *viz.* *Cowardice*, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed *Cowards*, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of *Courage*? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent soever they may be about other Points of Morality. Other *Vices* would appear equally odious and despicable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were they equally stript of the *Disguises* of *Vir.*

Virtue. A vicious Man has no other Security against the Appearances of this terrifying *Form*, than *Ignorance* or *Inadvertence*. If *Truth* break in upon him, as it often must, when any *Adversity* stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use *Freedom* with his Conduct, he is render'd perpetually miserable, or must fly to the only Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible *Reparation* of Injuries, and a new Course of Life, the Necessity of which is not superseded by any *Remedy* suggested by the *Christian Revelation*.

THE Pains of the *publick Sense* are very lasting. The *Misery* of others, either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy *Reflection*, and must continue so, if their State appears in the whole *absolutely Evil*. Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a “good governing MIND, ordering all for good in the whole, with the Belief of a future State, where the particular seeming Disorders are rectified.” A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong *publick Affections* interesting us strongly in this *Whole*, and considering this *Whole* as one great *System*, in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these Pains, by removing the Opinion of any *absolute Evil*.

Sect. 5.



THE Pains arising from foolish *Associations of moral Ideas*, with the Gratifications of *external Senses*, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of *Beauty*, or *Grandeur*, or from the Desires of *Property*, the Humour of *Distinction*, may be as constant as the Pains of the *Senses* from which these Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these Associations is very little. “ The *Desires* of Trifles are often made “ very strong and uneasy ; the *Pleasures* “ of *Possession* very small and of short Continuance, only till the Object be familiar, or the *Fancy* change : But the *Pains* “ of *Disappointment* are often very lasting “ and violent. Would we guard against “ these Associations, every real *Pleasure* “ in Life remains, and we may be easy “ without these things, which to others “ occasion the greatest Pains.”

*Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Getulo Murice tinctas,
Est qui non habet, est qui nec curat habere. Hor.*

S E C T.

SECT. VI.

Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness.

WE see therefore, upon comparing the several kinds of Pleasures and Pains, both as to *Intention* and *Duration*, that “ the whole Sum of Interest lies upon “ the Side of *Virtue*, *Publick-spirit*, and “ *Honour*. That to *forfeit* these Pleasures “ in whole, or in part, for any other *Enjoyment*, is the most foolish Bargain; “ and on the contrary, to secure them “ with the *Sacrifice* of all others, is the “ *truest Gain*.”

THERE is one general *Observation* to be premised, which appears of the greatest Necessity for the just *Management* of all our Desires; viz. that we should, as much as possible, in all Affairs of Importance to our selves or others, prevent the *Violence* of their *confused Sensation*, and stop their *Propensities* from breaking out into Action, till we have fully examined the real *Moment* of the Object, either of our Desires

Constant
Discipline
necessary.

Sect. 6. or Aversions. The only way to affect
 this is, “ a constant *Attention* of Mind,
 “ an habitual *Discipline* over our selves,
 “ and a fixed *Resolution* to stop all Action,
 “ before a calm *Examination* of every
 “ Circumstance attending it; more parti-
 “ cularly, the real *Values* of external Ob-
 “ jects, and the *moral Qualities* or *Tem-*
 “ *pers* of rational Agents, about whom our
 “ Affections may be employed” This
 Power we may obtain over our selves, by
 a frequent Consideration of the great *Cala-*
mities, and pernicious Actions, to which
 even the *best of our Passions* may lead us,
 when we are rashly hurried into Action by
 their Violence, and by the *confused Sensa-*
tions, and *fantastick Associations* of Ideas
 which attend them: Thus we may raise an
habitual Suspicion and *Dread* of every
violent Passion, which, recurring along
 with them continually, may in some mea-
 sure counter-balance their *Propensities* and
confused Sensations. This *Discipline* of
 our Passions is in general necessary. The
unkind or destructive Affections, our *An-*
ger, *Hatred*, or *Aversion* to rational A-
 gents, seem to need it most; but there is
 also a great Necessity for it, even about the
tender and benign Affections, lest we should
 be hurried into *universal and absolute Evil*,
 by the Appearance of *particular Good*:
 And consequently it must be of the highest
 Importance to all, to strengthen as much

as possible, by frequent Meditation and Re-
flection, the calm Desires either private or
publick, rather than the particular Passions,
and to make the *calm universal Benevo-*
lence superior to them.


THAT the necessary *Resignation* of o-
ther Pleasures may be the more easy, we
must frequently suggest to our selves these
Considerations above-mentioned. “ *Ex-*
“ *ternal Pleasures* are short and transito-
“ ry, leave no agreeable *Reflection*, and
“ are no manner of *Advantage* to us when
“ they are past; we are no better than if
“ we had wanted them altogether.”

IN like manner, “ past Pains give us
“ no unpleasant *Reflection*, nor are we the
“ worse for having endured them. If they
“ are violent, our Existence will probably
“ be short; if not, they are tolerable, or
“ allow long Intervals of Ease.” Let us
join to these a *stoical Consideration*; “ that
“ *external Pains* give us a noble Oppor-
“ tunity of *moral Pleasures* in Fortitude,
“ and *Submission* to the Order of the
“ whole, if we bear them resolutely; but
“ if we fret under them, we do not alle-
“ viate the Suffering, but rather increase
“ it by *Discontent* or *Sullenness*.” When
external Pains must be endured volunta-
rily to avoid *moral Evil*, we must, as
much as possible, present to our selves

Sect. 6. “ the *moral Species* itself, with the *publick*
 “ *Good* to ensue, the *Honour* and *Appro-*
 “ *bation* to be expected from all good
 “ Men; the *DEITY*, and our own Hearts,
 “ if we continue firm; and on the con-
 “ trary, the *Remorse*, *Shame* and *Appre-*
 “ *hension* of *future Punishments*, if we
 “ yield to this Temptation.”

How necessary it is to break off the vain Associations of *moral Ideas*, from the Objects of *external Senses*, will also easily appear. This may be done, by considering how trifling the *Services* are which are done to our Friends or Acquaintances, by *splendid Entertainments*, at an Expence, which, otherways employed, might have been to them of considerable Importance. Men who are at ease, and of as *irregular Imaginations* as our selves, may admire and praise our *Magnificence*; but those who need more *durable Services*, will never think themselves much obliged. We cannot expect any *Gratitude* for what was done only to please our own *Vanity*: The *Indigent* easily see this, and justly consider upon the whole how much they have profited.

IF the Wealth of the *Luxurious* fails, he is the Object of *Contempt*: No body pities him nor honours him: his *personal Dignity* was placed by himself in his *Table*,

ble, *Equipage* and *Furniture*; his Admi- Sect. 6.
rers placed it also in the same: When 
these are gone all is lost.

— *Non est melius quo insumere possis ?*

Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite ? quare

Templa ruunt antiqua Deum ? cur improbe cara

Non aliquid Patriæ ex tanto emetiris acervo ?

Uni nimirum tibi recte semper erunt res :

O magnus posthac inimicis Risus. — Hor.

THERE is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused *Species of Morality*, than *Gallantry*. The sensible Pleasure alone must, by all Men who have the least Reflection, be esteemed at a very low rate : But the Desires of this kind, as they were by Nature intended to found the most constant uninterrupted *Friendship*, and to introduce the most venerable and lovely *Relations*, by *Marriages* and *Families*, arise in our Hearts, attended with some of the *sweetest Affections*, with a disinterested *Love* and *Tenderness*, with a most gentle and obliging Deportment, with something great and heroick in our Temper. The Wretch who rises no higher in this Passion than the mean *sensual Gratification*, is abhorred by every one : But these sublimer Sensations and Passions do often so fill the Imaginations of the *Amorous*, that they are unawares led into the most

~ Sect. 6. most contemptible and cruel Conduct which can be imagined. When for some trifling transitory *Sensations*, which they might have innocently enjoyed along with the highest *moral Pleasures* in Marriage, they expose the very Person they love and admire to the deepest *Infamy* and *Sorrow*, to the *Contempt* of the World, to perpetual *Confusion*, *Remorse*, and *Anguish*; or, to what is worse, an *Insensibility* of all Honour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil, to be the Scorn and Aversion of the World; and all this coloured over with the gay Notions of *Pleasantry*, *Gentleness*, *Politeness*, *Courage*, *high Enjoyment of Life*.

WOULD Men allow themselves a little Time to reflect on the *whole Effect* of such capricious Pursuits, the *Anguish* and *Distraction* of Mind which these Sallies of Pleasure give to *Husbands*, *Fathers*, *Brothers*; would they consider how they themselves would resent such Treatment of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Sister*; how much deeper such Distresses are, than those trifling Losses or Damages, for which we think it just to bring the Authors of them to the Gallows; sure none but a thorow Villain could either practise or approve the one more than the other.

A WISE Man in his Oeconomy, must do much even in Complaisance to the *Follies* of others, as well as his own *Convenience*, to support that general good *Opinion* which must be maintained by those who would be publickly useful. His *Expences* must be some way suited to his *Fortune*, to avoid the Imputation of *Avarice*. If indeed what is saved in *private Expences*, be employed in *generous Offices*, there is little danger of this Charge. Such a *Medium* may be kept as to be above *Censure*, and yet below any *Affectation of Honour* or *Distinction* in these matters. If one corrects his own *Imagination* in these things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to please others. He is still in a State fit to judge of the real *Importance* of every thing which occurs to him, and will gratify the false *Relish* of others, no farther than it is consistent with, and subservient to *some nobler Views*.

II. To make the Pleasures of *Imagination* a constant Source of *Delight*, as they seem intended in the Frame of our Nature, with no hazard of *Pain*, it is necessary to keep the Sense free from foreign *Ideas of Property*, and the *Desire of Distinction*, as much as possible. If this can be done, we may receive Pleasure from every *Work of Nature or Art* around us. We enjoy
not

Sect. 6. not only the whole of *Nature*, but the united Labours of all about us. To prevent the Idea of *Property*, let us consider “how little the *Proprietor* enjoys more “than the *Spectator*: Wherein is he the “better or the happier?” The *Poet*, or the *Connoisseur*, who judges nicely of the Perfection of the Works of Art, or the Beauties of Nature, has generally a *higher Taste* than the Possessor. The magnificent *Palace*, the grand *Apartments*, the *Vistas*, the *Fountains*, the *Urns*, the *Statues*, the *Grottos* and *Arbours*, are exposed either in their own *Nature*, or by the Inclination of the *Proprietor*, to the Enjoyment of others. The *Pleasure of the Proprietor* depends upon the *Admiration* of others. he robs himself of his chief Enjoyment if he excludes *Spectators*: Nay, may not a *Taste* for Nature be acquired, giving greater Delight than the Observation of Art?

*Deterius Lybicus olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis ?
 Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum,
 Quam quæ per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?
 Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,
 Laudaturque Domus, longos quæ prospicit Agros.
 Naturam expellas furca licet, usque recurret. Hor.*

Must an *artful Grove*, an *Imitation* of a *Wilderness*, or the more confined *Forms* or *Ever-greens*, please more than the real *Forest*,

rest, with the *Trees of God*? Shall a *Sta-Sect. 6.*
tue give more Pleasure than the *human* ~~~~~
Face Divine?

WHERE the *Humour of Distinction* is not corrected, our Equals become our Adversaries: The Grandeur of another is our *Misery*, and makes our Enjoyments insipid. There is only one way of making this Humour tolerable, but this way is almost inconsistent with the *Inclination* itself, viz. "continually to haunt with our Inferiors, and compare our selves with them." But if inconstant *Fortune*, or their own Merit do raise any of them to equal us, our *Pleasure* is lost, or we must sink our selves to those who are still *Inferior*, and abandon the Society of every Person whose *Art* or *Merit* raises him. How poor a Thought is this!

THE Pursuits of the *Learned* have often as much Folly in them as any others, when Studies are not valued according to their *Use in Life*, or the real Pleasures they contain, but for the *Difficulty* and *Obscurity*, and consequently the *Rarity* and *Distinction*. Nay, an abuse may be made of the most noble and manly Studies, even of *Morals*, *Politicks*, and *Religion* itself, if our Admiration and Desire terminate upon the *Knowledge* itself, and not upon
the

Sect 6. the Possession of the *Dispositions* and *Affections* inculcated in these Studies. If these Studies be only matter of *Amusement* and *Speculation*, instead of leading us into a constant *Discipline* over our selves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, we are not much better employed, than if we had been studying some useless Relations of *Numbers*, or Calculations of *Chances*.

THERE is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely *useless*. The most *abstracted Parts* of *Mathematicks*, and the Knowledge of *mythological History*, or antient *Allegories*, have their own Pleasures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of *Painting*, *Musick*, or *Architecture*; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that some are found, who have a Taste for these Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting any of those *inferior Tastes* engross the whole Man to the Exclusion of the nobler Pursuits of *Virtue* and *Humanity*.

CONCERNING all these Pleasures of the Imagination, let us consider also "how little support they can give Men under any of the Calamities of Life," such as the Treachery or Baseness of a *Friend*, a *Wife*, a *Child*, or the perplexing Intricacies

cies of our common Affairs, or the Apprehension of *Death*. Sect. 6.

*Re veraque Metus hominum, Curaque sequaces
Nec metuunt sonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela;
Audacterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes
Versantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,
Nec clarum vestis splendorem purpuream
Quid dubitas quin omne sit hoc rationis egestas?* Luc.

III. UNDER this Head of our Internal Sense, we must observe one natural Effect of it, that it leads us into *Apprehensions of a DEITY*. ^{Ideas of Divinity arise from the Internal Senses.} Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Harmony, wherever they occur, raise an Opinion of a MIND, of *Design*, and *Wisdom*. Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, excites *Veneration*, either toward itself, if we imagine it animated, if not animated, toward some apprehended Cause. No Determination of our Mind is more natural than this, no Effect more universal. One has better Reason to deny the Inclination between the *Sexes* to be natural, than a Disposition in Mankind to *Religion*.

WE cannot open our Eyes, without discerning *Grandeur* and *Beauty* every where. Whoever receives these Ideas, feels an inward *Veneration* arise. We may fall into a Thousand vain Reasonings: foolish limited Notions of DIVINITY may be formed, as attached to the particular *Places*
or

Sect. 6. or *Objects*, which strike us in the most lively manner. Custom, Prejudice of Sense or Education, may confirm some foolish Opinion about the *Nature* or *Cause* of these Appearances: But wherever a superior MIND, a governing INTENTION or DESIGN is imagined, there *Religion* begins in its most simple Form, and an inward *Devotion* arises. Our Nature is as much determined to this, as to any other Perception or Affection. How we manage these Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the greatest Importance to our Happiness or Misery.

THE Apprehension of an universal MIND with Power and Knowledge, is indeed an agreeable Object of Contemplation. But we must form our Ideas of all intelligent Natures, with some Resemblance or Analogy to our selves: We must conceive something correspondent to our *Affections* in the DIVINITY, with some *moral Apprehensions* of the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures. The *Order of Nature* will suggest many Confirmations of this. We must conclude some *Worship* acceptable, and some Expressions of *Gratitude* as our Duty. The Conceptions of the DEITY must be various, according to the different Degrees of *Attention* and *Reasoning* in the Observers, and their own Tempers and Affections. Imagining the divine MIND as *cruel*,
wrathful.

wrathful, or capricious, must be a perpetual Source of Dread and Horror ; and will be apt to raise a *Resemblance* of Temper in the Worshipper, with its attendant *Misery*. A contrary Idea of the DIVINITY, as good, and kind, delighting in universal Happiness, and ordering all Events of the Universe to this End, as it is the most delightful Contemplation, so it fills the good Mind with a constant *Security* and *Hope*, amidst either publick Disorders, or private Calamities. Sect. 6.

To find out which of these two Representations of the DEITY is the true one, we must consult the *Universe*, the Effect of his Power, and the Scene of his Actions. After what has been observed by so many ingenious Authors, both *Antient* and *Modern*, one cannot be at a loss which Opinion to chuse. We may only on this occasion consider the Evidences of divine Goodness appearing in the *Structure of our own Nature*, and in the Order of our *Passions and Senses*.

It was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the whole. Many of them indeed do not pursue the *private Good* of the Agent ; nay, many of them, in various Cases, seem to tend to his detriment, by concerning him violently in the Fortunes of *others*, in their

Evidences of the Goodness of God in the Frame of our Senses and Affections.


Sect. 6. *Adversity*, as well as their Prosperity. But they all aim at *good*, either private or publick : and by them each particular Agent is made, in a great measure, subservient to the *good of the whole*. Mankind are thus insensibly link'd together, and make one great *System*, by an invisible Union. He who *voluntarily* continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his *Kind*, makes himself happy : He who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, makes himself wretched ; nor yet can he break the *Bonds of Nature*. His *publick Sense*, his *Love of Honour*, and the very *Necessities* of his Nature, will continue to make him depend upon his *System*, and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a View to a general good *End* ; and may in our own Nature discern a universal Mind watchful for the whole.

THE same is observable in the Order of our *external Senses*. The simple Productions of Nature, which are useful to any Species of Animals, are also *grateful* to them ; and the pernicious or useless Objects are made disagreeable. Our external Sensations are no doubt often *painful*, when our Bodies are in a dangerous State ; when they want supplies of Nourishment ; when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears, “ that the *general Laws* “ are

“ are wisely constituted, and that it is ne- Sect. 6.
 “ cessary to the Good of a System of
 “ such Agents, to be under the Influence
 “ of *general Laws*, upon which there is
 “ occasion for *Prudence* and *Activity* ;”
 the particular *Pains* occasioned by a neces-
 sary *Law* of Sensation, can be no Objec-
 tion against the Goodness of the Author.

Now that there is no room for com-
 plaint, that “ our external Sense of *Pain*
 “ is made too acute,” must appear from
 the Multitudes we daily see so careless of
 preserving the Blessing of *Health*, of which
 many are so prodigal as to lavish it away,
 and expose themselves to external *Pains* for
 very trifling Reasons. Can we then re-
 pine at the friendly *Admonitions* of Na-
 ture, joined with some *Austerity*, when
 we see that they are scarce sufficient to re-
 strain us from Ruin? The same may be
 said of the *Pains* of other kinds. *Shame*
 and *Remorse* are never to be called too se-
 vere, while so many are not sufficiently re-
 strained by them. Our *Compassion* and
 friendly *Sense of Sorrow*, what are they
 else but the *Alarms* and *Exhortations* of a
 kind impartial *Father*, to engage his *Chil-*
dren to relieve a distressed *Brother*? Our
Anger itself is a necessary Piece of Ma-
 nagement, by which every pernicious At-
 tempt is made *dangerous* to its Author.

Sect. 6.




WOULD we allow room to our Invention, to conceive what sort of *Mechanifm*, what *Constitutions* of Senses or Affections a *malicious powerful Being* might have formed, we should soon see how few Evidences there are for any such Apprehension concerning the AUTHOR of this World. Our *Mechanifm*, as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel *Device*, no *Art* or *Contrivance* to produce evil: No such *Mark* or *Scope* seems ever to be aimed at. How easy had it been to have contrived some necessary Engines of *Mifery* without any use; some *Member* of no other service but to be matter of *Torment*; *Senses* incapable of bearing the surrounding Objects without Pain; Eyes pained with the *Light*; a *Palate* offended with the *Fruits* of the Earth; a *Skin* as tender as the Coats of the *Eye*, and yet some more furious Pain forcing us to bear these Torments? Human *Society* might have been made as uneasy as the Company of *Enemies*, and yet a perpetual more violent Motive of *Fear* might have forc'd us to bear it. *Malice*, *Rancour*, *Distrust*, might have been our natural Temper. Our *Honour* and *Self-Approbation* might have depended upon *Injuries*; and the *Torments* of others been made our *Delight*, which yet we could not have enjoyed thro' perpetual *Fear*. Many such Contrivances we
may

may easily conceive, whereby an evil *Mind* could have gratified his *Malice* by our *Misery*. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or Design of the Mechanism of this World?

OUR *Passions* no doubt are often matter of Uneasiness to our selves, and sometimes occasion Misery to *others*, when any one is indulged into a Degree of Strength beyond its *Proportion*. But which of them could we have wanted, without greater Misery in the whole? They are by Nature ballanced against each other, like the *Antagonist Muscles* of the Body; either of which separately would have occasioned *Distortion* and irregular *Motion*, yet jointly they form a Machine, most accurately subservient to the *Necessities*, *Convenience*, and *Happiness* of a rational System. We have a Power of *Reason* and *Reflection*, by which we may see what Course of Action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable *Gratifications* of all our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary *Pains*, or provide some support under them. We have Wisdom sufficient to form Ideas of *Rights*, *Laws*, *Constitutions*; so as to preserve large Societies in Peace and Prosperity, and promote a general Good amidst all the *private Interests*.

Sect. 6.



IF from the present Order of Nature, in which *Good* appears far superior to *Evil*, we have just Presumptions to conclude the DEITY to be benevolent, it is not conceivable “ that any Being, who desires the
 “ Happiness of others, should not desire a
 “ *greater Degree* of Happiness to them
 “ rather than a less; and that consequent-
 “ ly the whole *Series of Events* is the
 “ best possible, and contains in the whole
 “ the greatest possible *absolute Good* :” especially since we have no Presumption of any *private Interest*, which an *universal MIND* can have in view, in opposition to the greatest Good of the whole. Nor are the particular Evils occurring to our Observation, any just Objection against the perfect Goodness of the universal PROVIDENCE to us, who cannot know how far these Evils may be necessarily connected with the *Means* of the greatest possible absolute Good.

*The Con-
 duct of our
 publick
 Sense and
 Affections.*

IV. IN managing our *publick Sense* of the State of others, we must beware of one common Mistake, *viz.* “ apprehending
 “ every Person to be miserable in those
 “ Circumstances, which we imagine would
 “ make our selves miserable.” We may easily find, that the *lower Rank* of Mankind, whose only Revenue is their bodily Labour, enjoy as much *Chearfulness, Contentment,*

tentment, Health, Gaiety, in their own way, Sect. 6. as any in the highest Station of Life. Both their Minds and Bodies are soon fitted to their State. The *Farmer* and *Labourer*, when they enjoy the bare Necessaries of Life, are easy. They have often more *correct Imaginations*, thro' *Necessity* and *Experience*, than others can acquire by *Philosophy*. This Thought is indeed a poor Excuse for a base selfish *Oppressor*, who, imagining Poverty a great Misery, bears hard upon those in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of their natural *Conveniences*, or even of bare *Necessaries*. But this Consideration may support a compassionate Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miseries, of which the *Sufferers* are themselves insensible.

THE Pains of this *Sense* are not easily removed. They are not allayed by the Distinction of Pains into *real* and *imaginary*. Much less will it remove them, to consider how much of human Misery is owing to their own *Folly* and *Vice*. Folly and Vice are themselves the most pityable Evils. It is of more consequence to consider, what Evidences there are " that the " Vice and Misery in the World are smaller " than we sometimes in our melancholy " Hours imagine." There are no doubt many furious Starts of Passion, in which

Sect. 6. Malice may seem to have place in our Constitution; but how seldom, and how short, in comparison of Years spent in fixed kind Pursuits of the Good of a *Family*, a *Party*, a *Country*? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from *Humanity* and *kind Affection*? How many censurable Actions are owing to the same Spring, only chargeable on *Inadvertence*, or an Attachment to too *narrow a System*? How few owing to any thing worse than *selfish Passions* above their Proportion?

HERE Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the *Robberies*, *Piracies*, *Murders*, *Perjuries*, *Frauds*, *Massacres*, *Assassinations*, they have ever either heard of, or read in History; thence concluding all Mankind to be very wicked: as if a *Court of Justice* were the proper Place of making an Estimate of the *Morals* of Mankind, or an *Hospital* of the *Healthfulness* of a Climate. Ought they not to consider, that the Number of honest *Citizens* and *Farmers* far surpasses that of all sorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themselves, surpass their Crimes in Numbers? That 'tis the *Rarity* of Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good Actions, which engages our Attention to them, and makes them be recorded in History; while incomparably more honest, generous, domest.

domestick Actions are overlooked, only Sect. 6. because they are so common ; as one great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sickness*, shall become a frequently repeated Story, during a long Life of Health and Safety.


THE Pains of the *external Senses* are pretty frequent, but how short in comparison of the long Tracts of Health, Ease and Pleasure ? How rare is the Instance of a Life, with one tenth spent in violent Pain ? How few want absolute Necessaries ; nay, have not something to spend on *Gaiety* and *Ornament* ? The Pleasures of *Beauty* are exposed to all in some measure. These kinds of Beauty which require *Property* to the full Enjoyment of them, are not ardently desired by many. The Good of every kind in the Universe, is plainly superior to the Evil. How few would accept of *Annihilation*, rather than Continuance in Life in the middle State of Age, Health and Fortune ? Or what separated Spirit, who had considered human Life, would not, rather than perish, take the hazard of it again, by returning into a Body in the State of Infancy ?

——— *Who would lose,
For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,
These Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost
In the wide Womb of uncreated Night,
Devoid of Sense and Motion—— ?*

Milton's *Par. lost*, Book. 2.

THESE

Sect. 6.



THESE Thoughts plainly shew a *Prevalence* of Good in the World. But still our publick Sense finds much matter of compassionate Sorrow among Men. The *Many* are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison of the whole, and yet a great *Multitude*.

WHAT Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of *Teeth*, were they sure they would be short, and end well? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an Incision, which was necessary for the Cure, and would certainly accomplish it? Is there then no *Parent* in NATURE, no *Physician* who sees what is necessary for the *Whole*, and for the good of each Individual in the whole of his Existence, as far as is consistent with the general Good? Can we expect, in this our *Childhood* of Existence, to understand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Physician of Nature? May not some harsh Discipline be necessary to Good? May not many natural Evils be necessary to prevent future moral Evils, and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good? Is not *Suffering* and *Distress* requisite, before there can be room for generous Compassion, *Succour*, and *Liberality*? Can there be *Forgiveness*, *Returns of good for evil*,

unless there be some *moral Evil*? Must the *Whole* want the eternally delightful *Con-*
sciousness of such *Actions* and *Dispositions*,
 to prevent a few transient Sensations of
 Pain, or natural Evil? May there not be
 some unseen Necessity for the greatest uni-
 versal Good, that * there should be an *Or-*
der of Beings no more perfect than we are,
 subject to Error and wrong Affections some-
 times? May not all the present Disorders
 which attend this State of *prevalent Or-*
dence in a future Part of our Existence?
 This Belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE,
 and a *future State*, are the only sure Sup-
 ports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire
 and strengthen our Love and Concern for
 this *Whole*, and acquiesce in what the go-
 verning MIND, who presides in it, is or-
 dering in the wisest manner, tho not yet
 fully known to us, for its most universal
 Good.

A FUTURE State, firmly believed, <sup>The Necessi-
 sity of be-
 lieving a
 future
 State.</sup>
 makes the greatest Difficulties on this Sub-
 ject to vanish. No particular *finite Evils*
 can be looked upon as intolerable, which
 lead to Good, infinite in *Duration*. Nor
 can we complain of the Conditions of
 Birth, if the present Evils of Life have

* See the Archbishop of Dublin, *De Origine Mali*.

Sect. 6. even a probable hazard of *everlasting Happiness* to compensate them ; much more if it be placed in our power certainly to obtain it. Never could the boldest Epicurean bring the lightest Appearance of Argument against the *Possibility* of such a State, nor was there ever any thing tolerable advanced against its *Probability*. We have no Records of any Nation which did not entertain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages, have found at least probable Arguments for it ; and the Vulgar have been prone to believe it, without any other *Argument* than their natural Notions of *Justice* in the *Administration of the World*. Present *Hope* is present Good : and this very Hope has enlivened human Life, and given ease to generous Minds, under Anxieties about the publick Good.

THIS Opinion was interwoven with all Religions ; and as it in many instances overballanced the Motives to Vice, so it removed Objections against *Providence*. The good Influence of this Opinion, however it might not justify any *Frauds*, yet probably did more good than what might overballance many Evils flowing from even very *corrupt Religions*. How agreeable then must it be to every good Man, that this Opinion, were there even no more to be done, should be confirmed beyond question or doubt, by a well attested *divine*

vine Revelation, for the perpetual *Security* Sect. 6. of the virtuous, and for the constant Support of the *kind and compassionate*? How gladly must every honest Heart receive it; and rejoice that even those who have neither *Leisure* nor *Capacity* for deep *Reflection*, should be thus convinced of it?

As to the Management of those Passions which seem *opposite* to the *Happiness* of others, such as *Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Hatred*; it is very necessary to represent to our selves continually, the most *favourable Conceptions* of others, and to force our Minds to examine the *real Springs* of the resented Actions. We may almost universally find, that “ no Man acts from “ *pure Malice*; that the Injurious only “ intended some *Interest of his own*, without any *ultimate Desire* of our *Misery*; that he is more to be pitied for his “ own mean *selfish Temper*, for the want “ of true *Goodness*, and its attendant *Happiness*, than to be hated for his Conduct, “ which is really more pernicious to himself than to others*. Our *Lenity, Forgiveness*, and *Indulgence* to the *Weakness* of others, will be constant Matter “ of *delightful Consciousness*, and *Self-*

The Conduct of the unkind Affections.

* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in *Plato's Gorgias*.

Sect. 6. “ *Approbation*; and will be as probably
 “ effectual in most cases, to obtain *Repa-*
 “ *ration* of Wrongs, from an hearty *Re-*
 “ *morse*, and thorow *Amendment* of the
 “ *Temper* of the Injurious, as any *Me-*
 “ *thods* of Violence.” Could we raise our
 Goodness even to an higher Pitch, and
 consider “ the Injurious as our *Fellow-*
 “ *Members* in this great intellectual Body,
 “ whose Interest and Happiness it becomes
 “ us to promote, as much as we can con-
 “ sistently with that of others, and not
 “ to *despise*, *scorn*, or *cut them off*, be-
 “ cause of every *Weakness*, *Deformity*,
 “ or *lighter Disorder* ;” we might bring
 our selves to that divine Conduct, of even
returning good for evil.

IN like manner, our *Emulation*, *Jealousy*, or *Envy*, might be restrained in a great measure, by a constant *Resolution* of bearing always in our Minds the * *love-ly Side* of every Character: † “ The
 “ compleatly Evil are as rare as the per-
 “ fectly Virtuous: There is something
 “ amiable almost in every one.” Could we enure our selves constantly to dwell on these things, we might often bear patiently the *Success of a Rival*, nay, sometimes even rejoice in it, be more happy our

* Epictet. Enchir. Cap. 65.

† Plato Phædon.

selves, and turn him into a real *Friend*. Sect. 6.
We should often find those *Phantoms* of
Vice and Corruption which torment the
Jealous, vanishing before the bright Warmth
of a thorow *good Temper*, resolved to
search for every thing *lovely and good*, and
averse to think any *evil*.

V. IN governing our *moral Sense*, and *Desires of Virtue*, nothing is more neces-
sary than to study the *Nature and Tendency* of human Actions; and to extend our
views to the *whole Species*, or to all *sensitive Natures*, as far as they can be af-
fected by our Conduct. Our moral Sense
thus regulated, and constantly followed in
our Actions, may be the most constant
Source of the most *stable Pleasure*. The
same Conduct is always the most probable
Means of obtaining the *Pleasures of Honour*.
If there be a Distinction between
Truth and *Falshood*, Truth must be stronger
than Falshood: It must be more probable
that *Truth* will generally prevail; that the
real *good Tendency* of our Actions, and
the *Wisdom* of our *Intentions* will be
known; and *Misrepresentations* or *partial Views*
will vanish. Our Desire of *Honour*
is not confined to our present State. The
Prospect of *future Glory* is a strong Mo-
tive of Action. And thus the *Time*, in
which our Character may have the hazard
of obtaining Justice, has no other Limits
than

Sect. 6. than those of the *Existence of rational Na-*
 ~~~~~*tures.* Whereas, *partial Notions* of Vir-  
 tue, and *partial Conduct*, have no other  
 Foundation for *Self-Approbation*, than our  
*Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence*; nor  
 for *Honour*, than the like *Ignorance, Er-*  
*ror, or Inadvertence* of others.

THAT we may not be engaged into any  
 thing contrary to the publick Good, or to  
 the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Desire  
 of *false Honour*, or *Fear of false Shame*,  
 it is of great use to examine the *real Dig-*  
*nity* of those we converse with, and to con-  
 fine our *Intimacies* to the truly virtuous  
 and wise. From such we can expect no  
 Honour, but according to our sincere Pur-  
 suit of the *publick Good*; nor need we ever  
 fear any *Shame* in such a Course. But above  
 all, did we frequently, and in the most  
 lively manner, present to our selves that  
 great, and wise, and good MIND, which  
 presides over the Universe, sees every *Ac-*  
*tion*, and knows the true *Character* and  
*Disposition* of every Heart, approving no-  
 thing but sincere Goodness and Integrity;  
 did we consider that the time will come,  
 when we shall be as conscious of his *Pre-*  
*sence*, as we are of our own *Existence*; as  
 sensible of his *Approbation* or *Condemna-*  
*tion*, as we are of the Testimony of our  
 own Hearts; when we shall be engaged in  
 a *Society of Spirits*, stripped of these *Pre-*  
*judices*



*judices* and *false Notions* which so often Sect. 6.  
attend us in *Flesh and Blood*, how should we despise that Honour which is from Men, when opposite to the truest Honour from GOD himself?

VI. CONCERNING the Desires of *Wealth* and *Power*, besides what was suggested above to allay their Violence, from considering the small Addition commonly made to the *Happiness* of the Possessor, by the greatest Degrees of them, and the *Uncertainty* of their Continuance; if we have obtained any share of them, let us examine their *true Use*, and what is the best Enjoyment of them.

— — — *Quid asper*

*Utile Nummus habet? Patria carisque propinquis*  
*Quantum elargiri decet? — Perſius.*

WHAT *moral Pleasures*, what Delights of *Humanity*, what *Gratitude* from Persons obliged, what *Honour*, may a wise Man of a generous Temper purchase with them? How foolish is the Conduct of heaping up *Wealth* for *Posterity*, when smaller Degrees might make them equally happy! when great *Prospects* of this kind are the strongest *Temptations* to them, to indulge *Sloth*, *Luxury*, *Debauchery*, *Insolence*, *Pride*, and *Contempt* of their Fellow-Creatures;

O

and

Sect. 6. and to banish some noble Dispositions, *Humility, Compassion, Industry, Hardiness of Temper and Courage*, the Offspring of the sober rigid Dame *Poverty*. How often does the *Example*, and almost direct *Instruction* of Parents, lead Posterity into the basest Views of Life!

————— *Qui nulla exempla beati*  
*Pauperis esse putat* —————  
*Cum dicis Juveni stultum qui donat amico,*  
*Qui paupertatem levat attollitque propinqui,*  
*Et spoliare doces & circumscribere* —————  
*Ergo Ignem, cujus scintillas ipse dedisti,*  
*Flagrantem late, & rapientem cuncta videbis.*

Juv. Sat. 14.

How powerfully might the Example of a wisely generous Father, at once teach his Offspring the true *Value* of Wealth or Power, and prevent their *Neglect* of them, or foolish *throwing* them away, and yet inspire them with a *generous Temper*, capable of the just *Use* of them!

Support a-  
 gainst  
 Death.

DEATH is one Object of our *Aversion*, which yet we cannot avoid. It can scarcely be said, that “ the *Desire of Life* is as “ strong as the Sum of all *selfish Desires*.” It may be so with those who enure themselves to no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*. But how often do we see  
 Death

Death endured, not only from Love of Sect. 6.  
*Virtue*, or *publick Affections*, in Heroes and Martyrs, but even from Love of *Honour* in lower Characters! Many Aversions are stronger than that to Death. *Fear of bodily Pain*, *fear of Dishonour*, which are selfish Aversions, do often surpass our Aversion to Death, as well as *publick Affections* to Countries or Friends. It is of the greatest Consequence to the *Enjoyment* of Life, to know its true *Value*; to strip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Terror; to consider it barely as the *Cessation of both the Pains and Pleasures we now feel*, coming frequently upon us with no more Pain than that of *Swooning*, with a noble Hazard, or rather a certain *Prospect* of superior Happiness to every *good Mind*. Death in this view must appear an inconsiderable Evil, in comparison of *Vice*, *Self-Abhorrence*, real *Dishonour*, the *Slavery of one's Country*, the *Misery of a Friend*.

THE tender Regards to a *Family* and *Offspring*, are often the strongest Bands to restrain a generous Mind from submitting to Death. What shall be the Fate of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Friend*, or a *Brother*, when we are gone, are the frequent Subjects of grievous Anxiety. The Fortunes of such Persons often depend much upon us; and when they do not, yet we are more anxious




Sect. 6. about their State when we shall be absent.

*Ut assidens implumibus pullis avis,  
Serpentium allapsus timet  
Magis relictis, non ut adsit Auxili  
Latura plus presentibus. Hor.*

Next to the Belief of a good PROVIDENCE, nothing can support Men more under such *Anxieties*, than considering how often the *Orphan* acquires a *Vigor* of Mind, *Sagacity* and *Industry*, superior to those who are enfeebled by the constant *Care* and *Services* of others. A wise Man would desire to be provided with Friends against such an *Exigency*; Persons of such Goodness, as would joyfully accept the *Legacy* of a *Child*, or indigent *Friend* committed to their Protection.

IF Death were an *entire End* of the Person, so that no Thought or Sense should remain, all *Good* must cease at Death, but no *Evil* commence. The *Loss of Good* is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a Being which has lost all *Sense of Evil*. Were this the Case, the Consolation against Death would only be this, frequently to look upon *Life* and all its Enjoyments as granted to us only for a *short Term*; to employ this uncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment of the *noblest Pleasures*;

*fures*; and to prevent Surprize at our Re. Sect. 6.  
moval, by *laying our Account* for it. 

BUT if we exist, and think after Death, and retain our *Senses* of Good and Evil, no Consolation against Death can be suggested to a *wicked Man*; but for the *virtuous*, there are the best Grounds of *Hope* and *Joy*. If the *Administration* of the whole be good, we may be sure “ that *Order* “ and *Happiness* will in the whole prevail : “ Nor will *Misery* be inflicted any farther “ than is necessary for some prepollent “ Good.” Now there is no Presumption, that the *absolute Misery* of any *virtuous* Person can be necessary to any good End: Such Persons therefore are the most likely to enjoy a State of perfect Happiness.

VII. To conclude: Let us consider that common Character, which when ascribed to any *State, Quality, Disposition, or Action*, engages our *Favour* and *Approbation* of it, *viz.* its being *natural*. We have many Suspicions about *Tempers* or *Dispositions* formed by *Art*, but are some way prepossessed in favour of what is *natural*: We imagine it must be advantageous and delightful to be in a natural State, and to live according to Nature. “ This very “ Presumption in favour of what is natural, “ is a plain Indication that the Order of “ Nature is good, and that Men are some

What is  
the natural  
State of  
Men.

O 3

“ way

Sect. 6. " way convinced of it. Let us enquire  
 ~~~~~ " then what is meant by it."

IF by natural we mean " that which we
 " enjoy or do, when we first begin to ex-
 " ist, or to think," it is impossible to
 know what *State*, *Temper*, or *Actions*,
 are *natural*. Our *natural State* in this
 Sense differs little from that of a *Plant*, ex-
 cept in some accidental *Sensations of Hun-*
ger, or of *Ease*, when we are well nourished.

SOME elaborate Treatises of great Phi-
 losophers about *innate Ideas*, or Principles
 practical or speculative, amount to no more
 than this, " That in the Beginning of our
 " Existence we have no *Ideas* or *Judg-*
 " *ments* ;" they might have added too, on
Sight, *Taste*, *Smell*, *Hearing*, *Desire*,
Volition. Such Dissertations are just as
 useful for understanding *human Nature*, as
 it would be in explaining the *animal Oeco-*
nomy, to prove that the *Fœtus* is animated
 before it has *Teeth*, *Nails*, *Hair*, or before
 it can *eat*, *drink*, *digest*, or *breathe* : Or in
 a *natural History of Vegetables*, to prove
 that *Trees* begin to grow before they have
Branches, *Leaves*, *Flower*, *Fruit*, or *Seed* :
 And consequently that all these things were
 adventitious, or the Effect of Art.

BUT if we call " that *State*, those
 " *Dispositions* and *Actions*, *natural*, to
 " which

“ which we are inclined by some part of Sect. 6.
 “ our Constitution, antecedently to any
 “ *Volition of our own*; or which flow
 “ from some *Principles* in our Nature, not
 “ brought upon us by our own *Art*, or
 “ that of others;” then it may appear,
 from what was said above, that “ a State
 “ of *Good-will, Humanity, Compassion,*
 “ *mutual Aid, propagating and support-*
 “ *ing Offspring, Love of a Community or*
 “ *Country, Devotion, or Love and Gra-*
 “ *titude to some governing Mind*, is our
 “ natural State,” to which we are naturally
 inclined, and do actually arrive, as univer-
 sally, and with as much uniformity, as we
 do to a certain *Stature and Shape*.

IF by natural we understand “ the
 “ *highest Perfection of the Kind*, to which
 “ any Nature may be improved by culti-
 “ vating its natural Dispositions or Pow-
 “ ers;” as few arrive at this in the Growth
 of their *Bodies*, so few obtain it in their
Minds. But we may see what this Perfec-
 tion is, to which our *natural Dispositions*
 tend, when we improve them to the ut-
 most, as far as they are consistent with
 each other, making the *weaker or meaner*
 yield to the *more excellent and stronger*.
 Our several *Senses and Affections, publick*
 and *private*, with our Powers of *Reason*
 and *Reflection*, shew this to be the *Per-*
fection of our Kind, viz. “ to know,
 O 4 “ love,

Sect. 6. “ love, and reverence the great AUTHOR
 “ of all things ; to form the most *exten-*
 “ *sive Ideas* of our own true Interests, and
 “ those of all other *Natures*, *rational* or
 “ *sensitive* ; to abstain from all *Injury* ;
 “ to pursue regularly and impartially the
 “ *most universal absolute Good*, as far
 “ as we can ; to enjoy constant *Self-App-*
 “ *robation*, and *Honour* from wise Men ;
 “ with *Trust* in *divine PROVIDENCE*,
 “ *Hope* of *everlasting Happiness*, and a
 “ full *Satisfaction* and *Assurance* of Mind,
 “ that the whole Series of *Events* is di-
 “ rected by an unerring *Wisdom*, for the
 “ greatest universal *Happiness* of the
 “ whole.”

To assert that “ Men have generally
 “ arrived to the *Perfection of their Kind*
 “ in this Life,” is contrary to Experience.
 But on the other hand, to suppose “ no Or-
 “ der at all in the *Constitution* of our Na-
 “ ture, or no *prevalent Evidences* of good
 “ Order,” is yet more contrary to Expe-
 rience, and would lead to a Denial of
 PROVIDENCE in the most important Af-
 fair which can occur to our Observation.
 We actually see such Degrees of *good Order*,
 of *social Affection*, of *Virtue* and *Honour*,
 as make the Generality of Mankind conti-
 nue in a tolerable, nay, an *agreeable* State.
 However, in some Tempers we see the
selfish Passions by Habits grown too strong ;
 in

in others we may observe *Humanity*, Com-Sect. 6. *passion*, and *Good-nature* sometimes raised by Habits, as we say, to an Excess.

WERE we to strike a *Medium* of the several Passions and Affections, as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural Ballance previously to any Change made by Custom or Habit, which we see casts the Ballance to either side, we should perhaps find the *Medium* of the publick Affections not very far from a sufficient *Counter-balance* to the *Medium* of the Selfish; and consequently the *Overballance* on either side in particular Characters, is not to be looked upon as the *original Constitution*, but as the *accidental Effect* of Custom, Habit, or Associations of Ideas, or other preternatural Causes: So that an universal *increasing* of the Strength of *either*, might in the whole be of little advantage. The raising universally the *publick Affections*, the Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*, would make the *Hero of Cervantes*, pining with *Hunger* and *Poverty*, no rare Character. The universal increasing of *Selfishness*, unless we had more accurate Understandings to discern our *nicest Interests*, would fill the World with universal *Rapine* and *War*. The Consequences of either universally *abating*, or *increasing* the Desires between the *Sexes*, the *Love of Offspring*, or the several *Tastes*

~ Sect. 6. *Tastes and Fancies* in other Pleasures, would perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the present Constitution. What seems most truly wanting in our Nature, is greater *Knowledge, Attention and Consideration*: had we a greater Perfection this way, and were evil *Habits*, and foolish *Associations of Ideas* prevented, our *Passions* would appear in better order.

BUT while we feel in our selves so much *publick Affection* in the various Relations of Life, and observe the like in others; while we find every one desiring indeed his *own Happiness*, but capable of discerning, by a little Attention, that not only his external *Conveniency*, or *worldly Interest*, but even the most immediate and lively *Sensations of Delight*, of which his Nature is susceptible, immediately flow from a *Publick Spirit*, a *generous, human, compassionate Temper*, and a suitable *Deportment*; while we observe so many Thousands enjoying a tolerable State of *Ease and Safety*, for each one whose Condition is made *intolerable*, even during our present *Corruption*: How can any one look upon this World as under the Direction of an *evil Nature*, or even question a perfectly good PROVIDENCE? How clearly does the *Order of our Nature* point out to us our true *Happiness and Perfection*, and lead us to it as naturally as the several *Powers of*
the

the *Earth*, the *Sun*, and *Air*, bring *Plants* Sect. 6.
to their Growth, and the Perfection of
their Kinds? We indeed are directed to it
by our *Understanding* and *Affections*, as
it becomes *rational* and *active Natures*;
and *they* by *mechanick Laws*. We may
see, that “ *Attention* to the most univer-
“ *sal Interest* of all sensitive Natures, is
“ the Perfection of each individual of Man-
“ kind : ” That they should thus be like
well-tuned *Instruments*, affected with every
Stroke or *Touch* upon any one. Nay, how
much of this do we actually see in the
World? What *generous Sympathy*, *Com-*
passion, and *Congratulation* with each o-
ther? Does not even the flourishing State
of the *inanimate Parts of Nature*, fill us
with joy? Is not thus *our Nature* admo-
nished, exhorted and commanded to cul-
tivate *universal Goodness* and *Love*, by a
Voice heard thro’ all the Earth, and *Words*
sounding to the Ends of the World?



T R E A T I S E II.

ILLUSTRATIONS *upon the* M O R A L S E N S E.

TH E Differences of Actions from which some are constituted *morally Good*, and others *morally Evil*, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry : And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Dispute, the *Confusion of ambiguous Words*, must be excusable.

I N the following Discourse, *Happiness* ^{Defini-} denotes pleasant *Sensation* of any kind, or a continued State of such *Sensations*; and *Misery* denotes the contrary *Sensations*.

SUCH Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called *privately useful*: and such Actions as procure Misery to the Agent, *privately hurtful*.

ACTIONS

ACTIONS procuring Happiness to others may be called *publickly useful*, and the contrary Actions *publickly hurtful*. Some Actions may be both *publickly and privately useful*, and others both *publickly and privately hurtful*.

THESE different *natural Tendencies* of Actions are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our *Reflection* upon human Affairs, we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.

Two Questions about Morality.

WHEN these *natural Differences* are known, it remains to be inquired into: 1st, "What *Quality* in any Action determines our *Election* of it rather than the contrary?" Or, if the Mind determines itself, "What *Motives* or *Desires* excite to an Action, rather than the contrary, or rather than to the *Omission*?" 2^{dly}, "What *Quality* determines our *Approbation* of one Action, rather than of the contrary Action?"

THE Words *Election* and *Approbation* seem to denote simple Ideas known by *Consciousness*; which can only be explained by *synonymous Words*, or by concomitant or consequent Circumstances. *Election* is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. *Approbation*

bation of our own Action denotes, or is attended with a Pleasure in the *Contemplation* of it, and in *Reflection* upon the *Affections* which inclined us to it. *Approbation* of the Action of another is pleasant, and is attended with *Love* toward the Agent.

THE *Qualities* moving to *Election*, or exciting to *Action*, are different from those moving to *Approbation*: We often do Actions which we do not *approve*, and *approve* Actions which we *omit*: We often *desire* that an Agent had omitted an Action which we *approve*; and *wish* he would do an Action which we *condemn*. *Approbation* is employed about the Actions of *others*, where there is no room for our *Election*.

NOW in our Search into the *Qualities* exciting either our *Election* or *Approbation*, let us consider the several *Notions* advanced of moral Good and Evil in both these Respects; and what *Senses*, *Instincts*, or *Affections*, must be necessarily supposed to account for our *Approbation* or *Election*.

THERE are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that of the old *Epicureans*, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of *Cicero*, *De finibus*; The Epicurean Opinion.

finibus ; which is revived by Mr. *Hobbes*,
and followed by many better Writers :

“ That all the Desires of the *human*
“ *Mind*, nay of all *thinking Natures*,
“ are reducible to *Self-Love*, or *Desire of*
“ *private Happiness* : That from this
“ Desire all Actions of any Agent do flow.”

Our *Christian Moralists* introduce other
sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still
“ ’tis the *Prospect of private Happiness*,
“ which, with some of them, is the sole
“ *Motive of Election*. And that, in like
“ manner, what determines any Agent to
“ approve his own Action, is its *Tendency*
“ to his *private Happiness* in the whole,
“ tho it may bring *present Pain* along
“ with it : That the *Approbation* of the
“ Action of another, is from an Opinion
“ of its Tendency to the Happiness of the
“ Approver, either *immediately* or more
“ *remotely* : That each Agent may disco-
“ ver it to be the surest way to promote
“ his private Happiness, to do *publickly*
“ *useful Actions*, and to abstain from those
“ which are *publickly hurtful* : That the
“ neglecting to observe this, and doing
“ *publickly hurtful Actions*, does mischief
“ to the whole of Mankind, by hurting
“ any one part ; that every one has some
“ little *damage* by this Action : Such an
“ *inadvertent Person* might possibly be
“ *pernicious* to any one, were he in his
“ Neighbourhood ; and the very *Exam-*
“ *ple*

“ *ple* of such Actions may extend over the
 “ whole World, and produce some pernicious
 “ Effects upon any Observer. That
 “ therefore every one may look upon such
 “ Actions as *hurtful to himself*, and in
 “ this view does disapprove them, and hates
 “ the Agent. In the like manner, a *publickly useful Action* may diffuse some
 “ small *Advantage* to every Observer,
 “ whence he may *approve* it, and *love*
 “ the Agent.”

THIS Scheme can never account for ^{Does not answer the} the principal Actions of human Life † : ^{Appearances.}
 Such as the *Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion*. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or *acute Reflections* in these Actions. Ingenious speculative Men, in their straining to support an *Hypothesis*, may contrive a thousand *subtle selfish Motives*, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for the sudden *Approbation*, and violent *Sense* of something amiable in Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of these distant *Tendencies* to his Happiness. Nor will it better account for our *want of Approbation*

* See Treat. 3. Sect. 1.

toward *publickly useful Actions* done *casually*, or only with Intention of *private Happiness* to the Agent. And then, in these Actions reputed *generous*, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his *own Pleasure*, how come we to approve them more than his *enriching himself*, or his *gratifying his own Taste* with good Food? The whole *Species* may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Observer an equal Share.

WERE our *Approbation* of Actions done in *distant Ages* and *Nations*, occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward our selves would be useful to us, why don't we approve and love in like manner any Man who *finds a Treasure*, or *indulges* himself in any exquisite *Sensation*, since these Advantages or Pleasures might be conferred on *our selves*; and tend more to *our Happiness* than any Actions in distant Ages?

THE *Sanctions of Laws* may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of *useful* to himself, and lead him into an Opinion of *private Advantage* in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions; but what should determine any Person to approve the *Actions of others*, because of a Conformity to a Law,

Law, if Approbation in any Person were only an Opinion of private Advantage?

THE other Opinion is this, " That we
 " have not only *Self-Love*, but *benevo-*^{The opposite}
 " *lent Affections* also toward others, in ^{Opinion}
 " various Degrees, making us desire their ^{does}
 " Happiness as an *ultimate End*, without ^{plainly.}
 " any view to private Happiness: That
 " we have a *moral Sense* or Determination
 " of our Mind, to *approve* every kind *Af-*
 " *fection* either in our selves or others,
 " and all publicly useful Actions which
 " we imagined do flow from such Affec-
 " tion, without our having a view to our
 " *private Happiness*, in our Approbation
 " of these Actions."

THESE two Opinions seem both intel-
 ligible, each consistent with itself. The
 former seems not to represent human Na-
 ture as it is; the other seems to do it.

THERE have been many *ways* of ^{Schemes}
speaking introduced, which seem to fig- ^{seemingly}
 nify something different from both the ^{different}
 former Opinions. Such as these; that ^{from both.}
 " Morality of Actions consists in *Con-*
 " *formity to Reason*, or *Difformity from*
 " *it*:" That " *Virtue* is acting accord-
 " ing to the *absolute Fitness and Unfit-*
 " *ness of Things*, or agreeably to the

“ *Natures* or *Relations* of Things,” and many others in different Authors. To examine these is the Design of the following Sections ; and to explain more fully how the *Moral Sense* alledged to be in Mankind, must be presupposed even in these Schemes.

SECT.

SECT. I.

*Concerning the Character of Virtue,
agreeable to Truth or Reason.*

SINCE Reason is understood to denote our *Power of finding out true Propositions*, Reasonableness must denote the same thing, with *Conformity to true Propositions, or to Truth*.


REASONABLENESS in an Action is a very common Expression, but yet upon inquiry, it will appear very confused, whether we suppose it the Motive to *Election*, or the Quality determining *Approbation*.

THERE is one sort of *Conformity to Truth* which neither determines to the one ^{ty to Truth} or the other; viz. that *Conformity which* ^{examined.} *is between every true Proposition and its Object*. This sort of Conformity can never make us *chuse* or *approve* one Action more than its contrary, for it is found in all Actions alike: Whatever *attribute* can be ascribed to a *generous kind Action*, the *contrary Attribute* may as *truly* be ascribed to a *selfish cruel Action*: Both Propositions are equally *true*, and the two contrary Actions, the Objects of the two

Se^{ct}. I. *Truths* are equally conformable to their several *Truths*, with that sort of *Conformity* which is between a *Truth* and its *Object*. This *Conformity* then cannot make a Difference among *Actions*, or recommend one more than another either to *Election* or *Approbation*, since any Man may make as many *Truths* about Villany, as about Heroism, by ascribing to it *contrary Attributes*.

FOR Instance, these are *Truths* concerning the *Preservation* of *Property*. “ It tends to the Happiness of human Society : It encourages Industry : It shall be rewarded by God ” These are also *Truths* concerning *Robbery*. “ It disturbs Society : It discourages Industry : It shall be punished by God.” The former *three Truths* have the *Preservation of Property* for their *Object*; the latter *three* have *Robbery*. And each Class of *Truths* hath that sort of *Conformity* to its *Object*, which is common to all *Truths* with their *Objects*. The *moral Difference* cannot therefore depend upon this *Conformity*, which is common to both.

THE *Number* of *Truths* in both cases may be plainly the same; so that a good *Action* cannot be supposed to agree to *more Truths* than an evil one, nor can an evil *Action* be disagreeable to any *Truth* or

Compages of Truths made about it ; for Sect. I. whatever Propositions do not agree with  their Objects are not Truths.

IF *Reasonableness*, the Character of Virtue, denote some other sort of *Conformity* to Truth, it were to be wished that these Gentlemen, who make it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any *Sense* or *Affections*, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to a Sense, either to *Election* or *Approbation*.

THEY tell us, “ we must have some
“ *Standard* antecedently to all *Sense* or
“ *Affections*, since we judge even of our
“ *Senses* and *Affections* themselves, and
“ approve or disapprove them: This
“ *Standard* must be our *Reason*, Conformi-
“ ty to which must be the original Idea of
“ moral Good.”

BUT what is this *Conformity of Actions* ^{Reasons} *to Reason*? When we ask the Reason of an ^{either justifying or} *Action* we sometimes mean, “ *What Truth* ^{exciting.}
“ *shews a Quality in the Action, exciting*
“ *the Agent to do it?*” Thus, why does a
Luxurious Man pursue *Wealth*? The Reason is given by this Truth, “ *Wealth* is
“ *useful to purchase Pleasures.*” Sometimes
for a Reason of *Actions* we shew the
Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our
Approbation. Thus the Reason of hazard-

Sect. I. ing Life in just War, is, that “ it tends
 ~~~~~ “ to preserve our honest Countrymen, or  
 “ evidences publick Spirit : ” The *Reason*  
 for *Temperance*, and against *Luxury* is  
 given thus, “ *Luxury* evidences a selfish  
 “ base Temper.” The former sort of  
 Reasons we will call *exciting* and the lat-  
 ter *justifying*. \* Now we shall find that all  
*exciting Reasons* presuppose *Instincts* and  
*Affections*; and the *justifying* presuppose a  
*Moral Sense*.

*Exciting  
 Reasons  
 suppose Af-  
 fections.*


As to *exciting Reasons*, in every calm  
 rational Action some *end* is desired or in-  
 tended; no end can be intended or desired  
 previously to some one of these Classes of  
*Affections*, *Self-Love*, *Self-Hatred*, or de-  
 sire of private Misery, (if this be possible)  
*Benevolence* toward others, or *Malice* :  
 All *Affections* are included under these;  
 no *end* can be previous to them all; there  
 can therefore be no *exciting Reason* previ-  
 ous to *Affection*.

WE have indeed many confused Ha-  
 rangues on this Subject, telling us, “ We  
 “ have two Principles of Action, *Reason*,  
 “ and *Affection*, or *Passion* (i. e. strong  
 “ *Affection*) : the former in common with

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\* Thus *Grotius* distinguishes the Reasons of War, into  
 the *Justifica*, and *Suasoria*.



“ Angels, the *latter* with Brutes: No Sect. 1.  
 “ Action is wise, or good, or reasonable,   
 “ to which we are not excited by *Reason*,  
 “ as distinct from all *Affections*; or, if  
 “ any such Actions as flow from *Affec-*  
 “ *tions* be good, 'tis only by *chance*, or  
 “ *materially* and not *formally*.” As if  
 indeed *Reason*, or the Knowledge of the  
 Relations of things, could excite to Action  
 when we proposed no *End*, or as if *Ends*  
 could be intended without *Desire* or *Af-*  
*fection*.

BUT are there not also exciting Reasons, No exciting  
Reasons for  
ultimate  
Ends.  
 even previous to any end, moving us to  
 propose one end rather than another? To  
 this *Aristotle* long ago answered, “ that  
 “ there are *ultimate Ends* desired without  
 “ a view to any thing else, and *subordinate*  
 “ *Ends* or Objects desired with a view to  
 “ something else.” To *subordinate Ends*  
 those *Reasons* or *Truths* excite, which shew  
 them to be conducive to the *ultimate End*,  
 and shew *one Object* to be more effectual  
 than another: thus *subordinate Ends* may  
 be called *reasonable*. But as to the *ultimate*  
*Ends*, to suppose *exciting Reasons* for them,  
 would infer, that there is no *ultimate End*,  
 but that we desire one thing for another in  
 an infinite Series.

THUS ask a Being who desires *private*  
*Happiness*, or has *Self-Love*? “ what  
 4 “ Reason

Sect 1. "Reason excites him to desire Wealth"?  
 He will give this Reason, that "Wealth  
 "tends to procure Pleasure and Ease." Ask his Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness: One cannot imagine what Proposition he could assign as his *exciting Reason*. This Proposition is indeed true, "There is an *Instinct* or *Desire* fixed  
 "in his Nature, determining him to  
 "pursue his Happiness;" but it is not this *Reflection* on his own Nature, or this *Proposition* which excites or determines him, but the *Instinct itself*. This is a Truth, "*Rhubarb* strengthens the Stomach:" But 'tis not a *Proposition* which strengthens the Stomach, but the *Quality* in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by *Propositions* shewing the Cause, but by the Cause itself.

IN like manner, what Reason can a benevolent Being give, as exciting him to hazard his Life in just War? This perhaps, "such Conduct tends to the Happiness of  
 "his Country." Ask him, "why he  
 "serves his Country?" he will say, "His  
 "Country is a very valuable Part of Mankind."  
 Why does he study the Happiness of Mankind? If his Affections be really *disinterested*, he can give no *exciting Reasons* for it: The Happiness of Mankind in general, or of any valuable Part of it, is an *ultimate End* to that Series of Desires.

WE

WE may transiently observe one Mistake which many fall into, who in their Philosophical Inquiries have learned to form very *abstract general Ideas*: They suppose, because they have formed some Conception of an *infinite Good*, or *greatest possible Aggregate*, or *Sum of Happiness*, under which all *particular Pleasures* may be included; that there is also some *one great ultimate End*, with a view to which every *particular Object* is desired; whereas, in truth, each *particular Pleasure* is desired without farther view, as an ultimate End in the *selfish Desires*. 'Tis true, the *Prospect* of a greater inconsistent Pleasure may surmount or stop this Desire; so may the *Fear* of a prepollent Evil. But this does not prove, that "all Men have formed  
 " *Ideas of infinite Good*, or *greatest possible Aggregate*, or that they have any  
 " *Instinct* or *Desire*, without an Idea of  
 " its Object." Just so in the *benevolent Affections*, the *Happiness* of any one Person is an *ultimate End*, desired with no farther view: And yet the observing its *Inconsistency* with the *Happiness* of another more beloved, or with the *Happiness* of *many*, tho each one of them were but equally beloved, may overcome the former Desire. Yet this will not prove, that in each *kind Action* Men do form the abstract Conception of *all Mankind*, or the *System of Rationals*.  
 The

Men have  
 many ultimate Ends.



Sect. 1. The forming such large Conceptions is indeed useful, that so we may gratify either our *Self-Love* or *kind Affections* in the fullest manner, as far as our Power extends; and may not content our selves with smaller Degrees either of *private* or *publick Good*, while greater are in our power: But when we have formed these *Conceptions*, we do not serve the *Individual* only from Love to the *Species*, no more than we desire *Grapes* with an Intention of the *greatest Aggregate* of Happiness, or from an Apprehension that they make a Part of the *General sum* of our Happiness. These Conceptions only serve to suggest *greater Ends* than would occur to us without Reflection; and by the *Prepollency* of one Desire toward the *greater Good*, either private or publick, to stop the Desire toward the *smaller Good*, when it appears inconsistent with the greater.

The common Reasons examined.


LET us examine the Truths assigned as *exciting* to the Pursuit of publick Good, even by those, who, tho they allow *disinterested Affections*, and a *moral Sense*, yet suppose something *reasonable* in it antecedently. They assign such as these “ publick Good “ is the End proposed by the DEITY.” Then what *Reason* excites Men to concur with the DEITY? Is it this, “ Concurring “ with the DEITY will make the Agent “ *happy*?” This is an *exciting Reason* indeed,

deed, but plainly supposes *Self-Love*: Sect. 1. And let any one assign the *exciting Reason* to the Desire of Happiness. Is the Reason exciting to concur with the DEITY this, "The DEITY is our *Benefactor*?" Then what *Reason* excites to concur with Benefactors? Here we must recur to an *Instinct*. Is it this Truth, "The divine Ends are *reasonable Ends*?" Then what means the Word [*reasonable*?] Does it mean, that "the Deity has *Reasons* exciting him to promote the publick Good?" What are these *Reasons*? Why, perhaps "we do not know them particularly, but in general are sure that the DEITY has *Reasons* for them." Then the Question recurs, What Reason excites us to *implicit Concurrence* with the Ends of the DEITY? The Reasons which excite *one Nature* may not excite another: The Tendency of an Action to the *Happiness of one Agent* may excite him, but will not excite another *Agent* to concur, unless there appears a like Tendency to the Happiness of that *other*. They may say, "they are sure the *divine Ends* are good." What means *Goodness*? Is it *moral* or *natural*? If the divine Ends be *natural Good*, i. e. *pleasant*, or the *Cause of Pleasure*, to whom is this *Pleasure*? If to the DEITY, then why do we study the Happiness or the pleasing of the DEITY? What *Reason* excites us? All the possible Reasons must either

Sect. 1. either presuppose some *Affection*, if they are exciting; or some *moral Sense*, if they are justifying. — Is the divine End naturally good to us? This is an exciting Reason, but supposes *Self-Love*. If we say the divine Ends are *morally Good*, we are just where we began. What is *moral Goodness*? *Conformity to Reason*. What are the *Reasons* exciting or justifying?


IF any alledg as the Reason *exciting* us to pursue publick Good, this Truth, that “ the Happiness of a *System*, a *Thousand*, “ or a *Million*, is a greater Quantity of “ Happiness than that of *one Person*: “ and consequently, if Men desire Happiness, they must have stronger Desires “ toward the *greater Sum*, than toward “ the *less*.” This Reason still supposes an *Instinct toward Happiness* as previous to it: And again, To *whom* is the Happiness of a *System* a greater Happiness? To one *Individual*, or to the *System*? If to the Individual, then his Reason exciting his Desire of a *happy System* supposes *Self-Love*: If to the *System*, then what Reason can excite to desire the greater *Happiness of a System*, or any *Happiness* to be in the Possession of *others*? None surely which does not presuppose *publick Affections*. Without such *Affections* this Truth, “ that an hundred Felicities is a “ greater Sum than one Felicity, ” will no more



more excite to study the Happiness of the Sect. i. *Hundred*, than this Truth, "an hundred  Stones are greater than one," will excite a Man, who has no *desire of Heaps*, to cast them together.

THE same may be observed concerning that *Proposition*, assigned by some as the *ultimate Reason* both *exciting* to, and *justifying* the Pursuit of publick Good, *viz.* "It is best that all should be happy." Best is most good: Good to whom? To the *Whole*, or to each *Individual*? If to the *former*, when this Truth excites to Action, it must presuppose *kind Affections*; if it is good to each *Individual*, it must suppose *Self-Love*.

LET us once suppose *Affections, Instincts* The true Meaning of or *Desires* previously implanted in our Nature: and we shall easily understand the Reasons exciting to Actions, and reasonable Actions. *exciting Reasons* for Actions, *viz.* "These Truths which shew them to be conducive toward some *ultimate End*, or toward the *greatest End* of that kind in our Power." He acts *reasonably*, who considers the various Actions in his Power, and forms *true Opinions* of their *Tendencies*; and then chuses to do that which will obtain the highest Degree of *that*, to which the *Instincts* of his Nature incline him, with the smallest Degree of those things to which

Sect. 1. which the *Affections* in his Nature make  
 him averse.

MORE particularly, the *exciting Reasons* to a Nature which had only *selfish Affections*, are those Truths which shewed “ what Object or Event would occasion “ to it the greatest Quantity of *Pleasure* :” these would excite to the Prosecution of it. The *exciting Truths* about *Means*, would be only those which pointed out some Means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with less *Pain* or *Trouble* to the *Agent*. *Publick Usefulness* of *Ends* or *Means*, or *publick Hurtfulness* would neither excite nor dissuade, farther than the *publick State* might affect that of the *Agent*.

IF there is any Nature with *publick Affections* : The Truths exciting to any *End* in this Order, are such as shew, “ that “ any Event would promote the Happiness of others.” That *End* is called most *reasonable*, which our Reason discovers to contain a greater Quantity of *publick Good*, than any other in our power.

WHEN any Event may affect both the *Agent* and *others*, if the *Agent* have both *Self-Love* and *publick Affections*, he acts according to that Affection which is *strongest*, when there is any *Opposition* of Interests ;  
 if

if there be no Opposition, he follows both. Sect. 1.  
 If he discovers this Truth, that "his constant pursuit of *publick Good* is the most probable way of promoting his *own Happiness*," then his Pursuit is truly reasonable and constant; thus both Affections are at once gratify'd, and he is consistent with himself. Without knowledge of that Truth he does not act *reasonably* for his own Happiness, but follows it by *Means* not tending effectually to this *End*: and must frequently, from the Power of *Self-Love*, neglect or counteract his other *End*, the *publick Good*. If there be also a *moral Sense* in such an Agent, while yet he is inadvertent to the *Connexion* of *private Happiness* with the *Study of the publick*; he must be perpetually yet more uneasy, either thro' the apprehended *Neglect of private Interest* when he serves the *Publick*; or when he pursues only *private Interest*, he will have perpetual *Remorse* and *Dissatisfaction* with his own Temper, thro' his *moral Sense*. So that the Knowledge of this *Connexion* of private Interest, with the *Study of publick Good*, seems absolutely necessary to preserve a constant *Satisfaction* of Mind, and to prevent an *alternate Prevalence* of seemingly contrary Desires.

SHOULD any one ask even concerning these two *ultimate Ends*, *private Good*  
 Q and



**Sect. 1.** and *publick*, is not the latter more *reasonable* than the former? — What means the Word *reasonable* in this Question? If we are allowed to presuppose *Instincts* and *Affections*, then the Truth just now supposed to be discoverable concerning our State, is an *exciting Reason* to *serve the publick Interest*, since this Conduct is the most *effectual Means* to obtain both ends. But I doubt if any Truth can be assigned which *excites* in us either the Desire of *private Happiness* or *publick*. For the former none ever alledged any *exciting Reason*: and a *benevolent Temper* finds as little *Reason* *exciting* him to the latter; which he desires without any view to *private Good*. If the meaning of the Question be this, “ does not every *Spectator* *approve* the Pursuit of publick Good more than private?” The Answer is obvious that he does: but not for any *Reason* or *Truth*, but from a *moral Sense*.

THIS leads to consider *Approbation* of Actions, whether it be for *Conformity to any Truth*, or *Reasonableness*, that Actions are ultimately approved, independently of any *moral Sense*? Or if all *justifying Reasons* do not presuppose it?

*Justifying  
Reasons  
suppose a  
moral  
Sense.*

IF *Conformity to Truth*, or *Reasonable*, denote nothing else but that “ an Action “ is the *Object of a true Proposition*,” ’tis plain,

plain, that all Actions should be approved Sect. 1. equally, since as many Truths may be made about the worst, as can be made about the best. See what was said above about exciting Reasons.

BUT let the *Truths* commonly assigned as *justifying* be examined. Here 'tis plain, "*A Truth shewing an Action to be fit to attain an End,*" does not justify it; nor do we approve a *subordinate End* for any Truth, which only shews it to be fit to promote the *ultimate End*; for the worst Actions may be conducive to their *Ends*, and *reasonable* in that Sense. The *justifying Reasons* then must be about the *Ends* themselves, especially the *ultimate Ends*. The Question then is, "Does a *Conformity to any Truth* make us approve an *ultimate End*, previously to any *moral Sense*?" For example, we approve *pursuing the publick Good*. For what *Reason*? or what is the *Truth* for Conformity to which we call it a *reasonable End*? I fancy we can find none in these Cases, more than we could give for our liking any *pleasant Fruit*.

THE Reasons assigned are such as these; "*'Tis the End proposed by the DEITY.*" But why do we *approve* concurring with the divine Ends? This Reason is given, "*He is our Benefactor:*" But then, for

Sect. 1. what *Reason* do we approve *Concurrence*  
 with a *Benefactor*? Here we must recur  
 to a *Sense*. Is this the *Reason* moving to  
*Approbation*, "*Study of publick Good tends*  
*to the Advantage of the Approver?*"  
 Then the *Quality* moving us to approve  
 an *Action*, is its being *advantageous to us*,  
 and not *Conformity to a Truth*. This  
 Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fact.  
 Men approve without Perception of *private*  
*Advantage*; and often do not con-  
 demn or disapprove what is plainly pernicious;  
 as in the Execution of a *just Sentence*,  
 which even the Criminal may approve.

IF any allege, that this is the *justifying*  
*Reason* of the *Pursuit of publick Good*,  
 "*that it is best all be happy*," then we  
 approve *Actions* for their *Tendency to that*  
*State which is best*, and not for *Conformity*  
*to Reason*. But here again, what means  
*best*? *morally best*, or *naturally best*? If  
 the *former*, they explain the same Word  
 by itself in a Circle: If they mean the  
*latter*, that "*it is the most happy State*  
*where all are happy*;" then, *most happy*,  
 for whom? the *System*, or the *Individual*?  
 If for the *former*, what *Reason* makes us  
 approve the *Happiness of a System*? Here  
 we must recur to a *Sense* or *kind Affec-*  
*tions*. Is it most happy for the *Individual*?  
 Then the *Quality* moving *Approbation* is  
 again



again *Tendency to private Happiness*, not *Reasonableness*. Sect. 1.

THERE are some other *Reasons* assigned <sup>Obligation</sup> in Words differing from the former, but <sup>supposes</sup> more confused, such as these: “ ’Tis <sup>either Affections or</sup> our *Duty to study publick Good. We are a moral* <sup>Sense.</sup> *obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to the Deity. The whole is to be preferred to a Part.*” But let these Words *Duty, Obligation, Owing*, and the meaning of that Gerund, *is to be preferred*, be explained; and we shall find our selves still at a Loss for *exciting Reasons* previously to *Affections*, or *justifying Reasons* without recourse to a *moral Sense*.

WHEN we say one is obliged to an <sup>The meaning of Obligation.</sup> *Action*, we either mean, 1. *That the Action is necessary to obtain Happiness to the Agent, or to avoid Misery*: Or, 2. *That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances.* The former Meaning of the Word *Obligation* presupposes *selfish Affections*, and the *Senses of private Happiness*: The latter Meaning includes the *moral Sense*. Mr. Barbeyrac, in his *Annotations upon Grotius*\*,

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
\* Lib. 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 10.

Se<sup>ct</sup>. 1. makes *Obligation* denote an *indispensable Necessity to act in a certain manner*. Whoever observes his Explication of this *Necessity*, ( which is not *natural*, otherwise no Man could act against his *Obligation* ) will find that it denotes only “ such  
 “ a Constitution of a powerful Superior,  
 “ as will make it impossible for any Being  
 “ to obtain *Happiness*, or avoid *Misery*,  
 “ but by such a Course of Action.” This agrees with the former Meaning, tho sometimes he also includes the latter.

MANY other confused Definitions have been given of *Obligation*, by no obscure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a distinct Meaning, different from the two above-mentioned. To pursue them all would be endless; only let the *Definitions* be substituted in place of the Word *OBLIGATION*, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be observed whether it makes good Sense or not.

*Arguments  
 for some  
 Standard  
 of Morals  
 prior to a  
 Sense con-  
 sidered.*

BEFORE we quit this Character *Reasonableness*, let us consider the Arguments brought to prove that there must be some Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Sense. Say they, “ *Perceptions of*  
 “ *Sense* are deceitful, we must have some  
 “ Perception or Idea of *Virtue* more stable  
 “ and certain; this must be *Conformity to*  
 “ *Reason: Truth* discovered by our *Reason*  
 “ *son*

“ *son* is certain and invariable : *That* Sect. 1.  
 “ then alone is the Original Idea of Virtue,   
 “ *Agreement with Reason.*” But in like  
 manner our *Sight* and *Sense of Beauty* is  
 deceitful, and does not always represent  
 the true *Forms* of Objects. We must not  
 call that *beautiful* or *regular*, which pleases  
 the *Sight*, or an *internal Sense* ; but Beauty  
 in external Forms too, consists in *Confor-*  
*mity to Reason.* So our *Taste* may be vi-  
 tiated : we must not say that *Savour* is per-  
 ceived by *Taste*, but must place the original  
 Idea of *grateful Savours* in *Conformity to*  
*Reason*, and of *ungrateful* in *Contrariety*  
*to Reason.* We may mistake the real *Ex-*  
*tent* of Bodies, or their *Proportions*, by  
 making a Conclusion upon the first sensible  
 Appearance : Therefore *Ideas of Extension*  
 are not originally acquired by a *Sense*, but  
 consist in *Conformity to Reason.*

IF what is intended in this Conformity  
 to Reason be this, “ That we should call  
 “ no Action *virtuous*, unless we have  
 “ some *Reason* to conclude it to be virtu-  
 “ ous, or some *Truth* shewing it to be so.”  
 This is very true ; but then in like manner  
 we should count no Action *vicious*, unless  
 we have some *Reason* for counting it so, or  
 when 'tis *Truth* “ that it is vicious.” If  
 this be intended by *Conformity to Truth*,  
 then at the same rate we may make *Con-*  
*formity to Truth* the original Idea of *Vice*



Sect. I. as well as *Virtue*; nay, of every Attribute  
 whatsoever. That *Taste* alone is *sweet*,  
 which there is *Reason* to count *sweet*;  
 that *Taste* alone is *bitter*, concerning which  
 'tis true that it is *bitter*; that *Form* alone  
 is *beautiful*, concerning which 'tis true that  
 it is *beautiful*; and that alone *deformed*,  
 which is truly *deformed*. Thus *Virtue*,  
*Vice*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, *Beautiful*, or *De-*  
*formed*, originally denote *Conformity to*  
*Reason*, antecedently to Perceptions of  
 any *Sense*. The *Idea of Virtue* is particu-  
 larly that concerning which 'tis *Truth*,  
 that it is *Virtue*; or *Virtue* is *Virtue*;  
 a wonderful Discovery!

So when some tell us, " that *Truth* is  
 " naturally pleasant, and more so than  
 " any *sensible Perception*; this must  
 " therefore engage Men more than any  
 " other Motive, if they attend to it."  
 Let them observe, that as much *Truth* is  
 known about *Vice* as *Virtue*. We may  
 demonstrate the publick *Miseries* which  
 would ensue upon *Perjury*, *Murder*, and  
*Robbery*. These Demonstrations would be  
 attended with that *Pleasure* which is peculi-  
 ar to *Truth*; as well as the Demonstrations  
 of the publick Happiness to ensue from  
*Faith*, *Humanity* and *Justice*. There is  
 equal *Truth* on both sides.

WE may transiently observe what has occasioned the Use of the Word *reasonable*, as an Epithet of only *virtuous Actions*. Tho we have *Instincts* determining us to desire *Ends*, without supposing any previous *Reasoning*; yet 'tis by use of our *Reason* that we find out the Means of obtaining our *Ends*. When we do not use our Reason, we often are disappointed of our End. We therefore call those Actions which are *effectual* to their Ends, *reasonable* in one Sense of that Word.

Whence it  
is that Vir-  
tue is called  
*reasonable*  
and not  
*Vice*.

AGAIN, in all Men there is probably a *moral Sense*, making publicly useful Actions and kind Affections *grateful* to the Agent, and to every Observer: Most Men who have thought of human Actions, agree, that the *publicly useful* are in the whole also *privately useful* to the Agent, either in this Life or the next: We conclude, that all Men have the *same Affections and Senses*: We are convinced by our Reason, that 'tis by publicly useful Actions alone that we can promote *all our Ends*. Whoever then acts in a contrary manner, we presume is *mistaken, ignorant of, or inadvertent* to, these Truths which he might know; and say he acts *unreasonably*. Hence some have been led to imagine, some *Reasons* either exciting or  
justi-

Sect. I. justifying previously to all *Affections* or a  
 *moral Sense*.

Objections  
 from our  
 judging  
 even of our  
*Affections*  
 and *Senses*  
 themselves.

TWO Arguments are brought in de-  
 fense of this Epithet, as antecedent to any  
*Sense*, viz. "That we judge even of  
 " our *Affections* and *Senses* themselves,  
 " whether they are *morally Good* or *Evil*."

THE second Argument is, that " if  
 " all *moral Ideas* depend upon the *Consti-*  
 " *tution* of our *Sense*, then all *Constitu-*  
 " *tions* would have been alike reasonable  
 " and good to the DEITY, which is ab-  
 " surd."

I. That we  
 judge our  
*Senses*  
 themselves.

AS to the first Argument, 'tis plain we  
 judge of our own *Affections*, or those of  
 others by our *moral Sense*, by which we  
 approve kind *Affections*, and disapprove  
 the contrary. But none can apply *moral*  
*Attributes* to the very *Faculty* of per-  
 ceiving *moral Qualities*; or call his *moral*  
*Sense* *morally Good* or *Evil*, any more  
 than he calls the *Power of Tasting*, *sweet*,  
 or *bitter*; or of *Seeing*, *strait* or *crooked*,  
*white* or *black*.

Answered.

EVERY one judges the *Affections* of  
 others by his own *Sense*; so that it seems  
 not impossible that in these *Senses* Men  
 might differ as they do in *Taste*. A *Sense*  
*approving Benevolence* would disapprove  
 that



*that Temper, which a Sense approving Sect. 1.*  
*Malice would delight in. The former* ~~~~~  
would judge of the *latter* by his *own Sense*,  
so would the *latter* of the *former*. Each  
one would at first view think the *Sense* of  
the other perverted. But then, is there no  
difference? Are both *Senses* equally *good*?  
No certainly, any *Man* who observed  
them would think the *Sense* of the *former*  
more desirable than of the *latter*; but  
this is, because the *moral Sense* of every  
*Man* is constituted in the former manner.  
But were there any Nature with no *moral*  
*Sense* at all observing these two Persons,  
would he not think the State of the *former*  
preferable to that of the *latter*? Yes, he  
might: but not from any Perception of  
*moral Goodness* in the one *Sense* more than  
in the other. Any rational Nature observing  
two Men thus constituted, with *opposite*  
*Senses*, might by reasoning see, not *moral*  
*Goodness* in one *Sense* more than in the  
contrary, but a *Tendency to the Happiness*  
*of the Person himself*, who had the former  
*Sense* in the one Constitution, and a *con-*  
*trary Tendency* in the opposite Constitution:  
nay, the Persons themselves might observe  
this; since the *former Sense* would make  
these Actions grateful to the Agent which  
were useful to others; who, if they had  
a like *Sense*, would *love* him, and return  
*good Offices*; whereas the *latter Sense*  
would make all such Actions as are *useful*  
to

Sect. 1. *to others*, and apt to engage their good Offices, ungrateful to the Agent; and would lead him into *publickly hurtful Actions*, which would not only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a *contrary Sense*, but engage them out of their *Self-Love* to study his *Destruction*, tho their Senses agreed. Thus any *Observer*, or the *Agent* himself with this *latter Sense*, might perceive that the *Pains* to be feared, as the Consequence of *malicious Actions*, did over-balance the *Pleasures* of this *Sense*; so that it would be to the Agent's *Interest* to counteract it. Thus one Constitution of the *moral Sense* might appear to be more *advantageous* to those who had it, than the contrary; as we may call that Sense of Tasting *healthful*, which made wholesom Meat pleasant; and we would call a contrary *Taste pernicious*. And yet we should no more call the moral Sense *morally good* or *evil*, than we call the Sense of Tasting *savoury* or *unsavoury*, *sweet* or *bitter*.

BUT must we not own, that we judge of all our Senses by our Reason, and often correct their Reports of the *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste* of Objects, and pronounce them *right* or *wrong*, as they agree or disagree with Reason? This is true. But does it then follow, that *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste*, are not  
sen-

*sensible Ideas*, but only denote *Reasonableness*, or *Agreement with Reason*? Or that these Qualities are perceivable antecedently to any *Sense*, by our *Power of finding out Truth*? Just so a *compassionate Temper* may rashly imagine the *Correction of a Child*, or the *Execution of a Criminal*, to be cruel and inhuman: but by *reasoning* may discover the *superior Good* arising from them in the whole; and then the same *moral Sense* may determine the Observer to approve them. But we must not hence conclude, that it is any *reasoning* antecedent to a *moral Sense*, which determines us to *approve* the Study of publick Good, any more than we can in the former Case conclude, that we perceive *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste*, antecedently to a *Sense*. All these Sensations are often corrected by *Reasoning*, as well as our *Approbations of Actions as Good or Evil*\*: and yet no body ever placed the *Original Idea* of *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, or *Taste*, in *Conformity to Reason*.

THUS tho no Man can immediately either *approve* or *disapprove* as *morally good or evil* his own *moral Sense*, by which he approves only *Affections* and *Actions* consequent upon them; yet he

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\* See Sect. 4. of this Treatise.



Sect. 1. may see whether it be *advantageous* to him in other respects, to have it constituted *one way* rather than another. *One Constitution* may make these Actions grateful to this Sense which tend to procure *other Pleasures* also. A *contrary Constitution* may be known to the very Person himself to be *disadvantageous*, as making these Actions *immediately grateful*, which shall occasion all *other sorts* of Misery. His *Self-Love* may excite him, tho with inward *Dissatisfaction*, to counteract this Sense, in order to avoid a greater *Evil*. Mr. *Hobbes* seems to have had no better Notions of the *natural State* of Mankind. An Observer, who was *benevolent*, would desire that all had the former sort of *Sense*; a *malicious Observer*, if he feared no *Evil to himself*, from the Actions of the Persons observed, would desire the *latter Constitution*. If this Observer had a *moral Sense*, he would think that *Constitution* which was contrary to *his own*, *strange* and *surprizing*, or *unnatural*. If the Observer had no *Affections* toward others, and were disjoined from Mankind, so as to have neither *Hopes* nor *Fears* from their Actions, he would be indifferent about their *Constitutions*, and have no *Desire* or *Preference* of one above another; tho he might see which were *advantageous* to them, and which *pernicious*.

As to the second Argument, What means [*alike reasonable or good to the DEITY?*] Does it mean, "that the DEITY could have had no *Reasons* exciting him to make one Constitution rather than another?" 'Tis plain, if the DEITY had nothing *essential to his Nature*, corresponding to our *sweetest and most kind Affections*, we can scarce suppose he could have any *Reason* exciting him to any thing he has done: but grant such a *Disposition* in the DEITY, and then the manifest *Tendency of the present Constitution to the Happiness of his Creatures* was an exciting Reason for chusing it before the contrary. Each sort of Constitution might have given Men an equal *immediate Pleasure* in present *Self-Approbation* for any sort of Action; but the Actions approved by the *present Sense*, procure all *Pleasures of the other Senses*; and the Actions which would have been approved by a *contrary moral Sense*, would have been productive of all *Torments of the other Senses*.

IF it be meant, that "upon this Supposition, that all our Approbation pre-supposes in us a moral Sense, the DEITY could not have approved one Constitution more than another:" where is the Consequence? Why may not the Deity have something

Sect. I. something of a superior Kind, analogous  
 ~~~~~ to our *moral Sense*, essential to him? How  
 does any Constitution of the *Senses of Men* hinder the DEITY to reflect and
 judge of his own Actions? How does it
 affect the divine Apprehension, which way
 soever *moral Ideas* arise with Men?


IF it means “ *that we cannot approve*
 “ *of one Constitution more than another,*
 “ *or approve the DEITY for making the*
 “ *present Constitution:*” This Consequence is also false. The *present Constitution*
 of our *moral Sense* determines us to approve all *kind Affections*: This Constitution the DEITY must have foreseen as
tending to the Happiness of his Creatures; it does therefore evidence *kind Affection* or
Benevolence in the DEITY, this therefore we must approve.

The meaning of antecedent Reasonableness.

WE have got some strange Phrases,
 “ *that some things are antecedently reasonable in the Nature of the thing,*”
 “ *nable in the Nature of the thing,*” which some insist upon: “ That otherwise,
 “ say they, if before Man was created,
 “ any Nature *without a moral Sense* had
 “ existed, this Nature would not have approved as morally good in the Deity,
 “ his constituting our Sense as it is at present.” Very true; and what next? If
 there had been no *moral Sense* in that Nature, there would have been no *Perception*
 of

of *Morality*. But “ could not such Na-Sect. 1.
 “ tures have seen something *reasonable* in
 “ one Constitution more than in another ?”
 They might no doubt have *reasoned* about
 the various *Constitutions*, and foreseen that
 the *present one* would tend to the *Happi-*
ness of Mankind; and would evidence *Be-*
nevolence in the DEITY: So also they
 might have *reasoned* about the *contrary*
Constitution, that it would make Men mi-
 serable, and evidence *Malice* in the Deity.
 They would have *reasoned* about *both*, and
 found out *Truths*: are both Constitutions
 alike *reasonable* to these Observers? No,
 say they, “ the *benevolent one* is *reasona-*
ble, and the *malicious unreasonable* :”
 And yet these Observers *reasoned* and *dis-*
covered Truths about both: An Action
 then is called by us *reasonable* when 'tis
benevolent, and *unreasonable* when *mali-*
cious. This is plainly making the Word
reasonable denote whatever is *approved* by
 our moral Sense, without Relation to *true*
Propositions. We often use that Word in
 such a confused Manner: But these *ante-*
cedent Natures, supposed without a *moral*
Sense, would not have *approved* one Con-
 stitution of the DEITY as *morally* better
 than another.

HAD it been left to the Choice of these
antecedent Minds, what *manner of Sense*
 R they

SECT. I. they would have desired for Mankind;  would they have seen no *difference*? Yes they would, according to their *Affections* which are presupposed in all *Election*. If they were *benevolent*, as we suppose the DEITY, the *Tendency of the present Sense to the Happiness of Men* would have excited their Choice. Had they been *malicious*, as we suppose the Devil, the *contrary Tendency of the contrary Sense* would have excited their *Election* of it. But is there nothing *preferable*, or *eligible* antecedently to all *Affections* too? No certainly, unless there can be *Desire* without *Affections*, or *superior Desire*, i. e. *Election* antecedently to all *Desire*.

Reasons for
Election
different
from those
for Appro-
bation.

SOME do farther perplex this Subject, by asserting, that “ the same *Reasons* determining *Approbation*, ought also to excite to *Election*.” Here, 1. We often see *justifying Reasons* where we can have no *Election*; viz. when we observe the *Actions of others*, which were even prior to our *Existence*. 2. The *Quality* moving us to *Election* very often cannot excite *Approbation*; viz. *private usefulness*, not publicly pernicious. This both does and ought to move *Election*, and yet I believe few will say, “ they approve as virtuous “ the eating a *Bunch of Grapes*, taking a “ *Glass of Wine*, or sitting down when “ one

“one is tired.” *Approbation* is not what Sect. 1. we can *voluntarily* bring upon our selves. When we are contemplating Actions, we do not *chuse* to approve, because *Approbation* is pleasant ; otherwise we would always approve, and never condemn any Action ; because this is some way uneasy. *Approbation* is plainly a *Perception* arising without previous *Volition*, or Choice of it, because of any *concomitant Pleasure*. The Occasion of it is the *Perception of benevolent Affections* in our selves, or the discovering the like in others, even when we are incapable of any *Action* or *Election*. The *Reasons* determining *Approbation* are such as shew that an Action evidenced *kind Affections*, and that in *others*, as often as in *our selves*. Whereas, the *Reasons* moving to *Election* are such as shew the *Tendency of an Action to gratify some Affection* in the Agent.

THE *Prospect* of the Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, is indeed often a Motive to *chuse* one Action rather than another ; but this supposes the *moral Sense*, or Determination to *approve*, prior to the *Election*. Were *Approbation* *voluntarily* chosen, from the *Prospect* of its concomitant Pleasure, then there could

Sect. 1. be no *Condemnation* of our own Actions,
~~~~~ for that is unpleasant.

As to that confus'd Word [ ought ]  
'tis needless to apply to it again all  
that was said about *Obligation*.

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SECT.

## S E C T. II.

*Concerning that Character of Virtue  
and Vice, The Fitness or Unfit-  
ness of Actions.*

WE come next to examine some other The Fitness  
and Unfit-  
ness in  
Morals. Explications of Morality, which have been much insisted on of late. \* We are told, “ that there are *eternal and immu-  
table Differences* of Things, absolutely  
“ and antecedently : that there are also  
“ *eternal and unalterable Relations* in  
“ the Natures of the Things themselves,  
“ from which arise *Agreements* and *Dis-  
agreements*, *Congruities* and *Incongrui-  
ties*, *Fitness* and *Unfitness* of the *Ap-  
plication of Circumstances*, to the *Quali-  
fications of Persons* ; that Actions  
“ agreeable to these Relations are morally  
“ Good, and that the contrary Actions are  
“ *morally Evil*.” These Expressions are  
sometimes made of the same Import with  
those more common ones : “ *acting agree-  
ably to the eternal Reason and Truth*

\* See Dr. Samuel Clarke's Boyle's Lectures ; and many late Authors.

Sect. 1. "*of Things.*" 'Tis asserted, that " God  
 ~~~~~ " who knows all these *Relations*, &c.  
 " does guide his *Actions* by them, since
 " he has no wrong *Affection* " (the Word
 [wrong] should have been first explained) :
 " And that in like manner these *Relations*,
 " &c. *ought* " (another unlucky Word in
 Morals) " to determine the *Choice* of all
 " *Rationals*, abstractly from any *Views*
 " *of Interest*. If they do not, these
 " *Creatures* are insolently *counteracting*
 " *their Creator*, and as far as they can,
 " *making things to be what they are not*,
 " which is the grearest *Impiety*."

THAT Things are now *different* is cer-
 tain. That *Ideas*, to which there is no
Object yet existing conformable, are also
different, is certain. That upon comparing
 two *Ideas* there arises a *relative Idea*, ge-
 nerally when the two *Ideas* compared have
 in them any *Modes of the same simple*
Idea, is also obvious. Thus every *extend-*
ed Being may be compared to any other of
 the same *Kinds of Dimensions*; and *rela-*
tive Ideas be formed of *greater, less,*
equal, double, triple, subduple, &c. with
 infinite variety. This may let us see that
Relations are not *real Qualities* inherent
 in external *Natures*, but only *Ideas* neces-
 sarily accompanying our *Perception* of two
Objects at once, and comparing them.
Relative Ideas do continue, when the ex-
 ternal

ternal Objects do not exist, provided we Sect. 2
retain the *two Ideas*. But what the *eternal Relations* in the Natures of Things do mean, is not so easy perhaps to be conceived.

To shew particularly how far *Morality* Three sorts of Relations considered. can be concerned in *Relations*, we may consider them under these Three Classes.

1. The *Relations of inanimate Objects*, as to their *Quantity*, or *active* and *passive Powers*, as explained by Mr. Locke. 2. The *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*, as to their *active* or *passive Powers*. 3. The *Relations of rational Agents among themselves*, founded on their *Powers* or *Actions* past or continued. Now let us examine what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from any of these *sorts of Relations*, in which the *Morality* of *Actions* may consist; and whether we can place *Morality* in them, without presupposing a *moral Sense*. 'Tis plain, that ingenious Author says nothing against the Supposition of a *moral Sense*: But many do imagine, that his Account of moral Ideas is independent upon a *moral Sense*, and therefore are less willing to allow that we have such an immediate Perception, or *Sense* of Virtue and Vice. What follows is not intended to oppose his Scheme, but rather to suggest what seems a necessary Explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise in-

Sect. 2. telligible, but upon Supposition of a *moral Sense*.

None of
them ex-
plain Mo-
rality
without a
Sense.

I. RELATIONS of *inanimate Objects* being known, puts it in the Power of a rational Agent often to *diversify* them, to *change their Forms, Motions, or Qualities* of any kind, at his pleasure: but no body apprehends any *Virtue* or *Vice* in such Actions, where no *Relation* is apprehended to a *rational Agent's Happiness* or *Misery*; otherwise we should have got into the Class of Virtues all the practical *Mathematicks*, and the Operations of *Chymistry*.

2. As to the *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*; the Knowledge of them equally puts it in one's Power to *destroy Mankind*, as to preserve them. Without presupposing *Affections*, this Knowledge will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a *moral Sense* will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The Relation of *Corn* to human Bodies being known to a Person of kind *Affections*, was perhaps the *exciting Reason* of teaching Mankind *Husbandry*: But the Knowledge of the *Relations of Arsenick* would excite a *malicious Nature*, just in the same manner, to the greatest Mischief. A *Sword*, an *Halter*, a *Musket*, bears the *same Relation*

tion to the Body of an *Hero*, which they Sect. 2. do to a *Robber*. The killing of either is equally agreeable to these *Relations*, but not equally good in a *moral Sense*. The Knowledge of these *Relations* neither excites to *Actions*, nor justifies them, without presupposing either *Affections* or a *moral Sense*. Kind *Affections* with such Knowledge makes *Heroes*; malicious *Affections*, *Villains*.

3. THE last sort of *Relations* is that among rational *Agents*, founded on their *Actions* or *Affections*; whence one is called *Creator*, another *Creature*; one *Benefactor*, the other *Beneficiary* (if that Word may be used in this general Sense;) the one *Parent*, the other *Child*; the one *Governor*, the other *Subject*, &c. Now let us see what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from these *Relations*.

THERE is certainly, independently of *Fancy* or *Custom*, a natural *Tendency* in some *Actions* to give *Pleasure*, either to the *Agent* or to others; and a *contrary Tendency* in other *Actions* to give *Pain*, either to the *Agent* or others: This sort of *Relation* of *Actions* to the *Agents* or *Objects* is indisputable. If we call these *Relations* *Fitnesses*, then the most contrary *Actions* have equal *Fitnesses* for contrary *Ends*; and each one is *unfit* for the *End* of the

Sect. 2. the other. Thus *Compassion* is fit to make others happy, and unfit to make others miserable. *Violation of Property* is fit to make Men miserable, and unfit to make them happy. Each of these is both fit and unfit, with respect to different Ends. The bare *Fitness then to an End*, is not the Idea of moral Goodness.


PERHAPS the *virtuous Fitness* is that of *Ends*. The Fitness of a *subordinate End* to the ultimate, cannot constitute the *Action good*, unless the *ultimate End* be good. To keep a *Conspiracy secret* is not a good *End*, tho it be fit for obtaining a farther *End*, the *Success of the Conspiracy*. The *moral Fitness* must be that of the *ultimate End* itself: The *publick Good* alone is a fit *End*, therefore the *Means* fit for this *End* alone are good.

WHAT means the *Fitness of an ultimate End*? For what is it fit? Why, 'tis an *ultimate End*, not fit for any thing farther, but *absolutely fit*. What means that Word *fit*? If it notes a *simple Idea* it must be the *Perception of some Sense*: thus we must recur, upon this Scheme too, to a *moral Sense*,

Agree-
ment with
Relations
presupposes
also a
moral
Sense.

IF *Fitness* be not a *simple Idea*, let it be defined. Some tell us, that it is " an Agreement of an Affection, Desire, Action,

“ *Action, or End, to the Relations of Sect. 2.*

“ *Agents.*” But what means *Agreement*? 


Which of these four Meanings has it? 1. We say one *Quantity* agrees with another of equal *Dimensions* every way. 2. A *Corollary* agrees with a *Theorem*; when our knowing the latter to be Truth, leads us to know that the former is also a *true Proposition*. 3. *Meat* agrees with that *Body* which it tends to *preserve*. 4. *Meat* agrees with the *Taste* of that Being in whom it raises a *pleasant Perception*. If any one of these are the Meanings of *Agreement* in the Definition, then one of these is the Idea of *Fitness*. 1. That an *Action* or *Affection* is of the same *Bulk* and *Figure* with the *Relation*. Or, 2. When the *Relation* is a *true Proposition*, so is the *Action* or *Affection*. Or, 3. The *Action* or *Affection* tends to *preserve* the *Relation*; and *contrary Actions* would destroy it: So that, for instance, GOD would be no longer related to us as *Creator* and *Benefactor*, when we disobeyed him. Or, 4. The *Action* raises *pleasant Perceptions* in the *Relation*. All these Expressions seem absurd.

THESE Gentlemen probably have some other Meanings to these Words *Fitness* or *Agreement*. I hope what is said will shew the need for *Explication* of them, tho they be so common. There is one Meaning

ing

Sect. 2. ing perhaps intended, however it be obscurely expressed, That “ certain *Affections* or *Actions* of an Agent, standing
“ in a *certain Relation* to other Agents,
“ is *approved* by every *Observer*, or raises
“ in him a *grateful Perception*, or moves
“ the *Observer* to *love* the Agent.” This
Meaning is the same with the Notion of
pleasing a *moral Sense*.

WHOEVER explains *Virtue* or *Vice* by
Justice or *Injustice*, *Right* or *Wrong*, uses
only more ambiguous Words, which will
equally lead to acknowledge a *moral Sense*.



SECT. III.

Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue considered.

MR. WOOLASTON* has introduced a new Explication of *moral Virtue*, viz. *Significancy of Truth in Actions*, supposing that in every Action there is some *Significancy*, like to that which *Moralists* and *Civilians* speak of in their *Tacit Conventions*, and *Quasi Contractus*!

THE Word *Signification* is very common, but a little Reflection will shew it to be very ambiguous. In *Signification of Words* these things are included: 1. An *Association of an Idea with a Sound*, so that when any *Idea* is formed by the Speaker, the *Idea of a Sound* accompanies it. 2. The *Sound perceived* by the Hearer excites the *Idea* to which it is connected. 3. In like manner a *Judgment* in the Speaker's Mind is accompanied with the *Idea of a Combination of Sounds*. 4. This Combination of

Signification where-
in it consists.

* In his *Religion of Nature delineated*.

Sect. 3. *Sounds* heard raises the *Apprehension* of that *Judgment* in the Mind of the Hearer. Nothing farther than these Circumstances seems to be denoted by *Signification*.

*Conclusions
drawn
from
Speech.*

HEARING a Proposition does not of itself produce either *Assent* or *Dissent*, or *Opinion* in the Hearer, but only presents to his Apprehension the *Judgment*, or *Thema Complexum*. But the Hearer himself often forms *Judgments* or *Opinions* upon this occasion, either *immediately* without Reasoning, or by some short *Argument*. These *Opinions* are some one or more of the following *Propositions*. 1. *That a Sound is perceived, and a Judgment apprehended.* 2. *Such a Person caused the Sound heard.* 3. *The Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the Sound, and the Apprehension of the Judgment, or Thema Complexum.* This Judgment is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men are heard speaking. 4. *The Speaker intended to produce Assent in the Hearer:* This Judgment is not always true. 5. *The Speaker assents to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment in the Hearer is often false, and is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's *Veracity*, or speaking what expresses his *Opinion* usually. 6. *The Speaker does not assent to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment of the Hearer is often false, when

when what is spoken is every way true. Sect. 3.

7. *The Speaker intended that the Hearer should believe or judge, "that the Proposition spoken was assented to by the Speaker."* 8. *The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to that supposed in the last Judgment: Both these latter Judgments may be false, when the Proposition spoken is every way true.* 9. *The Proposition spoken represents the Object as it is, or is logically true.* 10. *The Proposition spoken does not represent the Object as it is, or it is logically false.*

As to the first four *Circumstances* which ^{Morality does not} make up the proper *Significancy* of Speech, ^{consist in} 'tis scarce possible that any one should place ^{Significan-} *moral Good or Evil* in them. Whether the Proposition were *logically true or false*, the having a bare *Apprehension* of it as a *Thema Complexum*, or raising this in another, without intending to produce *Assent* or *Dissent*, can have no more *moral Good or Evil* in it, than the *Reception* of any other *Idea*, or raising it in another. This *Significancy of Falshood* is found in the very *Propositions* given in *Schools*, as *Instances of Falshood, Absurdity, Contradiction to Truth, or Blasphemy*. The pronouncing of which, are *Actions* signifying more properly than most of our other *Actions*; and yet no body condemns them as immoral.

As

Sect. 3.

Nor in
Conclu-
sions form-
ed by Hear-
ers.

As to the *Opinions* formed by the Hearer, they are all his own *Action* as much as any other *Conclusion* or *Judgment* formed from *Appearances* of any sort whatsoever. They are *true* or *false*, according to the Sagacity of the *Observer*, or his *Caution*. The Hearer may form perfectly true *Opinions* or *Judgments*, when the *Speaker* is guilty of the basest *Fraud*; and may form *false Judgments*, when the *Speaker* is perfectly *innocent*, and spoke nothing *false* in any *Sense*.

THE *Evils* which may follow from the false *Judgments* of the Hearer, are no otherwise chargeable on the *Speaker*, than as the evil *Consequences* of another's *Action* of any kind may be chargeable upon any Person who *co-operated*; or, by his *Action* or *Omission*, the *Consequence* of which he might have *foreseen*, did either actually *intend* this *Evil*, or *wanted that Degree of kind Affection*, which would have inclined him to have prevented it.

The Mo-
rality of
Speech in
the Inten-
tion.

THE *Intention* of the *Speaker* is what all *Moralists* have hitherto imagined the *Virtue* or *Vice* of Words did depend upon, and not the bare *Significancy* of *Truth* or *Falshood*. This *Intention* is either, 1. To lead the Hearer into a true or false *Opinion* about the *Sentiments* of the *Speaker*.
2. To

2. To make the Hearer assent to the Proposition spoken. Or, 3. Both to make the Hearer assent to the Proposition, and judge that the Speaker also assents to it. Or, 4. To accomplish some End, by means of the Hearer's assent to the Proposition spoken. This End may be known by the Speaker to be either *publickly useful*, or *publickly hurtful*.

SOME Moralists * of late have placed all *Virtue in Speech* in the *Intention* of the last kind, *viz.* " Accomplishing some publickly useful End, by speaking either *logical Truth* or *Falshood*: and that all *Vice* in speaking, consists in intending to effect something *publickly hurtful* by Speech, whether *logically true* or *false*, and known to be such; or by using Speech in a manner which we may foresee would be *publickly hurtful*, whether we actually *intend* this evil Consequence or not." Some stricter Moralists assert, that " the *publick Evils* which would ensue from destroying mutual Confidence, by allowing to speak *Propositions known to be false* on any occasion, are so great, that no particular *Advantage* to be expected from speaking *known logical Falshoods*, can ever over-balance

* Barberack's Notes on Puffendorf, Lib. iv. c. 1, 7.

Sect. 3. “ them ; that all use of Speech supposes a
 “ *tacit Convention of Sincerity, the Vio-*
 “ *lation of which is always evil.*” Both
 sides in this Argument agree, that the *mo-*
ral Evil in Speech consists either in some
direct malicious Intention, or a *Tendency*
to the publick Detriment of Society ; which
 Tendency the Agent might have *foreseen*,
 as connected with his Action, had he not
 wanted that Degree of good Affections
 which makes Men *attentive* to the Effects
 of their Actions. Never was bare *Signifi-*
cancy of Falshood made the Idea of *moral*
Evil. Speaking *logical Falshood* was still
 looked upon as innocent in many cases.
 Speaking *contrary to Sentiment*, or *moral*
Falshood, was always proved evil, from
 some *publickly hurtful Tendency*, and not
 supposed as evil *immediately*, or the same
 Idea with *Vice*. The *Intention to deceive*
 was the Foundation of the Guilt. This
 Intention the Speaker studies to *conceal*,
 and does not *signify* it : It is an *Act of the*
Will, neither *signified* by his Words, nor
 itself *signifying* any thing else.

THIS Point deserved Consideration, be-
 cause if any Action be *significant*, 'tis cer-
 tainly the *Act of Speaking* : And yet even
 in this the *Virtue* is not the *Significancy of*
Truth, nor the *Vice* the *signifying Fal-*
shood.

THE *Signification of some Actions* depends upon a like *Association of Ideas* with them, made either by *Nature*, or *arbitrarily*, and by *Custom*, as with *Sounds*. *Letters* are by *Custom* the *Signs of Sounds*. A *Shriek* or *Groan* is a natural *Sign of Fear* or *Pain*: A *Motion of the Hand* or *Head* may signify *Assent*, *Dissent*, or *Desire*. The *cutting down tall Poppies* was an *answer*: The *sending Spurs*, *advice to Flight*: *Kindling many Fires* raises the *Opinion of an Encampment*: *Raising a Smoke* will raise *Opinion of Fire*.

THE most important *Distinction of Signs* is this, that * 1. " *Some Appearances* " are the *Occasion* upon which an *Obser-* " *ver*, by his *own reasoning*, forms a " *Judgment*, without supposing, or having " *reason to believe*, that the *Agent*, who " *caused these Appearances*, did it with " *design to communicate his Sentiments* to " *others*; or when the *Actions* are such " *as are usually done by the Agents*, with- " *out designing to raise Opinions* in *Ob-* " *servers*. 2. *Some Actions* are never " *used but with professed Design* to con- " *vey the Opinions of the Agent* to the " *Observer*; or such as the *Observer in-*

* See Grotius de Jure Bell. Lib. 3. c. 1.

Sect. 3. “fers nothing from, but upon having
 “reason to believe that the *Causer* of the
 “Appearance intended to convey some Sen-
 “timent to the Observer.” 3. Other
 Signs are used, when “the *Signifier* gives
 “no reason to conclude any other *Inten-*
 “tion, but only to raise an *Apprehension*
 “of the Judgment, or the *Thema Com-*
 “plexum, without professing any design to
 “communicate his Sentiments, or to pro-
 “duce any Assent in the Observer.”

To do Actions from which the Obser-
 ver will form *false Opinions*, without
 having reason to imagine an *Intention* in
 the Agent, is never of itself imagined evil,
 let the Signs be *natural* or *instituted*; pro-
 vided there be no *malicious Intention*, or
neglect of publick Good. 'Tis never called
 a Crime in a *Teacher*, to pronounce an *ab-*
surd Sentence for an instance; in a *Noble-*
man, to travel without *Coronets*; or a
Clergyman in *Lay-Habit*, for private Con-
 veniency, or to avoid troublesome Cere-
 mony; to leave *Lights* in a *Lodge*, to
 make People conclude there is a *Watch*
kept. This *Significancy* may be in any
 Action which is observed; but as *true Con-*
clusions argue no *Virtue* in the Agent, so
false ones argue no *Vice*.

RAISING *false Opinions* designedly by
 the second Sort of Signs, which reasonably
 lead

lead the Observer to conclude *Intention* in Sect. 3.
the Agent to communicate his Sentiments, whether the Signs be *customary, instituted,*
or natural, is generally *evil,* when the Agent knows the *Falshood*; since it tends to diminish *mutual Confidence*. To send *Spurs* to a Friend, whom the *Sender* imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by *Hieroglyphicks* or *Painting*, is as criminal as a *false Letter*. This *Significancy* occurs in very few human *Actions*: Some of the most important *Virtues* profess no *design of communicating Sentiments,* or *raising Opinions* either true or false: Nor is there any more *Intention* in some of the most *vicious Actions*. Again, who can imagine any *Virtue* in all *Actions*, where there is this *Significancy of Truth* with *Intention*? Is it *Virtue* to say at *Christmas*, that "the Mornings are sharp?" to beckon with the *Hand*, in sign of *Assent* to such an *Assertion*? And in *false Propositions* thus signified by *Actions* or *Words*, there is no *Evil* apprehended where the *Falshood* is only *logical*. When the *Falshood* is known by the Agent, the *Evil* is not imagined in the *Significancy*, but in doing what one may foresee tends to breed *Distrust in Society*. And did all *moral Evil* consist in *moral Falshood*, there could be no *Sins of Ignorance*. If Mr. Woolaston alledges, that "Ignorance of some things" signifies this *Falshood*, viz. *We are not*
 S 3 " *obliged*

Sect. 3. *“obliged to know the Truth:”* This *W* Falshood is not signified with *Intention*; nor is it *moral Falshood*, but only *logical*: since no Man in an Error knows that “*he*” “*is obliged to know the contrary Truth.*” Mr. *Woolaston*’s use of the Words [ought] or [obliged] without a distinct Meaning, is not peculiar to this Place.

THE third sort of *Significancy of Falsehood* is never apprehended as *morally Evil*: if it were, then every *Dramatick Writer* drawing *evil Characters*, every *History Painter*, every *Writer of Allegories*, or *Epicks*, every *Philosopher* teaching the Nature of *contradictory Propositions*, would be thought criminal.

Signifi-
cancy dif-
ferent from
the Mo-
rality.

BUT since only the *first sort of Signifi-*
cancy can be in all Actions, and that too
supposing that every Action whatsoever is
observed by some Being or other: Let us
see if this will account for *Morality*. Per-
haps either, 1st, “Every Action is good
“ which leads the Observer into *true Opi-*
“ *nions* concerning the *Sentiments* of the
“ *Agent*, whether the *Agent’s Opinions*
“ *be true or false.*” Or, 2^{dly}, “That Ac-
“ tion is good which leads the Observer
“ into *true Opinions* concerning the Ob-
“ *ject*, the *Tendency* of the *Action*, and
“ *the Relation* between the *Agent* and
“ *the Object.*”

DID

DID *Virtue* consist in this first sort of Significancy of Truth, it would depend not upon the *Agent* but the *Sagacity of the Observer*: The acute Penetration of one would constitute an *Action virtuous*, and the Rashness or Stupidity of another would make it *vicious*: And the most *barbarous Actions* would raise no *false Opinion of the Sentiments of the Agent*, in a judicious Observer.

THE second sort of Significancy would also make *Virtue* consist in the *Power of Observers*. An exact Reasoner would receive no *false Opinion* from the worst Action concerning the *Object* or *Relation* of the Agent to it: And a *false Opinion* might be formed by a weak Observer of a *perfectly good Action*.—An Observer who knew an Agent to have the *basest Temper*, would not from his worst Action conclude any thing *false* concerning the *Object*: And all such *false Opinions* would arise only upon Supposition that the Agent was *virtuous*.

BUT may it not be said, that “ whether
 “ Men reason well about Actions or not,
 “ there are some *Conclusions really deducible from every Action*? It is a *Datum*
 “ from which something may be inferred
 “ by just Consequence, whether any one ac-

Se^{ct.} 3. *“* tually infers it or not. Then may not this
“ *Quality* in Actions, whether we call it
“ *Significancy* or not, *that only true*
“ *Propositions can be inferred from them*
“ *by just Reasoning, be moral Goodness?*
“ And may it not be the *very Idea* of mo-
“ *ral Evil* in Actions, that *some false*
“ *Conclusions can by just Consequence be*
“ *deduced from them?*” Or if we will not
 allow these to be the *very Ideas* of moral
 Good and Evil, “ are they not *universal*
“ *just Characters* to distinguish the one
“ from the other?”

ONE may here observe in general, that
 since the Existence of the Action is sup-
 posed to be a true *Premise* or *Datum*, no
false Conclusion can possibly be inferred
 from it by *just Reasoning*. We could per-
 haps often justly infer, that the Agent had
false Opinions; but then this Conclusion
 of the Observer, *viz.* “ that the Agent
 “ has false Opinions,” is really true.

True Con-
 clusions
 deducible
 from Ac-
 tions, no
 just Cha-
 racter of
 Virtue.

BUT again, it will not make an *univer-*
sal Character of good Actions, that a just
 Reasoner would infer from them, that
 “ *the Opinions of the Agent are true.*”
 For it is thus Men must reason from Ac-
 tions; *viz.* *Given the Constitution of*
Nature, the Affections of Agents, and
the Action, to conclude concerning the Opi-
nions: Or more generally given any three
 of

of these to conclude the fourth. Thus sup- Sect. 3.
 pose the "*Constitution of Nature such,*
 " *that the private Interest of each Indi-*
 " *vidual is connected with the publick*
 " *Good:*" Suppose an Agent's Affections
selfish only, then from a *publickly useful*
Action we infer, that "*the Agent's Opi-*
 " *nions are true:*" And from a *publickly*
hurtful Action conclude his *Opinions* to be
 false.

THE same *Constitution* supposed with
publick Affections as well as *selfish*. The
 observing a *kind or publickly useful Action*,
 will not immediately infer, that the Agent's
Opinions are either *true* or *false*: With
 false *Opinions* he might do *publickly useful*
Actions out of his *publick Affections*, in
 those cases wherein they are not appa-
 rently opposite to his Interest. A *publick*
Action opposite to some present *private*
Interest, would generally evidence *true*
Opinions; or if the *Opinions* were *false*,
 that his *publick Affections* were in this
 Case much stronger than his *Self-Love*. A
 cruel Action would indeed evidence *false*
Opinions.

SUPPOSE the same *Constitution* in all
 other respects, with *malicious Affections* in
 an Agent. A *cruel or ungrateful Action*
 would not always prove the *Opinions* of
 the Agent to be *false*; but only that his
Malice

Sect. 3. *Malice* in this instance, was more violent than regard to his *Interest*. A *beneficent Action* would prove only one of these two, either that his *Opinions of the Constitution* were true; or, that if he was mistaken about the *Constitution*, he had also a *false Opinion* of the natural Tendency of the *Action*. Thus *false Opinions* may be evidenced by contrary *Actions*.

SUPPOSE “ a *Constitution wherein a private Interest could be advanced in Opposition to the publick* ” (this we may call an *evil Constitution*;) Suppose only *Self-Love* in the Agent, then a *publickly useful Action*, any way *toilsome* or *expensive* to the Agent, would evidence *false Opinions*: And the most *cruel selfish Actions* would evidence *true Opinions*.

IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *kind Affections* in the Agent; a *publickly useful Action* would not certainly argue either *true or false Opinions*. If his *Opinions* were true, but *kind Affections* stronger than *Self-Love*, he might act in the same manner, as if his *Opinions* were false, and *Self-Love* the reigning *Affection*.

IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *malicious Affections* in an Agent, all *publickly useful Actions* would argue *false Opinions*;

ons; and *publicly hurtful Actions* would *argue true ones.* Sect. 3.

THIS may shew us that Mens Actions are generally *publicly useful*, when they have *true Opinions*, only on this account; that we neither have *malicious Affections* naturally, nor is there any probability, in our present *Constitution*, of promoting a *private Interest* separately from, or in Opposition to the *Publick*. Were there contrary *Affections* and a contrary *Constitution*, the most cruel Actions might flow from *true Opinions*; and consequently *publicly useful Actions* might flow from false ones.

IN our *present Constitution*, 'tis probable no Person would ever do any thing publicly hurtful, but upon some false Opinion. The *flowing from true Opinions* is indeed a tolerable Character or Property of *Virtue*, and *flowing from some false Opinion* is a tolerable Character of *Vice*; tho neither be strictly universal. But, 1. This is not *proper Signification*. A judicious Observer never imagines any *Intention to communicate Opinions* in some of the most important Actions, either *good or evil*. 2. Did an Action *signify Falshood*, 'tis generally only *logical*. 3. The *false Opinion* in the Agent is not the *Quality* for which the evil Action is *condemned*; nor is the


How far it is a Character of Virtue, that it flows from true Opinions.

true

Sect. 3. *true Opinion* that for which the good Action is *approved*. True Opinions in Agents often *aggravate* Crimes, as they shew higher Degrees of *evil Affection*, or total *Absence* of good. And *false Opinions* generally *extenuate* Crimes, unless when the very Ignorance or Error has flowed from *evil Affection*, or total *Absence* of good.

'T is surprizing, for instance, how any should place the *Evil* of *Ingratitude* in *denying* the Person injured, to have been a *Benefactor*. The Observer of such an Action, if he supposed the Agent had really that *false Opinion*, would think the Crime the less for it : But if he were convinced that the Agent had a *true Opinion*, he would think his *Ingratitude* the *more odious*. Where we most abhor Actions, we suppose often *true Opinions* : And sometimes admire Actions flowing even from *false Opinions*, when they have evidenced no want of good Affection.

To write a Censure upon a Book so well designed as Mr. *Woolaston's*, and so full of very good Reasoning upon the most useful Subjects, would not evidence much *good Nature*. But allowing him his *just Praise*, to remark any *Ambiguities* or *Inadvertencies* which may lead Men into Confusion in their Reasoning, I am confident would have

have been acceptable to a Man of so much Sect. 3.
Goodness, when he was living. 

ONE may see that he has had some other Idea of *moral Good*, previous to this *Significancy of Truth*, by his introducing, in the very Explication of it, Words presupposing the *Ideas of Morality* previously known: Such as [*Right*,] [*Obligation*,] [*Lye*,] [*his*] denoting [*Property*.]

M R. *Woolaston* acknowledges that there may be very little *evil* in some Actions signifying Falshood; such as *throwing away that which is of but little Use or Value*. It is objected to him, that there is equal *Contrariety to Truth* in such Actions, as in the greatest *Villany*: He, in answer to it, really unawares gives up his whole Cause. He must own, that there may be the *strictest Truth* and *Certainty* about Trifles; so there may be the most *obvious Falshood* signified by *trifling Actions*. If then *Significancy of Falshood* be the very same with *moral Evil*, all Crimes must be equal. He answers, that *Crimes* increase according to the *Importance* of the Truth denied; and so the *Virtue* increases, as the *Importance* of the Truths affirmed. Then

Signifying
of Truth
equal in
unequal
Virtue.

Virtue

Sect. 3.

Virtue and Vice increase, as the Importance of Propositions affirmed or denied; But Signification of Truth and Falshood does not so increase:

Therefore Virtue and Vice are not the same with Signification of Truth or Falshood.

BUT what is this *Importance of Truth*? Nothing else but the *Moment* or *Quantity* of good or evil, either *private* or *publick*, which should be produced by *Actions*, concerning which these *true Judgments* are made. But 'tis plain, the *Signification* of Truth or Falshood is not varied by this *Importance*; therefore *Virtue* or *Vice* denote something different from this *Signification*.


BUT farther, The *Importance* of *Actions* toward publick Good or Evil, is not the *Idea of Virtue* or *Vice*: Nor does the one prove *Virtue* in an *Action*, any farther than it evidences *kind Affections*; or the other *Vice*, farther than it evidences either *Malice* or *Want* of kind *Affections*: Otherwise a *casual Invention*, an *Action* wholly from *views of private Interest*, might be as virtuous as the most *kind* and *generous Offices*: And *Chance-Medley*, or *kindly intended*, but *unsuccessful Attempts* would

would be as vicious as Murder or Treason. *Sec. 3.*

ONE of Mr. Woolaston's Illustrations that Significancy of Falshood is the Idea of moral Evil, ends in this, " 'Tis acting *Some Ambiguities in Mr. Woolaston.*
" a Lye." What then? Should he not first have shewn what was moral Evil, and that every Lye was such?

ANOTHER Illustration or Proof is that, " it is acting contrary to that Reason which GOD has given us as the Guide of our Actions." Does not this place the original Idea of moral Evil in counteracting the DEITY, and not in signifying Falshood? But, he may say, " Counteracting the DEITY denies him to be our Benefactor, and signifies Falshood." Then why is signifying Falshood evil? Why, 'tis counteracting the DEITY, who gave us Reason for our Guide. Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth, that " he is our Benefactor."

ANOTHER Illustration is this, " That signifying Falshood is altering the Natures of Things, and making them be what they are not, or desiring at least to make them be what they are not." If by altering the Natures be meant destroying Beings, then moral Evil consists in desiring the Destruction of other Natures,

Sect. 3. or in *Evil Affections*. If what is meant  be *altering the Laws of Nature*, or *desiring that they were stopped*; this is seldom desired by any but *Madmen*, nor is this *Desire* evidenced by some of the worst *Actions*, nor is *such Desire* always criminal; otherwise it were as great a Crime as any, to wish, when a *Dam* was broken down, that the *Water* would not overflow the *Country*.

IF *making Things be what they are not*, means “ attempting or desiring that any
 “ Subject should have two *opposite Quali-*
 “ *ties at once*, or a *Quality* and its *Pri-*
 “ *vation* ;” ’tis certain then, that according to the *Stoicks*, all *vicious Men* are *thorowly mad*. But ’tis to be doubted, that such *Madness* never hapned to even the *worst of Mankind*. When a *Man murders*, he does not desire his *Fellow-Creature* to be both *dead* and *living*. When he *robs*, he does not desire that both *he* and the *Proprietor* should at the *same time* possess. If any says, that he desires to have a *Right* to that, to which another has a *Right*; ’tis probably false *Robbers* neither think of *Rights* at all, nor are solicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retain some *wild Notions of Rights*, they think their *Indigence*, *Conquest* or *Courage* gives them a *Right*, and makes the other’s *Right* to *cease*. If attempting to make
 old

old Qualities or Rights give place to new, Sect. 3;
 be the Idea of *moral Evil*, then every
Artificer, Purchaser, or Magistrate in-
vested with an Office is criminal.

MANY of Mr. Woolaston's Propositions contradicted by Actions, are about *Rights, Duties, Obligation, Justice, Reasonableness*. These are long Words, principal Names, or Attributes in Sentences. The little Word [his,] or the Particles [as, according] are much better: they may escape Observation, and yet may include all the Ambiguities of *Right, Property, Agreement, Reasonableness*: "Treating Things as they are, and not as they are not." Or, *According to what they are, or are not,* are Expressions he probably had learned from another truly great Name, who has not explained them sufficiently.

It may perhaps not seem improper on this occasion to observe, that in the *Quasi Contractus*, the *Civilians* do not imagine any Act of the Mind of the *Person obligated* to be really signified, but by a sort of *Fictio juris* supposing it, order him to act as if he had contracted, even when they know that he had *contrary Intentions*. In Quasi Contracts, or Tacit, no Signification of Truth.

IN the *Tacit Conventions*, 'tis not a Judgment which is signified, but an *Act of the Will* transferring Right, in which
 T there

Sect. 3. there is no Relation to *Truth* or *Falshood* of itself. The *Non-performance* of *Covenants* is made *penal*, not because of their *signifying Falshoods*, as if this were the Crime in them: But it is necessary, in order to preserve *Commerce* in any Society, to make *effectual* all *Declarations of Consent to transfer Rights* by any usual *Signs*, otherwise there could be no *Certainty* in *Mens Transactions*.

S E C T.

SECT. IV.

Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.

HAD those who insist so much upon *Truths* the *antecedent Reasonableness of Vir-* about Mo-
tue, told us distinctly what is *reasonable* rals, four
or *provable* concerning it, many of our sorts.
Debates had been prevented. Let us consider what *Truths* concerning Actions Men could desire to know, or prove by *Reason*. I fancy they may be reduced to these Heads. 1. "To know whether there are
" not *some Actions or Affections* which
" obtain the *Approbation* of any Specta-
" tor or Observer, and others move his
" *Dislike* and *Condemnation*?" This
Question, as every Man can answer for himself, so *universal Experience* and *History* shew, that in all Nations it is so; and consequently the *moral Sense* is *universal*.
2. "Whether there be any particular
" *Quality*, which, wherever it is appre-
" hended, gains *Approbation*, and the con-
" trary raises *Disapprobation*?" We shall

Sect. 4. find this *Quality* to be *kind Affection*, or
 Study of the Good of others; and thus
 the *moral Senses* of Men are generally *uni-*
form. About these two Questions there
 is little reasoning; we know how to an-
 swer them from reflecting on our own *Sen-*
timents, or by consulting others. 3. "What
 " Actions do really *evidence kind Affec-*
 " *tions*, or do really *tend to the greatest*
 " *publick Good*?" About this Question is
 all the *special Reasoning* of those who
 treat of the particular *Laws of Nature*,
 or even of *Civil Laws*: This is the largest
 Field, and the most useful Subject of *Rea-*
soning, which remains upon every *Scheme*
of Morals. 4. "What are the Motives
 " which, even from *Self-Love*, would ex-
 " cite each Individual to do those Actions
 " which are *publickly useful*?" 'Tis pro-
 bable indeed, no Man would *approve* as
 virtuous an Action *publickly useful*, to
 which the Agent was excited only by
Self-Love, without any *kind Affection*:
 'Tis also probable that no view of *Interest*
 can raise that *kind Affection*, which we
approve as virtuous; nor can any *Reaso-*
ning do it, except that which shews some
moral Goodness, or *kind Affections* in the
 Object; for this never fails, where it is
 observed or supposed in any Person to raise
 the *Love* of the Observer; so that *Virtue*
 is not properly taught.

YET since all Men have naturally *Self-Love* as well as *kind Affections*, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former; in each case the Agent is *uneasy*, and in some degree *unhappy*. The first *rash Views* of human Affairs often represent *private Interest* as opposite to the *Publick*: When this is apprehended, *Self-Love* may often engage Men in *publickly hurtful Actions*, which their *moral Sense* will condemn; and this is the ordinary Cause of Vice. To represent these Motives of *Self-Interest*, to engage Men to publickly useful Actions, is certainly the most necessary Point in Morals. This has been so well done by the *antient Moralists*, by Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf*, *Grotius*, *Shaftesbury*; 'tis made so certain from the *divine Government* of the World, the *State of Mankind*, who cannot subsist without Society, from universal *Experience* and *Consent*, from *inward Consciousness* of the Pleasure of kind Affections, and *Self-Approbation*, and of the *Torments* of *Malice*, or *Hatred*, or *Envy*, or *Anger*; that no Man who considers these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible *Interest* in opposing the publick Good; or in checking or restraining his kind Affections; nay, if he had no *kind Affections*, his very *Self-Love* and *Regard* to his private Good might excite


Sect. 4. him to publickly useful Actions, and dissuade from the contrary.

WHAT farther should be provable concerning Virtue, whence it should be called *reasonable antecedently to all Affection, or Interest, or Sense, or what it should be fit for*, one cannot easily imagine.

PERHAPS what has brought the Epithet *Reasonable*, or *flowing from Reason*, in opposition to what flows from *Instinct, Affection, or Passion*, so much into use, is this, " That it is often observed, that
 " the very best of our particular *Affections*
 " or *Desires*, when they are grown violent and *passionate*, thro' the *confused*
 " *Sensations* and *Propensities* which attend them, do make us incapable of
 " considering calmly the whole *Tendency*
 " of our *Actions*, and lead us often into
 " what is *absolutely pernicious*, under
 " some Appearance of *relative or particular Good*." This indeed may give some ground for distinguishing between *passionate Actions*, and those from *calm Desire or Affection* which employs our *Reason* freely: But can never set *rational Actions* in Opposition to those from *Instinct, Desire or Affection*. And it must be owned, that the most perfect Virtue consists in the *calm, unpassionate Benevolence*,

lence, rather than in particular Affec-
tions. Sect. 4.

IF one asks “ how do we know that ^{How we}
“ *our Affections are right when they are* ^{judge of}
“ *kind?*” What does the Word [right] ^{our Moral}
mean? Does it mean *what we approve?*
This we know by *Consciousness* of our
Sense. Again, how do we know that our
Sense is right, or that we *approve our*
Approbation? This can only be answered
by another Question, *viz.* “ How do
“ we know we are pleased when we are
“ pleased?” — Or does it mean, “ how
“ do we know that we shall *always* ap-
“ prove what we *now* approve?” To an-
swer this, we must first know that the
same Constitution of our *Sense* shall always
remain: And again, that we have applied
our selves carefully to consider the *natural*
Tendency of our Actions. Of the *Conti-*
nuance of the same Constitution of our
Sense, we are as sure as of the Continu-
ance of *Gravitation*, or any other *Law*
of *Nature*: The *Tendency* of our own
Actions we cannot always know; but we
may know certainly that we *heartily* and
sincerely studied to act according to what,
by all the Evidence now in our Power to
obtain, appeared as most *probably tending*
to publick Good. When we are conscious
of this *sincere Endeavour*, the *evil Con-*
sequences which we could not have fore-
seen,

Sect. 4.  teen, never will make us *condemn* our Conduct. But without this *sincere Endeavour*, we may often approve at *present* what we shall *afterwards* condemn.

How our
Moral
Sense is
corrected
by Reason.

IF the Question means, “ How are
“ we sure that what *we* approve, *all o-*
“ *thers* shall also approve?” Of this we
can be sure upon *no Scheme*; but ’tis highly
probable that the *Senses* of all Men are
pretty *uniform*: That the DEITY also
approves *kind Affections*, otherwise he
would not have implanted them in us, nor
determined us by a *moral Sense* to approve
them. Now since the *Probability* that
Men shall judge truly, abstracting from
any presupposed *Prejudice*, is greater than
that *they shall judge falsely*; ’tis more pro-
bable, when our Actions are really *kind*
and *publicly useful*, that *all Observers*
shall judge *truly* of our *Intentions*, and of
the *Tendency* of our Actions, and conse-
quently approve what *we* approve our-
selves, than that they shall judge *falsely*
and condemn them.

IF the Meaning of the Question be,
“ Will the doing what our *moral Sense*
“ approves tend to *our Happiness*, and to
“ the avoiding *Misery*?” ’Tis thus we
call a *Taste wrong*, when it makes that
Food at present *grateful*, which shall occa-
sion *future Pains*, or *Death*. This Ques-
tion

tion concerning our *Self-Interest* must be Sect. 4.
 answered by such *Reasoning* as was men-
 tioned above, to be well managed by our
Moralists both antient and modern.

THUS there seems no part of that *Reasoning* which was ever used by *Moralists*, to be superseded by supposing a *moral Sense*. And yet without a *moral Sense* there is no Explication can be given of our *Ideas of Morality*; nor of that *Reasonableness* supposed antecedent to all *Instincts, Affections, or Sense*.

“ BUT may there not be a *right* or
 “ *wrong State* of our *moral Sense*, as
 “ there is in our other *Senses*, according
 “ as they represent their *Objects* to be
 “ as they really are, or represent them o-
 “ therwise?” So may not our *moral Sense*
 approve that which is *vicious*, and disap-
 prove *Virtue*, as a *sickly Palate* may dis-
 like *grateful Food*, or a *vitiating Sight*
 misrepresent *Colours* or *Dimensions*? Must
 we not know therefore antecedently what
 is *morally Good* or *Evil* by our *Reason*, be-
 fore we can know that our *moral Sense* is
right?

TO answer this, we must remember that
 of the *sensible Ideas*, some are allowed to
 be only *Perceptions* in our *Minds*, and not
 Images of any like *external Quality*, as
Colours,

Sect. 4. *Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure, Pain.* Other Ideas are *Images* of something *external*, as *Duration, Number, Extension, Motion, Rest*: These latter, for distinction, we may call *concomitant Ideas of Sensation*, and the former *purely sensible*. As to the *purely sensible Ideas*, we know they are *alter'd* by any Disorder in our *Organs*, and made *different* from what arise in us from the same Objects at other times. We do not denominate Objects from our *Perceptions during the Disorder*, but according to our *ordinary Perceptions*, or those of others in good *Health*: Yet no body imagines that therefore *Colours, Sounds, Tastes*, are not *sensible Ideas*. In like manner many *Circumstances* diversify the *concomitant Ideas*: But we denominate Objects from the *Appearances* they make to us in an *uniform Medium*, when our *Organs* are in no disorder, and the Object not very distant from them. But none therefore imagines that it is *Reason* and not *Sense* which discovers these *concomitant Ideas*, or *primary Qualities*.

Just so in our *Ideas of Actions*. These three Things are to be distinguished, 1. The Idea of the *external Motion*, known first by *Sense*, and its *Tendency to the Happiness or Misery* of some *sensitive Nature*, often inferr'd by *Argument* or *Reason*. 2. *Apprehension* or *Opinion* of the *Affections*


tions in the Agent, concluded by our Reason: So far the Idea of an Action represents something external to the Observer. Sect. 4.

3. The Perception of Approbation or Disapprobation arising in the Observer, according as the Affections of the Agent are apprehended kind in their just Degree, or deficient, or malicious. This Approbation cannot be supposed an Image of any thing external, more than the Pleasure of Harmony, of Taste, of Smell. But let none imagine, that calling the Ideas of Virtue and Vice Perceptions of a Sense, upon apprehending the Actions and Affections of another does diminish their Reality, more than the like Assertions concerning all Pleasure and Pain, Happiness or Misery. Our Reason does often correct the Report of our Senses, about the natural Tendency of the external Action, and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of the Agent. But whether our moral Sense be subject to such a Disorder, as to have different Perceptions, from the same apprehended Affections in an Agent, at different times, as the Eye may have of the Colours of an unaltered Object, 'tis not easy to determine: Perhaps it will be hard to find any Instances of such a Change. What Reason could correct, if it fell into such a Disorder; I know not; except suggesting to its Remembrance its former Approbations, and representing the general Sense of Mankind.

Sect. 4. kind. But this does not prove Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice* to be previous to a *Sense*, more than a like *Correction* of the Ideas of *Colour* in a Person under the *Jaundice*, proves that *Colours* are perceived by *Reason*, previously to *Sense*.

IF any say, “ this *moral Sense* is not “ a *Rule* :” What means that Word? It is not a *strait rigid Body* : It is not a *general Proposition*, shewing what *Means* are fit to obtain an end : It is not a *Proposition*, asserting, that a *Superior* will make those happy who act one way, and miserable who act the contrary way. If these be the Meanings of *Rule*, it is no *Rule* ; yet by reflecting upon it our Understanding may find out a *Rule*. But what *Rule* of Actions can be formed, without Relation to some *End* proposed? Or what *End* can be proposed, without presupposing *Instincts*, *Desires*, *Affections*, or a *moral Sense*, it will not be easy to explain.

SECT.



S E C T. V.

Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit ; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct.

SOME will not allow any *Merit* in *Actions* flowing from *kind Instincts* :
 “ *Merit*, say they, attends *Actions* to
 “ which we are excited by *Reason* alone,
 “ or to which we *freely* determine our
 “ selves. The Operation of *Instincts* or
 “ *Affections* is *necessary*, and not *volun-*
 “ *tary* ; nor is there more *Merit* in them
 “ than in the *Shining of the Sun*, the
 “ *Fruitfulness of a Tree*, or the *Over-*
 “ *flowing of a Stream*, which are all *pub-*
 “ *lickly useful*.”

BUT what does *Merit* mean ? or *Praise-Merit,*
worthiness ? Do these Words denote the *what.*
 “ *Quality* in *Actions*, which gains *Appro-*
 “ *bation* from the Observer ? Or, 2dly, Are
 these *Actions* called *meritorious*, “ which,
 “ when any Observer does *approve* all o-
 “ ther

Sect. 5. “ther *Observers* approve him for his *Ap-
 ~~~~~*probation of it; and would condemn  
 “any *Observer* who did not approve these  
 “*Actions?*” These are the only Meanings  
 of *meritorious*, which I can conceive as  
 distinct from *rewardable*, which is con-  
 sidered hereafter separately.

Now we endeavoured already to shew,  
 that “no *Reason* can excite to Action  
 “previously to some *End*, and that no  
 “*End* can be proposed without some *In-  
 “stinct* or *Affection*.” What then can  
 be meant by being *excited by Reason*, as  
 distinct from all Motion of *Instincts* or  
*Affections*?

THEN determining our selves freely,  
 does it mean *acting without any Motive*  
 or *exciting Reason*? If it did not mean  
 this, it cannot be opposed to *acting from*  
*Instinct* or *Affections*, since all *Motives*  
 or *Reasons* presuppose them. If it do mean  
 this, that “Merit is found only in Actions  
 “done without *Motive* or *Affection*, by  
 “mere *Election*, without prepollent *De-  
 “sire* of one *Action* or *End* rather than  
 “its opposite, or without *Desire* of that  
 “*Pleasure* which \* some do suppose fol-  
 “lows

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\* This is the Notion of *Liberty* given by the Archbishop  
 of *Dublin*, in his most ingenious Book, *De Origine Mali*.  
 This

“ lows upon any *Election*, by a natural Sect. 5.  
 “ *Connexion*.” Then let any Man consider whether he ever acts in this manner by mere *Election*, without any previous *Desire*? And again, let him consult his own Breast, whether such kind of Action gains his *Approbation*? Upon seeing a Person not more disposed by *Affection*, *Compassion*, or *Love* or *Desire*, to make his Country happy than miserable, yet choosing the one rather than the other, from no *Desire* of publick *Happiness*, nor *Aversion* to the *Torments* of others, but by such an *unaffectionate Determination*, as that by which one moves his *first Finger* rather than the *second*, in giving an Instance of a *trifling Action*; let any one ask if this Action should be *meritorious*: and yet that there should be no *Merit* in a *tender compassionate Heart*, which shrinks at every *Pain* of its *Fellow-Creatures*, and triumphs in their *Happiness*; with *kind Affections* and *strong Desire* labouring for the publick Good. If this be the Nature of *meritorious Actions*; I fancy every honest

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This Opinion does not represent *Freedom* of Election, as opposite to all *Instinct* or *Desire*; but rather as arising from the *Desire* of that *Pleasure supposed to be connected with every Election*. Upon his Scheme there is a *Motive* and *End* proposed in every Election, and a natural *Instinct* toward *Happiness* presupposed: Tho 'tis such a *Motive* and *End* as leaves us in perfect *Liberty*. Since it is a *Pleasure* or *Happiness*, not connected with one thing more than another, but following upon the *Determination* itself.

Sect. 5. Heart would disclaim all *Merit in Morals*, as violently as the old *Protestants* rejected it in *Justification*.

BUT let us see which of the two Senses of *Merit* or *Praise-worthiness* is founded on this ( I won't call it *unreasonable* or *casual*) but *unaffectionate Choice*. If *Merit* denotes the *Quality moving the Spectator to approve*, then there may be *unaffectionate Election* of the greatest Villany, as well as of the most useful Actions; but who will say that they are *equally approved*? — But perhaps 'tis not the *mere Freedom of Choice* which is approved, but the *free Choice of publick Good*, without any *Affection*. Then Actions are approved for *publick Usefulness*, and not for *Freedom*. Upon this Supposition the *Heat of the Sun*, the *Fruitfulness of a Tree*, would be *meritorious*: or if one says, “ these are “ not *Actions*,” they are at least *meritorious Qualities, Motions, Attractions, &c.* And a *casual Invention* may be *meritorious*. — Perhaps *Free Election* is a *Conditio sine qua non*, and *publick Usefulness* the immediate *Cause* of *Approbation*; neither separately, but both jointly are *meritorious*: *Free Election alone* is not *Merit*; *Publick Usefulness alone* is not *Merit*; but both concurring. Then should any Person by *mere Election*, without any *Desire* to serve the publick, set about  
*Mines,*



*Mines*, or any *useful Manufacture*; or Sect. 5.  
 should a Person by *mere Election* stab a  
 Man, without knowing him to be a *publick Robber*; here both *free Election* and  
*publick Usefulness* may concur: Yet will  
 any one say there is *Merit* or *Virtue* in such  
 Actions? Where then shall we find *Merit*,  
 unless in *kind Affections*, or *Desire* and  
*Intention* of the publick Good? This  
 moves our *Approbation* wherever we ob-  
 serve it: and the want of this is the true  
*Reason* why a *Searcher for Mines*, a *free*  
*Killer* of an unknown Robber, the *warm-*  
*ing Sun*, or the *fruitful Tree*, are not  
 counted *meritorius*.

BUT it may be said, that to make an  
 Action *meritorious*, it is necessary not only  
 that the Action be *publickly useful*, but  
 that it be *known* or *imagined* to be *such*,  
 before the Agent freely chuses it. But  
 what does this add to the former Scheme?  
 Only a *Judgment* or *Opinion* in the *Un-*  
*derstanding*, concerning the *natural Ten-*  
*dency* of an Action to the publick Good:  
 Few, it may be presumed, will place *Vir-*  
*tue* in *Assent* or *Dissent*, or *Perceptions*.  
 And yet this is all that is superadded to  
 the former Case. The Agent must not  
*desire* the publick Good, or have any *kind*  
*Affections*. This would spoil the *Freedom*  
*of Choice*, according to their Scheme, who  
 insist on a *Freedom opposite to Affections*

Sect. 5. or *Instincts*: But he must *barely know* the Tendency to publick Good, and without any *Propensity* to, or *Desire* of, the Happiness of others, by an *arbitrary Election*, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himself, whether these are the Qualities which he *approves*.

WHAT has probably engaged many into this way of speaking, “ that Virtue is “ the Effect of *rational Choice*, and not “ of *Instincts or Affections*,” is this; they find, that “ some Actions flowing from “ particular kind Affections, are sometimes “ condemned as *evil*,” because of their *bad Influence* upon the State of larger Societies; and that the *Hurry and confused Sensations* of any of our Passions, may divert the Mind from considering the *whole Effect* of its Actions: They require therefore to *Virtue a calm and undisturbed Temper*.

THERE is indeed some ground to commend this *Temper* as very necessary in many Cases; and yet some of the most *passionate Actions* may be perfectly good. But in the *calmest Temper* there must remain *Affection* or *Desire*, some implanted *Instinct* for which we can give no *reason*; otherwise there could be no Action of any kind. As it was shewn above in the first Section.

IF *meritorious Actions* are these which whosoever does not *approve*, is himself *condemned* by others; the *Quality* by which they are constituted *meritorious* in this Sense, is the same which moves our *Approbation*. We *condemn* any Person who does not *approve* that which we ourselves *approve*: We presume the *Sense* of others to be constituted like our own; and that any other Person, would he attend to the *Actions* which we *approve*, would also *approve* them, and love the *Agent*; when we find that another does not *approve* what we *approve*, we are apt to conclude, that he has not had *kind Affections* toward the *Agent*, or that some *evil Affection* makes him overlook his *Virtues*, and on this account condemn him.

PERHAPS by *meritorious* is meant the same thing with another Word used in like manner, *viz. rewardable*. Then indeed the *Quality* in which *Merit* or *Rewardableness* is founded, is different from that which is denoted by *Merit* in the former Meanings.

REWARDABLE, or *deserving Reward*, denotes either that *Quality* which would incline a superior Nature to make an *Agent* happy: Or, 2dly, That *Quality* of *Actions* which would make a *Spectator* ap-



Sect. 5. *prove a superior Nature, when he conferred Happiness on the Agent, and disapprove that Superior, who inflicted Misery on the Agent, or punished him.* Let any one try to give a Meaning to the Word *rewardable* distinct from these, and not satisfy himself with the Words *worthy of*, or *deserving*, which are of very complex and ambiguous Signification.

Now the *Qualities* of an Action determining a powerful Nature to reward it, must be various, according to the *Constitution* and *Affections* of that Superior. If he has a *moral Sense*, or *something analogous* of a more excellent sort, by which he is determined to *love* those who evidence *kind Affections*, and to desire their Happiness, then *kind Affection* is a Quality moving to Reward.

BUT farther, if this Superior be *benevolent*, and observes that inferior Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happiness; then he must incline to excite them to *publickly useful Actions*, by Prospects of *private Interest* to the Agent, if it be needful: Therefore he will engage them to publickly useful Actions by *Prospects of Rewards*, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions, or whatever their *Affections* be. These two *Qualities* in Actions, *viz. flowing from kind Af-*

*Affections*, and *publick Usefulness* concur- Sect. 5.  
 ring, undoubtedly incline the *benevolent*  
*Superior* to confer Happiness: The *former*  
*alone*, where, thro' want of *Power*, the  
 Agent is disappointed of his kind Inten-  
 tions, will incline a benevolent Superior to  
 reward; and the *want of Power* in the  
 Agent will never incline him to punish.  
 But the *want of kind Affections*, altho  
 there be *publickly useful Actions*, may be so  
 offensive to the *moral Sense* of the *superior*  
*Nature*, as to prevent *Reward*, or excite  
 to *punish*; unless this Conduct would oc-  
 casion *greater publick Evil*, by with-  
 drawing from many Agents a *necessary Mo-*  
*tive* to publick Usefulness, *viz.* the *Hope*  
*of Reward*.

BUT if the Superior were *malicious*  
 with a *moral Sense* contrary to ours, the  
 contrary *Affections* and *Tendency of Ac-*  
*tions* would excite to reward, if any such  
 thing could be expected from such a  
*Temper*.


IF Actions be called *rewardable*, when  
 “ a *Spectator* would approve the *superior*  
 “ *Mind* for conferring Rewards on such  
 “ Actions:” Then various Actions must  
 be rewardable, according to the *moral*  
*Sense* of the *Spectator*. Men approve re-  
 warding all *kind Affections*: And if it  
 will promote publick Good to promise  
 U 3 Rewards

Sect. 5. Rewards to *publicly useful Actions* from whatsoever *Affections* they proceed, it will evidence Benevolence in the Superior to do so. And this is the Case with *human Governors*, who cannot dive into the *Affections* of Men.

Whether  
Motives or  
Inclinations  
to Evil  
be necessary  
to make  
an Agent  
rewardable?


SOME strongly assert (which is often the only Proof) that "to make an Action *rewardable*, the Agent should have had Inclinations to evil as well as to good." What does this mean, That a good governing MIND is only inclined to make an Agent happy, or to confer a *Reward* on him when he has some *evil Affections*, which yet are surmounted by the *benevolent Affections*? But would not a *benevolent Superior* incline to make any *benevolent Agent* happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather have some Tendency to *diminish* the Love of the superior Mind. Cannot a good Mind *love* an Agent, and *desire* his Happiness, unless he observes some Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite *Hatred* or *Aversion*? Must there be a Mixture of *Hatred* to make *Love* strong and effectual, as there must be a Mixture of *Shade* to set off the Lights in a Picture, where there are no *Shades*? Is there any Love, where there is no *Inclination to make*



*make happy?* Or is strong Love made up of Sect. 5.  
*Love and Hatred?* 

'TIS true indeed, that *Men* judge of the *Strength* of kind Affections generally by the contrary Motives of *Self-Love*, which they surmount: But must the D E I T Y do so too? Is any Nature the less lovely, for its having no Motive to make itself *odious*? If a Being which has no Motive to evil can be *beloved* by a Superior, shall he not *desire the Happiness* of that Agent whom he loves? 'Tis true, such a Nature will do good Actions without Prospect of any *Self-Interest*; but would any benevolent Superior study the less to make it happy on that account? — But if they apply the Word *rewardable* to those Actions alone, *which an Agent would not do without Prospect of Reward*: then indeed to make an Action in this Sense *rewardable*, 'tis necessary that the Agent should either have *no kind Affections*, or that he should live in such Circumstances, wherein Self-Love should lead to Actions *contrary* to the publick Good, and over-power any kind Affections; or that he should have *evil Affections*, which even in a good Constitution of the World, his *Self-Love* could not over-balance without *Reward*.

Sect. 5.



THIS poor Idea of *Rewardableness* is taken from the *Poverty* and *Impotence* of *human Governors*: Their Funds are soon exhausted; they cannot make happy all those whose Happiness they desire: Their *little Stores* must be frugally managed; none must be rewarded for what good they will do without Reward, or for abstaining from Evils to which they are not inclined. Rewards must be kept for the *insolent Minister*, who without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the *turbulent Demagogue*, who will raise Factions if he is not bribed; for the *covetous, mean-spirited, but artful Citizen*, who will serve his Country no farther than it is for his private Interest. But let any kind honest Heart declare what *sort of Characters* it loves? *Whose* Happiness it most desires? *Whom* it would reward if it could? Or what these *Dispositions* are, which if it saw rewarded by a superior Nature, it would be most pleased, and most *approve* the Conduct of the Superior? When these Questions are answer'd, we shall know what makes Actions *rewardable*.


IF we call all Actions *rewardable*, the rewarding of which we *approve*; then indeed we shall approve the rewarding of all *Actions which we approve*, whether the Agent

Agent has had any *Inclinations* or *Motives* to Evil or not : We shall also approve the *promising of Rewards* to all *publickly useful Actions*, whatever were the *Affections* of the Agents. If by this *Prospect of Reward* either *malicious* Natures are restrained from Mischief, or *selfish* Natures induced to serve the Publick, or *benevolent* Natures not able without reward to surmount real or apparent *selfish Motives* : In all these Cases, the *proposing Rewards* does really advance the Happiness of the *Whole*, or diminish its *Misery* ; and evidences *Benevolence* in the superior Mind, and is consequently *approved* by our *moral Sense*.

IN this last Meaning of the Word *rewardable*, these Dispositions are rewardable. 1. *Pure unmixed Benevolence*. 2. *Prepollent good Affections*. 3. *Such weak Benevolence, as will not without Reward overcome apparently contrary Motives of Self-Love*. 4. *Unmixed Self-Love, which by Prospect of Reward may serve the publick*. 5. *Self-Love, which by Assistance of Rewards, may overballance some malicious Affections*. If in these Cases *proposing Rewards* will increase the Happiness of the System, or diminish its Misery, it evidences *Goodness* in the Governor, when he cannot so well otherwise accomplish so much good for the whole.



Sect. 5.



IF we suppose a Necessity of making all virtuous Agents *equally happy*, then indeed a *Mixture of evil Dispositions*, tho surmounted by the good, or of *strong contrary Motives* overballanced by *Motives to Good*, would be a Circumstance of some Importance in the Distribution of Rewards: Since such a Nature, during the *Struggle of contrary Affections* or *Motives*, must have had less *Pleasure* than that virtuous Nature which met with no Opposition: But as this very Opposition did give this Nature *full Evidence* of the Strength of its Virtue, this *Consciousness* may be a peculiar *Recompence* to which the unmixed Tempers are Strangers: And there seems no such necessity of an *equal Happiness of all Natures*. It is no way inconsistent with perfect Goodness, to make different *Orders of Beings*; and, provided all the Virtuous be at last *fully content*, and as happy as they desire, there is nothing absurd in supposing *different Capacities* and *different Degrees*; and during the Time of *Probation*, there is no necessity, not the least shew of it, that all be equal.

THOSE who think “ *no Person punishable for any Quality or Action, if he had it not in his Power to have had the opposite Quality, or to have abstained* ”

“ *stained from the Action if he had wil-* Sect. 5.  
 “ *led it ;*” perhaps are not mistaken :  
 but then let them not assert on the *other*  
*Hand*, that it is unjust to reward or make  
 happy those, who neither had any *Dis-*  
*positions to Evil*, nor could possibly *de-*  
*sire* any such Dispositions. Now if Mens  
 Affections are naturally good, and if there  
 be in their Fellows no *Quality* which would  
 necessarily raise *Malice* in the Observer ;  
 but, on the contrary, *all Qualities* requisite  
 to excite at least *Benevolence* or *Compass-*  
*ion* : It may be justly said to be in the  
*Power* of every one, by due Attention,  
 to prevent any *malicious Affections*, and  
 to excite in himself *kind Affections* to-  
 ward all. So that the intricate Debates a-  
 bout human *Liberty* do not affect what is  
 here alledged, concerning our *moral Sense*  
 of Affections and Actions, any more than  
 any other Schemes.

SOME alledge, that MERIT supposes,  
 beside *kind Affection*, that the Agent has a  
*moral Sense*, reflects upon his own Vir-  
 tue, *delights* in it, and *chuses* to adhere  
 to it for the *Pleasure* which attends it\*. We  
 need not debate the Use of this Word *Merit* :  
 'tis plain, we *approve* a generous kind Ac-  
 tion, tho the Agent had not made this *Re-*

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\* See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. Part I.

**Sect. 5.** *Reflection.* This Reflection shews to him a Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to which does not increase our *Approbation*: But then it must again be owned, that we cannot form a just Conclusion of a *Character* from one or two kind, generous Actions, especially where there has been no very strong *Motives to the contrary*. Some apparent Motives of *Interest* may afterwards overballance the *kind Affections*, and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. But the *Reflection* on Virtue, the being once *charmed* with the lovely Form, will discover an *Interest* on its side, which, if well attended to, no other Motive will overballance. This Reflection is a great *Security* to the *Character*; this must be supposed in such Creatures as *Men* are, before we can well depend upon a *Constancy in Virtue*. The same may be said of many other Motives to Virtue from *Interest*; which, tho they do not *immediately* influence the *kind Affections* of the Agent, yet do remove these *Obstacles* to them, from *false Appearances of Interest*. Such are these from the Sanctions of *divine Laws* by future Rewards and Punishments, and even the manifest *Advantages of Virtue in this Life*: without *Reflection* on which, a steady *Course of Virtue* is scarce to be expected amidst the present Confusion of human Affairs.





## S E C T. VI.

*How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous.*

I. **S**OME do imagine, that “ to make  
 “ an Action virtuous, it is necessary  
 “ that the Agent should have previously  
 “ known his Action to be *acceptable to*  
 “ *the DEITY*, and have undertaken it  
 “ chiefly with design to please or obey  
 “ him. We have not, say they, reason  
 “ to imagine a *malicious Intention* in many  
 “ of the worst Actions: the very *want*  
 “ *of good Affections in their just Degree*,  
 “ must constitute *moral Evil*. If so, then  
 “ the *moral Evil* in the *want of Love or*  
 “ *Gratitude*, must increase in proportion  
 “ to the *Causes of Love or Gratitude* in  
 “ the Object: by the Causes of Love,  
 “ they mean *those Qualities in the Object*  
 “ upon Observation of which Love or  
 “ Gratitude do arise in every good Temper.  
 “ Now the *Causes of Love* toward  
 “ the DEITY are infinite; therefore the  
 “ want of the highest possible Degree of  
 “ Love to him, must be infinitely evil.  
 “ — To be excited more by *smaller*  
 “ *Motives*

Sect. 6. “ *Motives* or *Causes* than by greater; to  
 “ love those who are less *lovely*, while  
 “ we neglect him in whom are *infinite*  
 “ *Causes of Love*, must argue great *Per-*  
 “ *verseness* of *Affections*. But the *Causes*  
 “ of *Love* in the DEITY, his infinite  
 “ *Goodness* toward all, and even toward  
 “ our selves, from whence springs all the  
 “ Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely  
 “ above any *Causes of Love* to be found  
 “ in *Creatures*: Therefore to act from  
 “ Love to them without *Intention* to please  
 “ GOD, must be infinitely evil.”

IF this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between *habitual* and *actual Intention* will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments require *actual Intention*. An *habitual Intention* is not a present act of Love to the DEITY, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to *Creatures*, which this Argument requires; but a prior general *Resolution* not at present repeated.

To find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by *Reflection*.

How we  
compute  
the Good-  
ness of  
Temper.

II. THERE is in Mankind such a *Dis-*  
*position* naturally, that they desire the Hap-  
 piness of any known *sensitive Nature*,  
 when

when it is not inconsistent with something Sect. 6.  
more strongly desired ; so that were there  
no *Oppositions of Interest* either private or  
publick, and *sufficient Power*, we would  
confer upon every Being the highest Hap-  
piness which it could receive.

BUT our *Understanding* and *Power* are  
limited, so that we cannot know many  
other Natures, nor is our utmost *Power*  
capable of promoting the Happiness of  
many: our Actions are therefore influen-  
ced by some *stronger Affections* than this  
general *Benevolence*. There are certain  
*Qualities* found in some Beings more than  
in others, which excite stronger *Degrees* of  
*Good-will*, and determine our *Attention* to  
their Interests, while that of others is neg-  
lected. The Ties of *Blood*, *Benefits*  
*conferred* upon us, and the Observation of  
*Virtue* in others, raise much more vigo-  
rous *Affections*, than that general *Bene-*  
*volence* which we may have toward all.  
These *Qualities* or *Relations* we may call  
the *Causes of Love*.

HOWEVER these *Affections* are very  
different from the *general Benevolence* to-  
ward all, yet it is very probable, that there  
is a *Regularity* or *Proportion* observed in  
the Constitution of our Nature; so that,  
abstracting from some acquired *Habits*, or  
Affo-



Se&t. 6. *Associations of Ideas*, and from the more sudden *Emotions* of some particular Passions, that Temper which has the most lively *Gratitude*, or is the most susceptible of *Friendship* with virtuous Characters, would also have the strongest *general Benevolence* toward indifferent Persons: And on the contrary, where there is the weakest *general Benevolence*, there we could expect the least *Gratitude*, and the least *Friendship*, or *Love toward the Virtuous*. If this *Proportion* be observed, then, if we express all these Desires of the good of others by the Name of *Benevolence*, we may denote the several *Degrees* in which Men possess these several kind Dispositions by the *Goodness of the Temper*: And the Degrees of Desire toward the Happiness of any Person, we may call the *Quantity of Love* toward him. Then,

THE *Quantity of Love* toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended *Causes of Love* in him, and of the *Goodness of Temper* in the Observer. Or  $L = C \times G$ .

WHEN the *Causes of Love* in two Objects are apprehended equal, the *Love* toward either in different Persons is as the *Goodness of Temper*; or  $L = G \times 1$ .

WHEN the *Goodness of Temper* is the same or equal, the *Love* toward any Objects will be as the *Causes*; or  $L = C \times 1$ .

THE *Goodness of any Temper* is therefore as the *Quantity of Love*, divided by the apprehended *Causes*, or  $G = \frac{L}{C}$ . And since we cannot apprehend any Goodness in having the *Degree of Love* above the *Proportion* of its *Causes*, the most virtuous Temper is that in which the *Love* equals its *Causes*, which may therefore be expressed by Unity \*.

HENCE it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our *Fellow-Creatures*, from whom also we our selves, and all others had received the greatest *Benefits*; there would be less Virtue in any small Degree of *Desire of his Happiness*, than in a like Degree of *Love* toward our *Fellow-Creature*. But not loving such a Being, or having a smaller Degree of *Love*, must evidence a much greater *Defect* in Virtue, than a like want of *Love* toward our *Fellow-Creatures*. For the *Causes of Love* being very great, unless the *Love* be also

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\* See *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. 11. last Paragraph.*

Sect. 6. very great, the *Quotient* which expresses  
 ~~~~~ the *Goodness of Temper* will be very much  
 below Unity.

*The general Rules
 applied to
 the Love
 of God.*

III. To apply this to the DEITY is very obvious. Our *Affections* toward him arise in the same manner as toward our Fellows, in proportion to our *Attention* to the *Causes of Love* in him, and the *Goodness of our Temper*. The Reflection on his Goodness raises *Approbation* and *Complacence*, his *Benefits* raise *Gratitude*, and both occasion *Good-will* or *Benevolence*. Some imagine, that “ his *Happiness* is wholly “ detached from all Events in this World, “ absolute, and unvaried in himself.” And yet the same *Inclination* of Mind might remain in us, tho we had this Opinion. When the *Happiness of a Friend* is in *Suspense*, we desire it; when he has obtained all that which we desired, the same *Inclination of Mind* seems to remain toward him, only without that *Uneasiness* accompanying Desire of an *uncertain Object*: Thus *Gravity* may be said to be the same when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as when it caused descent.

UPON this Scheme of the divine Happiness, it is not easy to account how our Love to him could excite us to promote the *Happiness of our Fellows*. Our frequent *Contemplation* of such an amiable excellent
 Nature

Nature, might indeed tend to *reform* or *improve* our Temper. *Sect. 6.*

IF we imagine that the DEITY has such *Perceptions* of *Approbation* or *Dislike* toward *Actions* as we have our selves, then indeed our *Love* to him would directly excite us to do whatever he approves, and shun what he condemns. We can scarce avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring of *Events disapproved*, must be uneasy to any Nature, and that the observing *approved Actions* must be delightful.

IF we imagine that the *divine Happiness*, or any part of it is connected with the *Happiness* of his *Creatures*, so that their *Happiness* is constituted the *Occasion* of his; then indeed our *Love to the DEITY* will directly excite us to all manner of *beneficent Actions*. 'Tis true, many good Men deny these two last *Opinions*, yet it is probable, when their *Minds* are diverted from *Speculations*, by *Opportunities* of *Action*, there recurs some *Imagination* of *Offence*, *Uneasiness*, and *Resentment* in the DEITY, upon observing *evil Actions*; of *Delight* and *Joy* in beholding good *Actions*; of *Sorrow* upon observing the *Misery* of his *Creatures*, and *Joy* upon seeing them happy: So that by their *Love to the DEITY* they are influenced to *beneficent Actions*, notwithstanding their

Sect. 6. *speculative Opinions.* In our Conceptions of the DEITY, we are continually led to imagine a Resemblance to what we feel in our selves.

WHOEVER maintains these Opinions of the DEITY to be true, must also suppose “ a particular *Determination* of all Events “ in the Universe ;” otherwise this *part* of the divine Happiness is made *precarious* and *uncertain*, depending upon the *undetermined Will* of Creatures.

THE Diversity of Opinions concerning the *divine Happiness*, may lead Men into different ways of accounting for the *Influence* which the *Love of God* may have upon our Actions toward our Fellows : But the Affections toward the DEITY would be much the same upon both Schemes. Where there were the same just *Apprehensions* of the *divine Goodness* in two Persons, the *Love* to the DEITY in both would be proportioned to the *Goodness of Temper*. Tho the highest possible *Degree* of Love to a perfectly good DEITY, would evidence no more *Virtue of Temper*, than a proportioned *Love to Creatures*; yet the having only *smaller Degrees* of Love to the DEITY, would evidence a greater *Defect* of Goodness in the Temper, than any want of *Affection* toward Creatures.

HERE

HERE it must be remembred, that in arguing concerning the *Goodness of Temper* from the *Degree of Love* directly, and the *Causes of Love* inverfly, *actual Attention* to the *Causes of Love* is supposed in the Person. For 'tis plain, that in the best Temper no one *Affection or Idea* can always continue present, and there can be no *Affection* present to the Mind, toward any Object, while the *Idea* of it is not present. The bare *Absence* therefore of *Affection*, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than want of *Attention* may argue want of *Affection*. In like manner, in the *best Temper*, there can be no Love toward an Object *unknown*: The want therefore of Love to an Object *unknown*, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than *Ignorance* may argue want of *Affection*. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good DEITY, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the *strongest Love and Gratitude* toward him, must have a Temper void of all Goodness; but it will not follow, that that Mind is void of Goodness which is not *always thinking* of the DEITY, or actually *loving* him, or even does not know him. How far the want of *Attention* to the DEITY, and *Ignorance* of him, may argue an *evil Temper*,


Sect 6. must be shown from different *Topicks*, to
 be considered hereafter.

*What De-
 grees of
 Affection
 necessary
 to Inno-
 cence.*

IV. But previously to these Inquiries we must consider “ what *Degrees* or Kinds of “ Affection are necessary to obtain the “ simple *Approbation* of *Innocence*.” ’Tis plain, the bare *Absence* of all *Malice* is not enough. We may have the general *Benevolence* toward a mere *sensitive Nature*, which had no other desire but *Self-Love*; but we can apprehend no *moral Goodness* in such a Being: Nay, ’tis not every *small Degree* of kind Affections which we approve. There must be some *proportion* of kind Affections to the *other Faculties* in any Nature, particularly to its *Understanding* and *active Powers* to obtain *Approbation*. Some Brutes evidence small *Degrees* of *Good-will*, which make them be approved in *their Kind*; but the same *Degrees* would not be approved in a *Man*. There is an higher *Degree* expected in Mankind, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them *innocent*. It is not easy to fix precisely that *Degree* which we approve as *innocent* by our moral Sense. Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved; such as *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Pity*, *Friendship*: And yet when we take a more *extensive View* of the Tendency of
 some

some Actions proceeding even from these *Affections*, we may often condemn these Actions when they are apprehended as pernicious to *larger Systems* of Mankind. In the same manner we often condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they appear to be *pernicious to Mankind* in general. In like manner, *Self-Preservation* and pursuing *private Advantage* abstractly considered, is *innocent* : But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any case to the Safety of *others*, it is condemned.


MANKIND are capable of large extensive Ideas of *great Societies*. And it is expected of them, that their *general Benevolence* should continually direct and limit, not only their *selfish Affections*, but even their *nearer Attachments* to others: that their Desire of *publick Good*, and Aversion to *publick Misery*, should overcome at least their Desire of *positive private Advantages*, either to themselves or their particular Favourites; so as to make them abstain from any Action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to *Mankind*, however *beneficial* it might be to *themselves*, or their *Favourites*. To undergo *positive Evil* for the sake of *positive Good* to others, seems some degree of Virtue above *Innocence*, which we do not universally expect: But to reject *positive attainable*

Sect. 6. tainable good, either for our selves or our particular Favourites, rather than occasion any considerable *Misery* to others, is requisite to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*. The *want* of this Degree we positively condemn as evil; and an Agent must rise above it by *positive Services* to Mankind, with some *Trouble* and *Expence* to himself, before we approve him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence: Whoever refuses them is below Innocence. But we do not *positively condemn* those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the *positive Good* of others, unless the private Interest be *very small*, and the publick Good *very great*.

BUT as the Desire of *positive private Good* is weaker than Aversion to *private Evil*, or Pain; so our *Desire* of the positive Good of others, is weaker than our *Aversion* to their Misery: It seems at least requisite to *Innocence*, that the stronger *publick Affection*, viz. our Aversion to the Misery of others, should surmount the *weaker private Affection*, the Desire of positive private Good; so that no prospect of Good to our selves, should engage us to that which would occasion *Misery* to others. It is in like manner requisite to
In.

Innocence, that our Aversion to the Misery Sect. 6.
of *greater* or *equal* Systems, should sur-
mount our Desire of the *positive* Good of
these to which we are more particularly
attached.

How far it may be necessary to Innocence to submit to smaller *private* Pains to prevent the *greater* Sufferings of others, or to promote some great *positive* Advantages; or how far the Happiness of *private* Systems should be neglected for the Happiness of the *greater*, in order to obtain the *Approbation* of *Innocence*, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any *general* Rules; nor indeed is it necessary. Our business is not to find out "at how *cheap* a Rate we can purchase "*Innocence*, but to know what is *most* "*noble, generous* and *virtuous* in Life." This we know consists in sacrificing all *positive* Interests, and bearing all *private* Evils for the publick Good: And in submitting also the Interests of all *smaller* Systems to the Interests of the whole: Without any other *Exception* or *Reserve* than this, that every Man may look upon himself as a *Part* of this System, and consequently not sacrifice an *important* *private* Interest to a *less* important Interest of others. We may find the same sort of Difficulty about all our other Senses, in determining precisely what Objects are *indifferent*,

Sect. 6. different, or where Pleasure ends, and Dis-
 *gust begins, tho the positive Degrees of*
the grateful and ungrateful are easily
distinguished.

IT is also very difficult to fix any precise *Degree* of Affection toward the DEITY, which should be barely requisite to Innocence. Only in general we must disapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehension of the perfect Goodness of the DEITY, and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, has not *stronger Affections* of *Love* and *Gratitude* toward him, than those toward any other Being. Such Affections would necessarily raise frequent *Attention* and *Consideration* of our Actions; and would engage us, if we apprehended any of them to be offensive to him, or contrary to that *Scheme of Events* in which we apprehended the DEITY to *delight*, to avoid them with a more firm Resolution than what we had in any other Affairs. *Positive Virtue* toward the DEITY must go farther than a *resolute abstaining from Offence*, by engaging us with the greatest Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as *positively pleasing*, or conducive to those Ends in which we apprehend the DEITY delights. It is scarce conceivable that any *good Temper* can want such Affections toward the DEITY, when once he is known, as were above supposed necessary to *Innocence*. Nor
 can

can we imagine *positive Degrees* of Good-Sect. 6.
ness of Temper above Innocence, where
Affections toward the D E I T Y do not arise
proportionably.

W H A T is here said relates only to the
Apprehensions of our moral Sense, and
not to those Degrees of Virtue which the
D E I T Y may require by *Revelation*: And
every one's Heart may inform him, whether
or no he does not *approve*, at least as *in-*
nocent, those who omit many good Offices
which they might *possibly* have done, pro-
vided they do a great deal of good; those
who carefully abstain from every *appre-*
hended Offence toward the D E I T Y, tho
they might possibly be more frequent in
Acts of *Devotion*. 'Tis true indeed, the
Omission of what we know to be required
is positively evil: so that by a *Revelation*
we may be obliged to farther Services than
were requisite previously to it, which we
could not innocently omit, after this *Re-*
velation is known: But we are here only
considering our *moral Sense*.

V. Now let us inquire how far *simple Ig-* How far.
norance of a D E I T Y, or *unaffected Atheism* Ignorance
does evidence an *evil Disposition*, or *De-* of D E I T Y
fect of good Affections below *Innocence*. is Evil.

I. A F F E C T I O N S arising upon *apparent*
Causes, or present *Opinions*, tho false, if
they

Sect. 6. they be such as would arise in the *best* Temper, were these Opinions *true*, cannot argue any present *want of Goodness* in any Temper, of themselves: the *Opinions* indeed may often argue a *want of Goodness* at the *time* they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no *Cause of Malice*, or Desire of the *Misery* or *Non-existence* of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of Dislike, and Desire of *Misery* or *Non-existence*, as the Means of greater Good, or of lessening Evil.

2. No Object which is entirely *unknown*, or of which we have no *Idea*, can raise *Affection* in the best Temper; consequently *want of Affection* to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Case of those who never heard even the *Report of a DEITY*, if ever there were any such: Or who never heard of any *Fellow-Creatures*, if one may make a Supposition like to that made by *Cicero* *. And this is perhaps the Case, as to the *DEITY*, of any unfortunate Children, who may have some little *Use of Reason*, before they are instructed in any *Religion*.

IF there really were an *Innate Idea* of a *DEITY* so imprinted, that no Person could

* De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2. cap. 37. Ex Aristotele.

be without it ; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily to receive this *Idea*, as soon as we can be called moral Agents : then no *Ignorance* of a DEITY can be innocent ; all *Atheism* must be affected, or an Opinion formed, either thro' *evil Affection*, or *want of good Affection* below Innocence. But if the *Idea of a DEITY* be neither imprinted, nor offer itself even previously to any *Reflection*, nor be universally excited by *Tradition*, the bare *Want* of it, where there has been no *Tradition* or *Reflection*, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who make *Virtue* and *Vice* relative to a *Law*, may say, " Men are required " to reflect, and thence to know a DEITY." But they must allow *Promulgation* necessary, before Disobedience to a *Law* can be criminal. Now previously to *Reflection* it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know the *Legislator*, or to know the *Law requiring him to reflect*, therefore this *Law requiring him to reflect*, was not antecedently to his *Reflection* published to him.

THE Case of *human Laws*, the Ignorance of which does not excuse, is not parallel to this. No Person under any Civil Government can be supposed ignorant that there are *Laws* made for the whole State. But in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to *Reflection* may be ignorant of the DEITY, or that there are *Laws of Nature*.

Sect. 6. *ture.* If any Subject could thus be *unapprized*, that he lived under Civil Government, he should not be accounted *Compos Mentis*. The Supposition indeed in both Cases is perhaps wholly *imaginary*; at least as to Persons above Childhood. One can scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly unapprized of a *governing Mind*, and of a *Right* and *Wrong* in *Morals*. Whether this is to be ascribed to *innate Ideas*, to *universal Tradition*, or to some *necessary Determination* in our Nature, to imagine a designing *Cause* of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a *moral Sense*, let the curious inquire.

3. SUPPOSE an Idea formed in a *benevolent Mind*, of other *sensitive Natures*, *Desire* of their Existence and Happiness would arise.

4. A GOOD *Temper* would incline any one to wish, that other Natures were *benevolent*, or morally Good, since this is the chief *Happiness*.

5. A GOOD *Temper* would desire that the Administration of Nature were by a *benevolent* or good *Mind*.

6. ALL Desire of any Event or Circumstance inclines any Mind to search into the *Truth* of that Event or Circumstance,
by

by all the *Evidence* within its power to obtain. Sect. 6.

7. WHERE there is such *Desire*, and sufficiently obvious *Evidence* given in proportion to the *Sagacity* of the desiring Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of the Truth, if its Desire be strong.

Now from these Propositions we may deduce the following Corollaries.

1. SUPPOSING the Idea of a good DEITY once apprehended, or excited either by *Report*, or the slightest *Reflection*; if there be *objective Evidence* in Nature proportioned to the *Capacity* of the Inquirer, for the Existence of a good DEITY, *Atheism* directly argues want of good Affection below *Innocence*.

2. IF there be only the simple *Tradition* or *Presumption* of a governing Mind once raised; and if there be *Evidence* as before for his *Goodness*, to conclude the DEITY *evil* or *malicious*, must argue want of *good Affection* as before.

3. SUPPOSE the Idea of an *evil* DEITY once excited, and some Presumptions for his *Malice* from *Tradition*, or slight *Reflection* upon particular *Evils* in Nature; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry, would

Sect. 6. would argue *want of good Affection* ; to desire to *reject* this Opinion, or *confute* it by contrary Evidence, would argue *good Affection* : Suppose such contrary *Evidences* obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own *Interest* ; to continue in the *false Opinion* cannot be innocent.

How Ignorance in human Affairs evidences a bad Temper.

VI. IN like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually known to us.

4. To imagine Fellow-Creatures *morally Good*, either according to *Evidence* upon Inquiry, or even by a rash *Opinion*, evidences *good Affection*.

5. IMAGINING them Evil contrary to obvious *Evidence*, argues *want of good Affection* below Innocence.

6. RETAINING and *inculcating* an Opinion either of the *Causes of Love* in others, or of the *Causes of Aversion*, induces an *Habit* ; and makes the Temper prone to the *Affection* often raised. Opinion of *Goodness* in the DEITY and our Fellows, increases *good Affection*, and improves the *Temper* : Contrary Opinion of either, by raising frequent *Aversions*, weakens *good Affection*, and impairs the *Temper*.

THIS

THIS may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the *Impiety* of their Fellows, or representing them as *wicked* and *profane*, or *hateful* to the DEITY, and justly given over to eternal Misery: We may see also what a wise *Mark* it is to know the *true Church* by, that “ it pronounces Damnation on all others.” Which is one of the Characters of the *Romish Church*, by which it is often recommended as the safest for Christians to live in.

THE same *Propositions* may be applied to our Opinions concerning the *natural Tendencies* of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce *true Opinions*, and *false Opinions* often argue want of good Affection below Innocence. Thus, tho in *Assent* or *Dissent* of themselves, there can neither be *Virtue* nor *Vice*, yet they may be *Evidences* of either in the Agent, as well as his *external Motions*. 'Tis not possible indeed for Men to determine precisely in many cases the *Quantity of Evidence*, and its *proportion* to the Sagacity of the Observer, which will argue *Guilt* in him, who contrary to it, forms a *false Opinion*. But Men are no better judges of the *Degrees of Virtue*
Y and

Sect. 6. and Vice in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all *false Opinions* or *Errors* are innocent, more than *external Actions*: The Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human *Punishments* are only *Methods of Self-Defense*; in which the *Degrees of Guilt* are not the proper Measure, but the *Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick*.

How want
of Atten-
tion evi-
dences a
bad Tem-
per.

VII. It is next to be considered, how far *want of Attention* to the DEITY can argue *want of good Affections*, in any Agent, to whom he is known.

EVERY *good Temper* will have strong *Affections* to a good DEITY, and where there is *strong Affection* there will be *frequent Reflection* upon the Object beloved, *Desire of pleasing*, and *Caution of offence*. In like manner every Person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a *Country*, a *System*, a *Species*, will consider how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such Attention as he uses in his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them.

ATTENTION to a DEITY apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the *Moment of Beneficence* in any good

good Agent, various ways, such as by Sect. 6. Prospects of *Reward*, either present or future, by improving his Temper thro' Observation of so amiable a *Pattern*, or by raising Sentiments of *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, a part of whose Happiness the Agent may imagine depends upon the Happiness of the Universe. In like manner, the considering a *Species* or *System* may increase our good Offices, since their Interests are advanced by good Offices to *Individuals*.

BUT then from a like Reasoning to that in *Art. II.* 'tis plain, that in *equal Moments* of good produced by two Agents, the *Goodness of the Temper* is inverfly as the several *additional Helps*, or *Motives* to it. So that *more Virtue* is evidenced by any given *Moment* of Beneficence from good Affections only toward our *Fellows*, or particular Persons, than by the *same Moment* produced from the joint Considerations of the DEITY, or of a general *System* or *Species*.

BUT an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent not only *pernicious to his Fellows*, or to particular Persons, but *offensive to the DEITY*, and pernicious to a *System*, is much more vicious than when the Agent did not reflect upon the DEITY, or a *Community*.

Sect. 6.

Nothing in
this Scheme
supercedes
the Duty
of Love to
the DEITY,
and gene-
ral Bene-
volence.

VIII. WE must not hence imagine, that in order to produce greater Virtue in our selves, we should regard the DEITY no farther, than merely to *abstain from Offences*. Were it our sole Intention in beneficent Actions, only to obtain the *private Pleasure of Self-Approbation* for the Degree of our Virtue, this might seem the proper Means of having *great Virtue* with the least *Expence*. But if the real Intention, which constitutes an Action virtuous, be the *promoting publick Good*; then *voluntarily* to reject the Consideration of any Motive which would increase the *Moment* of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and stedfast in Virtue, must argue *want of good Affection*. In any given *Moment* of Beneficence, the unaffected *Want* of Regard to the DEITY, or to *private Interest*, does really argue greater Virtue. But the *retaining these Motives* with a View to increase the *Moment* of publick Good in our Actions, if they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And the *affected Neglect* of these Motives, that so we may acquit our selves virtuously with the *least Expence* to our selves, or with the least *Moment* of publick Good, must evidence *want of good Affections*, and base *Trick* and *Artifice* to impose upon Ob.

Observers, or our own Hearts. There-fore Sect. 6.

SINCE Gratitude to the DEITY, and even Consideration of *private Interest*, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and to strengthen good Affections, the voluntary *Retaining* them with this View evidences Virtue, and *affecting* to neglect them evidences Vice*. And yet,


IF the Moment produced by the Conjunction of these Motives, be not greater than that produced with unaffected Neglect of these Motives, from particular good

* THIS may sufficiently justify the *Writers of Morality* in their proving, that "Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness to the Agent." 'Tis also plain from universal Experience, that a *Regard to the Deity*, frequent *Reflection* on his Goodness, and consequent *Acts of Love*, are the strongest and most universally prevailing Means of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever *Institution* therefore does most effectually tend to raise Mens *Attention*, to recal their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to *instruct* them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than the busy Part of the World without assistance would probably apprehend, must be so wise and good, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even tho it had no other *Authority* than *human* to recommend it. Every one will understand that by this is meant a *publick Worship* on set Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce, and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of *Piety* and *Humanity*.

Sect. 6. Affection, there is less Virtue in the former than in the latter.

MEN may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing *Virtue* but “ what is intended chiefly to evidence *Affection* of one kind or other “ toward the DEITY.” Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this *virtuous Intention* is ; whether only to evidence *Submission*, or *Submission* and *Love*, or to obtain the divine *Benevolence*, and *private Happiness* to the Agent, or to give *Pleasure to the Deity*. But let them not assert, against universal *Experience*, that we approve no Actions which are not thus intended toward the DEITY. 'Tis plain, a *generous compassionate Heart*, which, at first view of the Distress of another, flies impatiently to his Relief, or spares no Expence to accomplish it, meets with strong *Approbation* from every Observer who has not perverted his *Sense of Life* by *School-Divinity*, or *Philosophy*. 'Tis to be suspected, that some *Vanity* must be at the Bottom of these Notions, which place Virtue in some *Nicety*, which *active Tempers*, have not leisure to apprehend, and only the *Recluse Student* can attain to.

To be led by a *weaker Motive*, where a *stronger* is alike present to the Mind, to love a Creature *more* than GOD, or to have *stronger Desires* of doing what is grateful to Creatures than to GOD, when we equally attend to both, would certainly argue some *Perversion of our Affections*; or to study the *particular Good* of one, more than that of a *System*, when we reflected on both: But as no *finite Mind* can retain at once a *Multiplicity of Objects*, so it cannot *always* retain any one Object. When a Person therefore not thinking at present of the DEITY, or of a *Community* or *System*, does a beneficent Action from *particular Love*, he evidences *Goodness of Temper*. The bare *Absence* of the Idea of a DEITY, or of *Affections* to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would be a Crime to *fall asleep*, or to think of any thing else: If the bare *Absence* of this Idea be no evil, the Presence of *kind Affections* to Fellow-Creatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to any Action, and at the *same time* Love to a Creature excited to the Omission of it, or to a contrary Action, we must be very criminal if the *former* do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil in which *pleasing the DEITY*,

Sect. 6. is not directly and chiefly intended. Nay,  that Temper must really be very *deficient* in Goodness, which needs to excite it to any good Office, to recal the Thoughts of a DEITY, or a *Community*, or a *System*. The frequent recalling these Thoughts, indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, and increases the *Moment* of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and with this *View* frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best *Helps* to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that Temper *entire* and *complete*, which has not the *strongest Affection* toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.

BEINGS of such Degrees of *Knowledge*, and such *Extent* of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of the DEITY, if their Temper be good. They must form *general Conceptions* of the whole, and see the *Order*, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness* in the *Administration of Nature* in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the DEITY, the *universal MIND*, is as *natural* a Perfection to such a Being as Man, as any *Accomplishment* to which we arrive by culti-

cultivating our natural Dispositions ; nor Sect. 6.
 is that Mind come to the *proper State* and
Vigor of its kind, where *Religion* is not
 the main *Exercise* and *Delight*.

IX. THERE is one very subtle Argu-^{Whether}
 ment on this Subject. Some alledge, "That^{the DEITY}
 " since the DEITY is really the Cause^{is the sole} of
 " all the Good in the Universe, even of^{proper Ob-}
 " all the *Virtue*, or good *Affection* in^{ject of}
 " Creatures, which are the seeming Causes^{Love.}
 " of *Love* toward them, it must argue
 " strange *Perversion* of Temper to love
 " those in whom there is no Cause of
 " *Love*, or who are (as they affect to
 " speak) *nothing*, or *Emptiness* of all
 " *Goodness*. The DEITY alone is amiable,
 " in whom there is infinite *Fulness* of
 " every amiable *Quality*. The DEITY,
 " say they, not without some Reason, is
 " the Cause of every pleasant *Sensation*,
 " which he immediately excites according
 " to a general *Law*, upon the Occasion
 " of *Motions* arising in our Bodies ; that
 " likewise he gave us that general *Incli-*
 " *nation*, which we modify into all our
 " different *Affections* ; GOD therefore,
 " say they, is alone *lovely*. Other Things
 " are not to be beloved, but only the
 " *Goodness* of God appearing in them ;
 " nay some do make the *loving* of them,
 " without considering GOD as display-
 " ing

Sect. 6. "ing his Goodness in them, to be infi-
 ~~~~~ "nitely evil."

IN answer to this it must be owned, that "GOD's being the Cause of all the Good in the Universe, will no doubt raise the highest Love to him in a good Temper, when it reflects upon it."

BUT 1<sup>st</sup>, had all Men this Apprehension that "there was no good in any Creature," they really would not love them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good ground, that there are *good Beings* distinct from God, tho produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or false, it evidences no evil.

2. As upon this Scheme GOD is the Cause of all *pleasant Sensation*, so is he the Cause of all Pain: He is, according to them, the Cause of that *Inclination* which we modify into *evil Affection*, as well as into *good*. If then we are to love GOD only, for what we call *good Affection* in Creatures, and not the Creatures themselves, we must also only love GOD upon observing *evil Affections* in Creatures, and have no *Aversion* to the *basest Temper*, since God gave the general INCLINATION alike in both Cases.

3. IF



3. IF we may suppose *real Beings* distinct from G O D, that *their Affections* are not G O D's Affections, if G O D is not the only *Lover* and *Hater*, if our *moral Sense* is determined to approve *kind Affections*, and our *Love* or *Benevolence* must arise toward what we *approve*; or if we find an *Instinct* to desire the Happiness of every sensitive Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures, and we must *approve* any *kind Affections* observed in others toward their Fellows. 'Tis true, we must approve the *highest Affections* toward the D E I T Y, and *condemn*, as a *Deficiency* of just Affections toward G O D any Degree which is not superior to our other Affections. But still, *Affections* towards Creatures, if they be *distinct Natures* from G O D, must be approved.

4. IF to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be necessary that it should have such sublime Speculations of G O D, as the τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active System* (if we may call *one Agent* in many *Passive Organs* an *active System*) then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute *Incapacity* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very *Instincts* and *natural Affections*. Does the *parental Affection* direct

Sect. 6. rect a Man to love the DEITY, or his *Children*? Is it the DIVINITY, to which our *Pity* or *Compassion* is directed? Is GOD the Object of *Humanity*? Is it a *Design* to support the DIVINITY, which we call *Generosity* or *Liberality*? Upon *Receipt of a Benefit*, does our Nature suggest only *Gratitude toward GOD*? Affections toward the DEITY may indeed often accompany Affections toward Creatures, and do so in a virtuous Temper: but these are distinct Affections. This Notion of making all virtuous Affections to be only directed toward GOD, is not suggested to Men by any thing in their *Nature*, but arises from the long subtle *Reasonings* of Men at leisure, and unemployed in the natural Affairs of Life.

5. IF there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward the DEITY, or in any thing else, since they are supposed to have none at all.

To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly *imperfect*, *inconstant*, and *partial*, in which *Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor*, *Admiration* and *Love of the supreme*

*preme original Beauty, Perfection and Sect. 6.*  
*Goodness, are not the strongest and most* ~~~~~  
*prevalent Affections; yet particular Ac-*  
*tions may be innocent, nay virtuous,*  
*where there is no actual Intention of*  
*pleasing the DEITY, influencing the*  
*Agent.*

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F I N I S.



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